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China has become one of the most important players in the landscape of higher 
education worldwide. The nation is home to the largest tertiary sector in the world, is the 
leading sender of international students, the third largest receiver of international 
students, and its government has aggressively pushed internationalization policies at its 
top universities. Policymakers and educational stakeholders in China have been 
implementing these strategies in order to chase world-class status for the nation’s 
universities. While the world-class university concept is ubiquitous across the globe, 
there has been no agreed upon definition for these elite institutions. In China, though, 
rankings have been adopted to make sense of this elite status. This dissertation explores 
the impact that university rankings have had on the Chinese higher education system.  
There has been considerable research on university rankings in China, but some gaps 
remain. Studies have explored Chinese universities’ ambitions for world-class status, but 
rankings are often marginalized within these studies. Studies on the impact of university 
rankings have mostly focused on their connection to Chinese international students, as 
league tables have key tools in decision-making for this population. Conversely, research 
that has focused on domestic students has emphasized geographic biases in university 
admissions and affluence advantages in the system, and usually has not engaged with 
global or local rankings. To fill these gaps, my study centers university rankings within 
the intersection of the local and global settings.    
I used two original datasets to engage this exploration of how university rankings 
impact Chinese universities. First, I interviewed 48 faculty and staff members from the 
elite spectrum of the Chinese higher education sector. Through the interviews, I 
investigated how the concept of the world-class university relates to university rankings 
in China. I confirmed that these league tables have provided a concrete, commensurate 
indicator for decision-makers to make sense of the global higher education hierarchy, 
with specific cut-offs to be considered world-class. Further, I examined the intersection 
between global ranking ambitions of Chinese universities coupled with stringent control 
from the central government through the striving model. I found that while international 
forces have had considerable impact on these institutions, local characteristics are highly 
filtered through a Chinese domestic lens, as governmental distinction has dominated the 
focus of elite universities. Concurrently, I surveyed over 900 students from across 
Chinese universities in an exploration of ranking familiarity and knowledge. Through 
multivariate analysis, I found that students from affluent classes, elite universities, and 
those with study abroad ambitions were all more familiar with rankings. However, in an 
actual test of knowledge, I discovered that elite university students actually did worse in 
regards to global ranking knowledge, while the associations to affluence and study 
abroad ambition disappeared. The findings in this research have centered rankings in a 
comparative perspective of higher education in China and the lessons learned can be 
adapted to future studies in other societies or sectors.  
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CHAPTER ONE: Introduction  
What would a world look like without university rankings? Students would not be able to 
simply whittle a list of prospective universities from the ones that made the cover of a magazine. 
University administrators would not have an individual metric to determine which institutional 
partners they should pursue for joint projects. Faculty members could not easily gauge a possible 
graduate candidate educated from an unfamiliar country to work under them. In each of these 
scenarios, these stakeholders would have to do a little bit more work in order to understand their 
predicament. In reality, these decisions by higher education stakeholders are difficult, and 
require nuance and insight, but university rankings are now commonly used in these kinds of 
decisions and for making sense of the complex higher education systems. Rankings provide a 
simple, yet powerful metric commonly used in higher education, even if these indicators are 
biased or flawed, and they promote a narrow standard for what a university looks like.  
Although the world is now familiar with university ranking, this phenomenon only emerged 
in 1983. US News & World Report introduced the first influential university ranking scheme in 
1983 with its "America's Best Colleges" issue. Since 1987, the magazine has continuously 
published the coveted league table issue every year, and it has only gained influence since its 
early inception (Ehrenberg, 2005). This ranking system measures graduation and retention 
numbers, university reputations via survey with sector stakeholders, university characteristics 
like class size or faculty salaries, selectivity as determined by SAT and ACT scores, financial 
resources, and alumni giving. Similar to other commensuration practices, the US News ranking 
reduces the complexity of higher education by focusing on certain aspects of universities, while 
marginalizing other domains, such as ignoring missions of diversity in favor of standardized test 
scores (Espeland & Sauder, 2007). While the scheme is tweaked each year, the categories have 
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mostly remained static. Despite critiques from educators that the metrics cannot properly gauge 
complex university systems, students, parents, alumni, and other stakeholders consume the 
findings upon release, forcing institutions to take heed (Dill, 2007). 
With the popularization of US News in the United States, other nations soon followed with 
their own domestic rankings. MacLean’s in Canada was founded in 1991 and has virtually 
identical metrics as its North American counterpart, aside from a few minor alterations (Salmi & 
Saroyan, 2007). The next year, in 1992, the Times newspaper published the first influential 
university ranking in the United Kingdom, which was also quite similarly constructed as US 
News (Bowden, 2000). Similar domestic rankings to the ones in the Anglo-West rapidly spread 
around the world. For instance, China was an early adaptor of national league tables for its 
universities. Since 1987, there have been 17 different domestic Chinese rankings that have 
gained some influence in the sector; though, many of these league tables have ceased operations 
and faded away in the intervening years since (Jin & Shen, 2012). While these domestic Chinese 
rankings have had similar metrics as their Western counterparts, such as reputational surveys and 
financial resources; they also put a heavier focus on measures of research output in highly cited 
journals or indices (Liu & Liu, 2005).  
 
Global University Rankings  
Aside from the spread of domestic league tables to other sectors, another aspect of the 
internationalization rankings arose in the early 2000s. In 2003, the Academic Ranking of World 
Universities (ARWU) was founded by the Institute of Higher Education at Shanghai Jiao Tong 
University, becoming the first global university rankings scheme in the world (Liu & Cheng, 
2005). The founding of this ranking changed the landscape of how higher education functioned 
	 3 
internationally, as it allowed for instant comparison of very different educational systems and 
institutions (Hazelkorn, 2015). The organization has used publicly available data to rank 
institutions across the world, releasing the results of the top 500 universities globally in an 
ordinal rank order. The metrics in ARWU have relied heavily on research capacities, such as 
faculty publications in Nature, Science, and journals listed in the Social Sciences Citation Index 
(SSCI). Unlike its domestic counterparts, ARWU does not factor in any peer survey scores for 
the metric; but like its domestic counterparts, there are also no measures of academic freedom 
accounted for in the ranking.  
Quickly following ARWU, in 2004, British-based Times Higher Education (THE) and QS 
released a joint global university ranking scheme that became highly cited in the sector (Rust & 
Kim, 2015). Different from ARWU, the British firms’ ranking included institutional reputation 
as a key indicator, compiled through a massive survey of academics and business people around 
the world. These reputational surveys asked actors in the higher education sector to rate various 
institutions that they were familiar, which the agencies heavily weighed in their metric. In 2009, 
the two organizations ended the cooperation, but each continued producing rankings 
independently, and both still hold considerable influence in the sector (Marginson, 2014). 
Currently, both the THE and QS ranking schemes still use the reputational surveys issued to 
sector stakeholders to rate peer institutions in their varying schemes. These schemes also 
consider research capacity, financial resources, and other university characteristics, such as 
internationalization. In a trend common across the other popular rankings, neither THE nor QS 
accounts for any measures of academic freedom or social missions.   
The inundation of global university rankings has not been without criticisms. These league 
tables have been critiqued for forcing universities around the world to comport to standards 
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established by Western nations (Shahjahan et al., 2017). Anglo-Western universities have 
dominated global university rankings, as the top positions in these league tables have mostly 
been filled with American or British intuitions. The metrics that are used in the rankings, such as 
research output and reputation, favor traditional, elite research universities in the US and Britain. 
The journals that are counted in the global ranking metrics are mostly English-language 
publications housed in the US or Commonwealth nations (Chou, 2014). Even strong, traditional 
academic systems like in Germany, France, and Japan have been marginalized in the rankings 
because of the metric bias for research conducted in English (Shin & Kehm, 2013).    
Another critique of global university rankings stems from their close association to world-
class university status (Cremonini et al., 2014). These kinds of elite global institutions are much 
sought after by almost every society, yet there is no universally agreed-upon definition of this 
concept (Ramirez & Meyer, 2013). Rankings have provided some sense making to understand 
this world-class status, and even the World Bank suggests policymakers use league tables in their 
higher education benchmarking (Salmi, 2009). Fig. 1.1 shows how research on university 
rankings and the concept of world-class universities have risen together in academic literature in 
recent decades.1 With the establishment of ARWU and the proliferation of these types of 
rankings, there has been a steady rise of research pertaining to the world-class concept. Ordorika 
and Lloyd (2014) argued that the Western-style, research-intensive university often considered 
the model for world-class status and favored by the rankings, is a barrier for developing nations 
because these societies have other priorities, such as expanding access or equity.   
 
																																								 																				
1 I utilized the Web of Science Core Collection database containing indices of top journals—including Social 
Sciences Citation Index (SSCI) and Arts & Humanities Citation Index (A&HCI)—to explore publications with 
specific key terms from 2000 to 2016: “university rankings,” “world-class universities,” and related variations. 
Ramirez and Tiplic (2013) used similar methods in the exploration of world-class universities and higher education 
development. 
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Fig. 1.1: Count of Publications on University Rankings and World-Class Universities, 2000-2016 
 
Source: Web of Science  
 
As illustrated in Fig. 1, the past three decades saw a growing interest in university rankings, 
both domestic and global. Scholars writing about the American higher education, for example, 
have documented the pervasive impact that rankings have had on the sector. Bowman and 
Bastedo (2009) discovered that rankings have a strong impact on student decisions; called the 
front-page effect, if a university makes it in the top-25 of US News publication, the following 
year it will see a spike in the quality and number of student applicants. Because students are so 
attuned to rankings, universities are forced to pay attention to their position. Espeland and Sauder 
(2007) found that chasing rankings has hindered higher educational diversity efforts, as US News 
does not account for these kinds of social missions. If a university wants to move up in league 
table positioning, it must follow the narrowly defined metrics established by the ranking 
publication. Though, scholars have also contended that not every university reacts to rankings in 
the same manner. O’Meara (2007) dubbed universities that most focus on rankings as “strivers,” 
and reported the extreme pressures placed on their faculties from rank-related initiatives; though, 
this work on strivers has been focused on domestic rankings.  
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Research and Gaps in Understanding Rankings  
There has also been considerable research conducted on global university rankings, including 
on their emergence and reactions to them by various stakeholders. ARWU, the first prominent 
global ranking, was established with the explicit goal to “assess the gap between Chinese 
universities and world-class universities” (Liu & Cheng, 2005, p. 127). The researchers at the 
Chinese university were attempting to find a model to measure rapid changes in the Chinese 
higher education system by comparing the nation’s institutions to those abroad. The scholars 
were unaware of the influence that this first ranking would have on other sectors around the 
world. The UK-based rankings were quickly launched after ARWU in part because British 
universities did not get “the recognition they deserve[d]” in the China-based ranking (Rust & 
Kim, 2015, p. 167). Others schemes have emerged in recent years, and some have even carried 
specific critiques against the dominant ranking agencies, such as U-Multirank’s ambitious goal 
of operating without ordinal ranks in its scheme (Marginson, 2014a). Nonetheless, the most 
popular schemes (ARWU, THE, and QS) have had a critical impact on higher education around 
the world.  
The impact of these global league tables was quickly felt across the world. Salmi and 
Saroyan (2007) reported that policymakers and university leaders in developing nations were 
especially intent on moving their universities up in these league tables because of perceptions in 
catching up with the West. Similar to Bowman and Bastedo’s top-25 in domestic rankings, 
Hazelkorn (2015) witnessed through in-depth interviews with university stakeholders from 
across the world that institutions viewed the top-100 as a crucial maker of global elite status. In 
the early years of global university rankings, scholars noted that Western nations, especially the 
United States, held clear advantages, dominating these top ranks. However, more recently, other 
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nations, especially China, have been rapidly rising in the rankings (Altbach, 2016). The ordinal 
positioning and competition are crucial for universities with any global ambitions because 
research has shown international students are especially drawn to these metrics (Liu et al., 2013). 
While there is considerable research already considering how rankings have impacted 
universities, gaps still remain in the understanding of their impacts. First, the most highly cited 
ranking literature comes from Western countries, mostly focusing on domestic league tables 
(such as Ehrenberg, 2005; Sauder & Espeland, 2009; Bastedo & Bowman, 2009). In the US 
especially, global rankings are marginalized in the higher education sector because of the 
dominance of US News. Research on the American sector has focused on stakeholders dealing 
with these domestic forces (O’Meara, 2007). Furthermore, in other highly cited works looking 
that consider global rankings, such as Hazelkorn (2015) and Salmi and Saroyan (2007), the 
effects of rankings are referred to in general terms only, rather than delineating the specific 
impact of global rankings versus the specific impact from the domestic versions. Therefore very 
little is known about the role of rankings in non-western contexts that might simultaneously 
emphasize both domestic and global rankings. A key example comes from China, a society in 
which its higher education actors face strict national hierarchies while also chasing global 
ranking ambitions. Living in this kind of ranking condition has been marginalized in the 
understanding of these pressures.  
There are specific gaps in research pertaining to university rankings in China, too. Studies on 
Chinese higher education have often focused on internationalization efforts, publishing issues, 
and the concept of world-class universities, with rankings as a secondary concern or even simply 
in the research (see Rhoads et al., 2014; Tian et al., 2016; Kim et al., 2017). Rankings have been 
key factors in the high profile internationalization efforts and provide sense making in the 
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complex global system, meaning that there should be a greater awareness of how stakeholders 
work under ranking pressures in China. Likewise, the literature on university stakeholders in 
regards to domestic rankings has also been sparse, and none have considered how these pressures 
intersect with global rankings. Similarly, much of the research on Chinese student reaction to 
rankings has only focused on the population’s usage of global league tables in decisions to attend 
universities abroad. Almost none of the domestic-focused research on students in China has 
contemplated rankings, either the global or local versions. I consider both in regards to the 
domestic sector in China.  
In this dissertation, I attempt to address these gaps in the literature by highlighting the 
intersections between the global and the local in Chinese higher education. Using literature on 
rankings, I have organized a framework for how universities have reacted to university league 
tables. Much of the foundational studies used to organize the framework have been focused on 
Western systems and there could be key differences in the unique Chinese setting. Chinese 
universities have operated in a society considerably different than in the West, as the former has 
had to balance a dominant central government while also chasing international ambitions. The 
focus on both the global and local from the Chinese higher education sector should impact how 
these universities have reacted to ranking forces. Therefore, the overall research question for this 
dissertation is: How have university rankings impacted Chinese universities?  
Because this is a large and expansive topic, I have honed the study’s focus to two sets of 
actors within the sector. First, I have explored the reactions of faculty and staff at Chinese 
universities. Specifically, I asked two sub-questions: 1) How have Chinese universities balanced 
between global striving ambitions and a dominant central government? 2) To what extent have 
university rankings been used by Chinese university stakeholders as credentials in navigating the 
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quest for world-class universities? Next, I also explored students within this setting. For these 
actors, I asked: What factors determine students knowing or not knowing their approximate 
university rank? Through these questions, I have been able to understand how university 
rankings have impacted Chinese institutions from the actors that live, operate, or work from 
within them.  
 
China and Rankings  
The case of China is noteworthy and beneficial for the study of global university rankings for 
six specific reasons. First, unlike many other educational trends, the global ranking phenomenon 
has its origins in a non-Western nation, as a Chinese university initiated the practice of global 
university ranking with the founding of ARWU in 2003. It is important to understand the society 
that produced such a global phenomenon that has impacted universities across the world. Next, 
scholars have argued that Chinese society has had reverence for social hierarchies through its 
Confucian tradition (Walton, 1989). These social cues and expectations have been guiding 
principals in China for thousands of years, permeating all classes and groups of people even 
today. The reverence for rankings in Chinese culture has permeated across to higher education 
sectors globally in the form of the aforementioned ranking. Third, the structure of the state in 
China has a history of administrative rankings, rooted in indicators borrowed from Soviet 
structures following the takeover of the nation by the Chinese Communist Party in 1949 (Lü, 
2000). In the Soviet system borrowed in the early foundation of the PRC, these planned policies 
led to strict uses of measures to ascertain all aspects of industrial capacities. For education in the 
centrally planned economy, the number of students enrolled in specialized universities and 
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majors was tied to the government’s industrial development planning because the Party needed 
to understand how many workers would fill certain roles and positions (Hayhoe, 1996).  
 The fourth point stems from the dramatic changes from the late 1970s, as the Chinese 
government began to incrementally move from away from tight controls that defined the post-
1940 era with the adoption of reforms rooted in marketization and privatization (Mok & Lo, 
2007; Hayhoe et al., 2012). These approaches eroded the Soviet state to some extent, but the 
governmental structure has remained highly centralized. Even today, many sectors are still 
dominated by state-owned enterprises and the government plays a central role in most policies. 
In accordance, the fifth reason centers on public institutions dominating the Chinese higher 
education sector, a dramatic difference from the American environment. The best universities in 
China, all of which are public, have been boosted by governmental elite-making policies, namely 
through the Project 985 and Project 211 (Mok & Chan, 2007). Moreover, the allocation of public 
money to higher education institutions is informed by domestic ranking conducted by the 
Ministry of Education. Finally, in recent years, China has become the most important actor in the 
international higher education space. The nation by far accounts for the most international 
students sent to universities abroad, with over 700,000 according to UNESCO. Conversely, 
China has now become the third large recipient of international students, only behind the US and 
UK, according to the Institute of International Education.  
Through these combinations of characteristics in the Chinese setting, studying rankings in 
China offer unique insight into a highly centralized system that has a perversion to rankings, and 
that is consistently seeking status globally. Researchers cannot just assume that in this differing 
environment, universities and their stakeholders will operate in the exact same manner as 
Western peers, the societies that currently underpin many foundational studies on rankings. Just 
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as research on the neoliberal movements in the US showed that audit culture helped to give rise 
and proliferation of domestic rankings, China’s combination of historical culture, governmental 
structures, and future ambitions has helped to give rise and proliferation of global rankings. 
Understanding how rankings operate in this kind of environment is important to all future 
research on the topic.  
 
Dissertation Overview  
In order to address the research questions that guide this dissertation, I conducted in-depth 
field research on the Chinese higher education sector during the spring and summer of 2018. I 
interviewed 48 academics and administrators from various Chinese universities regarding their 
experiences with university rankings. Additionally, I surveyed over 1,000 university students 
from across China on their knowledge and familiarity with university rankings. Through these 
data, I have answered the overarching research question, along with the specific sub-questions as 
outlined by each empirical chapter.           
In Chapter 2, I have explored the larger literature related to university rankings, and the logic 
underpinning the pervasive use of these indicators by decision makers across the world.  
Furthermore, I have provided background information on Chinese society and its education 
system, showing how it fits into the larger global trends in ranking studies. Using this literature, I 
have illustrated a framework for how universities and their stakeholders are affected by 
university rankings, including students, academics, and administrators.  
Chapter 3 has provided the data and methodological approaches used in the analytical 
chapters. I have first offered the sample breakdowns for both the qualitative and quantitative 
datasets, followed by cleaning and coding, respectively. For the qualitative research, I 
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interviewed 48 stakeholders from Chinese universities across China on their experiences with 
rankings and other aspects of higher education. The interview sample cuts across various 
academic fields and administrative positions, but it is centered on the elite end of the Chinese 
higher education sector. For the quantitative data, I surveyed over 1,000 Chinese university 
students for this project. The survey gathered information on student familiarity with rankings, 
factors in their university selection, and basic demographic characteristics. The limitations that 
have arisen from the nature of this type of study will also be addressed.  
In Chapter 4, the first empirical chapter, I asked to what extent have university rankings been 
used by Chinese university stakeholders as credentials in navigating the quest for world-class 
universities? Through interviews with academics and administrators, I explored the intersection 
of the global and local in an attempt to understand how world-class universities in China differ 
from their Western counterparts. Because there is no agreed-upon definition of the world-class 
university, I argued that rankings have filled the vacuum and have provided stakeholders with a 
concrete measure. I argue that league tables, in this complex environment, have provided a 
commensurate proxy for the world-class conception. Indeed, my findings showed that rankings 
have provided an outlet for Chinese institutions to continue gaining global recognition through a 
specific metric and that they are regularly used as decision-making tools by administrators.   
In Chapter 5, I ascribed O’Meara’s striving model to the elite Chinese university sector, 
while adding an emphasis on international rankings. I particularly asked how have these actors in 
Chinese universities balanced global striving ambitions and a dominant central government. 
Through analysis of my faculty and staff interviews, I identified how global rankings have 
pushed isomorphism on the higher education sector, altering research goals, but I also showed 
that local characteristics have mitigated some of these influences, namely through the stunting of 
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the C9 League, the elite coalition of universities sometimes compared to the Ivy League. Indeed, 
in this competitive environment, distinction and rankings from the central government have 
promoted the most intense striving behaviors from universities in China.   
Chapter 6, the final empirical chapter, turned the focus to students. In this chapter, I explored 
which factors determined students’ engagement with university ranking and what determined if 
students know or not know their approximate university rank? Specifically, I had students to 
gauge their own familiarity with rankings and their importance to the college-going decision. 
Furthermore, I tested the participants’ knowledge by asking them to estimate their own 
universities’ global and local ranking. From the results of my multivariate analysis, it appears 
that rankings do indeed have significant influences on this student population, but the impact is 
more apparent on the students in elite institutions. Students from elite universities better know 
their domestic ranking, but scored much worse when gauging their global ranking, while the 
opposite is true for local or regional university students.   
Finally, in the concluding chapter, I recapped the larger research question in this dissertation. 
I noted how the findings from the empirical chapters have informed this inquiry by highlighting 
the intersections of local and global rank forces. I also considered the implications that this 
comparative study brings to research on league tables in the US and other Western nations, as 
much of the literature is rooted in these societies, and I provide a discussion on the differences 
and similarities. Furthermore, this era of internationalization of higher education is likely to see 
China continue and increase its dominance of the sector. Conceptions by other nations for 
Chinese universities’ usage of rankings are likely to have reverberating effects throughout the 
world, redefining perceived best practices in the sector. Given these conclusions and findings, I 
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posited new directions that can be taken with the study of university rankings, especially in 
regards to media, young Chinese academics, and other comparative studies of this nature. 
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CHAPTER TWO: Theorizing University Rankings in Global and Local Contexts 
 
Introduction  
University rankings changed the landscape of higher education first in 1983 with the 
establishment of US News & World Report and then again in 2003 with the founding of 
Academic Ranking of World Universities (ARWU), the first prominent global university 
ranking. Over the past decade and a half, the influences from these league tables have 
proliferated to higher education sectors across the world. Popular league tables have 
stimulated standardization across institutions worldwide, even for those systems with 
very little in common (Altbach, 2015a). University leaders and educators have heavily 
criticized the ranking phenomenon because the narrow metrics used have forced 
institutions to align with a standard defined by the ranking agencies (Espeland & Sauder, 
2007). Despite critique, though, universities have had to pay attention to league table 
position because students, parents, and even policymakers have all utilized the rankings 
in decision-making processes (Ehrenberg, 1999; Salmi & Saroyan, 2007; Hazelkorn, 
2015). 
There are several noteworthy reasons to study the case of China in regards to 
university rankings. First, the global university ranking phenomenon originated in China, 
with the establishment of the ARWU by Shanghai Jiao Tong University. Historically, 
hierarchical structure and organization have been an important aspect of Chinese 
sociopolitical culture because of it Confucian roots (Walton, 1989). Further, with the 
establishment of the People’s Republic of China by the CCP, the nation reorganized 
Soviet model of bureaucratization and central planning that lionized practical science.  
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After the Reforms and Opening in the late 1970s, the nation again went through a 
transformation as it moved to a market economic system characterized by incremental 
privatization efforts (Lü, 2000). In this era, students were sent across the world to learn 
from Western nations, and expected to return to China with new ideals to modernize the 
nations. Despite these privatization efforts, though, the nation is still heavily centralized 
and government-led, especially in comparison to the United States (Mok & Chan, 2007). 
Finally, in recent years, the nation has become the most influential player for higher 
education globally, leading initiatives in exchanges, dual degrees, and student exchanges.  
Considering these unique characteristics for the case of China, the experiences with 
university rankings in this nation is crucial to the understanding the impacts of university 
rankings in a context dramatically differing from the West. Thus, the overarching 
research question that guides this project is: How have university rankings impacted 
Chinese universities? To answer this larger research question, I have focused my inquiry 
into three sub-questions and onto specific actors, university faculty, staff, and university 
students. Through the faculty and staff, I first asked, how have Chinese universities 
balanced between global striving ambitions and a dominant central government? 
Likewise, I next examined the question of to what extent have university rankings been 
used by Chinese university stakeholders as credentials in navigating the quest for world-
class universities? Finally, through a dataset of Chinese students, I explored what factors 
determine students knowing or not knowing their approximate university rank? 
Before answering these research questions, I first needed to understand the literature 
on how university rankings have operated throughout the world, which I have used to 
organize a framework for my inquiry. In this chapter, I placed keen focus on literature 
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and studies on university rankings in the United States, which has two more decades of 
experience with domestically compared to global university ranking. I also explored the 
literature related to global university rankings from around the world, which is commonly 
tied to the world-class university concept. While ranking literature is heavily rooted in the 
Western setting, especially the US, there are a few, limited studies in regards to China, 
which have been considered here, too. Moreover, I also provided the background for the 
case of China and its education system, tying educational trends in the nation to that on 
the international stage. Finally, I concluded this chapter with a framework for how 
university rankings have impacted universities and their actors.  
 
University Rankings and Their Impacts 
The quantification of any complex idea, such as the quality of entire national 
education system, into a simplified measurement is known as commensuration (Espeland 
& Stevens, 1998). The process of commensuration occurs when various sets of 
information are compartmentalized, converged, or organized into simplified units. The 
commensuration concept is part of a larger movement in so-called policy by numbers, in 
which indicators, targets, and league tables are used by various decision makers to form, 
create, or react to policy (Cooley & Snyder, 2015; Kelley et al., 2015). In the West, this 
movement has its roots in neoliberal ideals related to the regimes of Ronald Reagan in the 
US and Margaret Thatcher in the UK. Harvey (2007) defined neoliberalism as “a theory 
of political economic practices proposing that human well-being can best be advanced by 
the maximization of entrepreneurial freedoms within an institutional framework 
characterized by private property rights, individual liberty, unencumbered markets, and 
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free trade” (p. 22). This dominant discourse has inundated governments and 
policymakers across the world, and has been especially attractive in post-Soviet societies 
because of their past lionization of practical sciences through central planning (Steiner-
Khamsi & Stolpe, 2006; Kojevnikov, 2008). The phenomenon promoted audits through 
performance indicators and accountably measures to leaders and decision makers in 
societies around the world. In this setting, commensurate indicators have become 
glorified as scientific objectivity and considered to be subjective information for 
policymakers, especially those in the bureaucracy (see Porter, 1996; Steiner-Khamsi, 
2003; Kelley et al., 2015; Shore et al., 2015). 
University rankings have become a central commensurate measure in higher 
education, and educational researchers have long been studying their impact since the 
phenomenon’s rise in the 1980s (Johnes et al., 1987; Woodhouse & Goldstein, 1988; 
Welch, 1998). Bowden (2000) called university rankings the “fantasy higher education,” 
a riff on British football league tables (p. 41). In the US there has been a long history of 
measuring and ranking universities, but the organization that is often cited as being the 
most influential in terms of competition and clout is US News and World Report (US 
News), with its annual ranking of American intuitions, first started in 1983 (Monks & 
Ehrenberg, 1999; Rust & Kim, 2015). This small magazine forever altered the higher 
education landscape in the United States and across the world. Ehrenberg (2005) claimed 
that US News creates a cycle of addiction for universities and students by releasing the 
ranking each year. The organization’s ordinal rank of every institution, as opposed to just 
providing different tiers, overinflates the differences between rank positions. Even as the 
key components have mostly remained stable (academic reputation, students selectivity, 
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faculty resources, graduation and retention rates, financial resources, alumni giving, and 
graduation rates), the metrics are slightly tweaked every year, causing shifts that are out 
of universities’ control. Volkwein and Gruing (2005) reasoned that the subtle changes 
purposely incite intrigue and buzz within the sector every year, boosting sales and 
relevance for the publication.  
Scholars have identified pressures to conform to a standard structure or organization, 
known as isomorphism, resulting from tactics in chasing these metrics (see DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1989; Sauder & Lancaster, 2006; Espeland & Sauder, 2007). Because the league 
table metrics are narrowly defined, little variation can happen in the sector. Programs 
with missions that do not align with the elite indicators lose out on rank position, and are 
pressured to alter policy from leaders, alumni, or policymakers; in some cases, Espeland 
and Sauder (2007) found that chasing rankings has hindered diversity efforts, as US News 
does not account for these kinds of social missions. In general, the competition creates 
incentives to game the system, such as admitting low scoring students in semesters that 
are not counted in the metric, encouraging students with no chance to be admitted to 
apply, and even falsifying information (Ehrenberg, 2005; Volkwein & Gruing, 2005; 
Bush & Peterson, 2012). 
In one of the most cited studies related to university rankings, using fixed effects 
regression on college admissions data, Bowman and Bastedo (2009) discovered the 
“front-page” effect from the US News ranking publication. Moving on or off the front 
page of the magazine’s ranking issue, meaning ranked in the top-25, had effects on class 
SAT scores, application numbers, and admitted rates. However, the impact of rankings 
did vary by tier of the institution. The study suggested that students use rankings as a tool 
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to create a perspective list, and that those very high achieving students mostly make their 
lists from the top-25 of US News. Recognizing these effects, intuitions must jockey for 
position, breeding more competition in an already competitive environment. Because 
students have been using rankings in their college selection processes, university 
administrators and policymakers are forced pay attention. Bastedo and Bowman (2009) 
used structural equation modeling to show that peer assessment ratings in US News were 
affected by the previous year’s rankings. These results show that the reputation from 
previous years follows institutions, certifying a self-fulfilling cycle that is called the “halo 
effect” (Marginson, 2014a). These consequences lead universities to heavily focus on 
areas that they think will boost rank scores.  
 
The Striving Model 
Despite complaints and drawbacks, universities are still highly attuned to rankings as 
status-seeking symbols. Bok (2003) said, “Although every college president can recite 
the many weaknesses of these ratings, they do provide a highly visible index of success, 
and competition is always quickened by such measures, especially among institutions like 
universities whose work is too intangible to permit more reliable means of evaluation” (p. 
14). Some universities, though, are more attuned to the ranking game than others. In a 
highly cited market research report from RAND, Brewer et al. (2002) identified three 
types of universities that react to rankings in different ways (p. 35):  
(1) prestigious: those already atop the hierarchy;  
(2) prestige-seeking: those investing in status;  
(3) reputation-based: other types of institutions.  
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Building from Brewer et al.’s work, O’Meara (2007) called universities that are more 
attuned to rankings “strivers.” She defined this characteristic as “the pursuit of prestige 
within the academic hierarchy. Striving behavior might include campuses amending their 
admissions process, reward structures, and resource allocation decisions” (O’Meara, 
2007. p. 122). She contended that the institutions that are most likely to engage in striving 
behaviors are comprehensive universities expanding their research capacity, non-elite 
liberal arts institutions, and research universities ranked just under their top-ranked peers 
(though, she does not offer any specific rank cut-off criteria). Striving universities spend 
massive amounts of resources, time, and initiatives chasing league table position. For 
instance, Morphew and Baker (2004) found that these universities dramatically expand 
administrative costs in order to move into the top of the Carnegie Foundation 
classification.  
The pressures resulting from university striving behaviors are often captured through 
the experiences of institutional stakeholders, such as academics, administrators, and 
university leaders. O’Meara et al. (2011) provided a framework for understanding these 
types of experiences in studies of faculty members. The model was specifically 
constructed for inquiries into “faculty agency,” but it can also be used to explore larger 
outcomes or other phenomena in higher education. The researchers define faculty agency 
as a “form of resistance to or in line with organizational, field, or social norms” in a 
“specific domain… taking strategic or intentional actions or perspectives towards goals 
that matter to oneself” (as cited in Campbell & O’Meara, 2013, p. 52). In the model, as 
illustrated on Table 2.1, O’Meara et al. (2011) posited that these perspectives can be 
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shaped and influenced on three levels: individual, organizational, or field/ societal. 
Pressures onto each level can clearly be connected to rankings, such as the increased 
burden to publish for many individual academics in striving universities. Building upon 
the framework, Campbell and O’Meara (2013) added several departmental contexts: 
professional development resources, work-life climate, perceptions of the tenure process, 
transparency, and person-department fit.  
 
Table 2.1: Faculty Perspective Framework   
Influences  Descriptions  Outcomes Example Ranking 
Connections 
Individual Psychological traits, 
internal resource, social 
capital, identity  
Satisfaction, productivity, 
retention, advancements, 
professional growth  
Pressures to publish, 
present at elite 
conferences 








Field/ societal Social stratification, norms 
and expectations  
Changes to field, societal 
changes  
Standardized model of 
a university 
Source: Adapted from O’Meara et al. (2011).  
 
Other studies have taken similar approaches by utilizing university stakeholder 
interviews in research on higher educational striving environments. Lamont (2009) 
described how she used faculty interviews in understanding aspects of evaluation, 
publishing, or peer review, saying that it was akin to opening the “black box” of an 
opaque sector (p. 12). Likewise, O’Meara and Bloomgarden (2011) agreed that 
interviewing a targeted group of academics provides the “ideal vehicle to examine faculty 
perceptions of their work environment” (p. 46). They found that the leaders at the liberal 
arts university in their study had placed uncomfortable pressures on the faculty that 
increased dissatisfaction across the university body. These behaviors are not relegated to 
private liberal arts colleges; Gonzales (2014) explored similar consternations from 
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professors at a working-class American university that had begun to chase elite status. 
Likewise, these are not just American issues; Philpott et al. (2011) tracked how faculty 
struggled in European universities that were pursuing more entrepreneurial business 
tactics in recent year. While these studies do focus on domestic rankings in the West, I 
will later discuss this type of research in a global context, as well as for the case of China. 
 
Global Rankings and World-Class Universities 
After Shanghai Jiao Tong University founded the first influential global ranking in 
2003, schemes in Britain soon followed. Like their counterparts that only measure 
domestic hierarchies, these international league tables also promote narrow parameters 
for higher education institutions. Unlike with domestic rankings, though, global rankings 
force comparison and benchmarking across the world, in societies and systems that often 
come from completely different contexts. Yudkevich et al. (2015) even referred to 
ranking competition as the “Olympic Games” of higher education, as nations jockey for a 
few coveted positions (p. 412). Some of the findings from domestic rankings have even 
been carried over to global university rankings, with some degrees of variation.  
Similar to American setting top-25 effects (Bowman & Bastedo, 2009), scholars have 
contended that there is a similar perception with the top-100 in the global rankings 
(Hazelkorn, 2015; Gong & Huybers, 2015). Hazelkorn (2015) contended that every 
nation desires at least one university to reach this elite point, which has beget funding 
initiatives into the top end of domestic hierarchies worldwide. Governments have placed 
explicit standards for international scholarships or other partnerships given specific 
global rank criteria, too. For instance, Qatar’s Institutional Standards Office formerly had 
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a list of 250 approved universities for exchanges that was based on the AWRU and THE 
rankings (Salmi & Saroyan, 2007). Similarly, Mongolia, Brazil, Chile, and Ecuador have 
used the rankings as bureaucratic determinants in scholarship funding (Salmi & Saroyan, 
2007; Ordorika & Lloyd, 2014). Global rankings have provided important and direct 
decision-making tools for bureaucrats and administrators across the world.  
Hazelkorn (2015) contended that powerful university positions are even decided by 
how well (or bad) a university fares in league table standings, such as the selection of 
rectors, presidents, or other leadership posts. Highlighting the pressures that university 
leaders and policymakers feel from global university rankings, Salmi (2009) described 
how Malaysia’s top two universities fell 100 spots in the 2005 THE rankings. The drops 
created a national outcry and the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Malaya was 
pressured to resign. Malaysia’s dramatic drop actually resulted from the ranking agency 
rejiggering its metric that year, and not because of any problem with the universities, but 
this nuance was lost in the scandal. In another case, in 2004, a group of New Zealand 
universities actually sued their own government in order to stop the release of a ranking 
that placed local institutions below peers in Australia and the UK (Salmi & Saroyan, 
2007).  
Policymakers and university leaders have feared that low rankings will inhibit 
recruitment or other important global connections. In 2011, the European Commission 
issued a warning to its members that too few of their institutions were recognized in 
global ranking schemes, and suggested a boost through national intervention and a more 
competitive model (Erkkilä, 2014). From a survey of higher education leaders from 
across the world, Hazelkorn (2008) reported that over 70% of the respondents understood 
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that they needed to be in the top 25% of the international rankings. Most of these 
presidents or other leaders were worried about possible bad press for their institution if 
they did not achieve a desired position. This sample of leaders was especially concerned 
with the impact that rankings and the coverage would have on student decisions. 
Media, too, has played a significant role in how global university rankings are 
perceived locally. In a study of ranking reactions in Italy, Blasi et al. (2007) noticed that 
media considerably simplifies ranking results, mostly focusing on only the very top 
positions. Nuances to biased metric constructions are forgotten with scandalization, and, 
instead, policy prescriptions to issues in the systems are presented as solutions to the poor 
results. In another example from Europe, France, with its strong academic history, has 
not fared well in the English-language dominated global ranking sphere. Salmi and 
Saroyan (2007) cited that, in 2004, Le Monde published an article lambasting the 
perceived bleak showing of the best French universities, entitled “The Great Misery of 
French Universities.” The problems were mostly pegged on budgetary cuts or admission 
policies inherent to the French system, while biased methodology was largely ignored. 
National anxieties over being left behind in global league tables, often fueled by pushes 
from the elites, has led to the development of higher education excellence initiatives in 
nations across the world, such as in Poland, Ukraine, Czech Republic, Germany, Japan, 
Russia, and Korea (Salmi & Saroyan, 2007; Antonowicz et al., 2017; Hazelkorn, 2015). 
Through these elite-making policies, governments have funneled massive funding 
injections to a select few universities, leading to elite university groupings in many 
societies, sometimes called the “Ivy League of X”—even for those with traditionally 
equitable higher education systems.    
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Unsurprisingly, there has been some pushback around the world to this global rank 
phenomenon. Before the true global ranking craze began, Asiaweek attempted to establish 
an Asian regional league table, but failed after 35 leading universities refused to 
participate (Salmi & Saroyan, 2007). Some French observers have decried the rankings as 
an “Anglo-Saxon” system (Salmi & Saroyan, 2007, p. 26). Relatedly, in a critical study 
of rankings in Latin America, Ordorika and Lloyd (2014) reported that rankings have 
been heavily criticized in the region as “neoliberal higher education policies” from the 
US (p. 387). Mexico has even witnessed student-led protests against the influence of 
rankings. Nonetheless, university leaders and policymakers in all of these societies have 
still had to grapple with the global pressures looming over their sectors. As far as I can 
tell, there has been no research on any society that has successfully eschewed the global 
university ranking game; though, it is possible that there are some exceptions. 
As illustrated in the previous chapter, university rankings and the concept of the 
world-class university are conjoined. With the development and maturation of a 
competitive environment dominated by rankings and comparison, the notion of a world-
class university has become globally prevalent, often characterized as large and 
comprehensive research universities (Altbach & Knight, 2007). Altbach (2013a) argued 
that these institutions are seen as pinnacles of the modern state that must have a properly 
educated citizenry. However, the exact definition of world-class remains elusive. Deem et 
al. (2008) claimed that the vagueness in definition allows for global malleability with a 
common language for the sector. This has led to different tactics around the world in the 
race for global universities: governments have poured massive investments into the top 
levels of the sectors (Altbach, 2015b); some nations have ramped up efforts to recruit 
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international students and foreign faculty; all-English language programs have even 
opened in nations where English is not the native tongue (Altbach & Knight, 2007; 
Knight, 2012; Kim, 2015). China has actually attempted a mishmash of all of these 
policies and more in its world-class quest (Luo, 2013). 
The expectation of having these elite global universities is not only sought by rich and 
developed societies, as Altbach (2013b) noted, the chase for world-class institutions has 
permeated to still-developing nations. The World Bank has helped to popularize the norm 
through their prescribed version of these types of elite universities. In a report by Salmi 
(2009) for World Bank, these institutions are defined to have three characteristics: a 
concentration of talent, abundant resources, and favorable governance. Similarly, Shin 
and Kehm (2012) recognized four key characteristics in world-class institutions. First, the 
institutions should be considering global competition rather than just regional or domestic 
(similar to Marginson, 2006). Second, the main focus of the current competition should 
be on economic benefits, rather than on quality enhancement. Third, this recent 
competition should focus more on research productivity, rather than on learning 
outcomes. Finally, the competitiveness of these elite universities should be measured by 
global ranking schemes that reinforce the first three characteristics. While some of the 
factors overlap, there is still no single, agreed-upon definition for world-class.  
Because of the difficulties in finding a common definition, rankings have naturally 
provided a proxy for elite status. Unlike in domestic sectors, there are no accreditation 
agencies affirming world-class credentials. Salmi and Saroyan (2007) reasoned, “without 
established evaluation or accreditation mechanisms, rankings can be used effectively to 
monitor and enhance quality” (p. 22). Indeed, the competition for world-class universities 
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can be observed in various systems around the world, which scholars have connected to 
the reverence for commensuration and benchmarks that began in the US and UK (Cooley 
& Snyder, 2015). Rankings, then, are the only perceived objective measure to truly 
ascertain global elite status, especially for bureaucrats or other decision makers. I will 
further explore rankings as a kind of world-class credential in a later analytical chapter.  
 
Rankings and Higher Education in China 
China has had historical an affinity to rankings through its Confucian heritage, 
manifesting in strict sociopolitical hierarchies and illustrated most notably through its 
Imperial Examination (Keju) system. Confucianism can be described as “lessons in 
practical ethics without any religious content” and a set of “pragmatic rules for daily life” 
(Hofstede & Bond, 1988, pp. 7-8). With the Confucian teachings, the stability of society 
should be based upon hierarchical relationships between a ruler to subjects, and even 
organized down to familial bonds. According to Hofstede and Bond (1988), “hierarchical 
dualities and interrelatedness lie at the heart of the Chinese” social structure (p. 18). This 
hierarchical reverence most notably manifested itself in Chinese education through the 
Imperial Examination system, in which the Chinese dynasties used to centrally control 
their various empires through bureaucratic order until the early twentieth century 
(Hayhoe, 1996). The system of examinations dominated the elite segments of society and 
was central to the nation’s leaders, literati, and bureaucrats for over a thousand years until 
it ended with the fall of the final Chinese dynasty in the early twentieth century.  
With the Communist takeover of China in 1949, the CCP radically restructured the 
nation’s economic, social, and political systems through socialist ideology, mirroring 
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structures in the Soviet Union (Kojevnikov, 2008). Under this Soviet system, the entire 
sociopolitical economy was centrally planned through, what Kojevnikov (2008) 
described as the “cult of science and technology as the key to achieving their primary 
economic objectives—industrialization and modernization of the country” (p. 118). The 
CCP used indicators such as grain yields and steel production to rank and gauge 
performance of local cadres and their administrative work units. Higher education played 
a key role in the CCP’s central planning, as comprehensive universities were contracted 
into specialized institutes that were mostly focused on practical sciences. Student intake 
and majors were carefully selected and allocated to match local, regional, and national 
needs as determined by the Party (Hayhoe, 1989). This educational period saw an 
emphasis on technical experts that could be slotted throughout the national bureaucracy 
to push Soviet modernization efforts.  
By the 1960s, the CCP’s relationship with the U.S.S.R had deteriorated, and Mao 
retreated from some of the so-called Soviet “bureaucratization” of this era (Lü, 2000). 
Mao still envisioned modernizing China through science and industrialization, but he also 
attempted to decrease the focus on ranking. During the Cultural Revolution cadre 
rankings were attacked as being “feudal” holdover (Lü, 2000). Chaos from the Cultural 
Revolution plunged the higher education system into utter tumult, the university entrance 
exam was discontinued in 1966, and most universities were closed until 1972 (Hayhoe, 
1989.). Academics, teachers, scientists, and other intellectuals were persecuted for their 
so-called bourgeois elements, often sent to do rural, manual labor or killed. The chaos of 
this era would not truly end until after Mao died, his close associates were arrested, and 
Deng Xiaoping took over (Hayhoe, 1996).  
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In 1978, Deng initiated incremental marketization and privatization reforms of the 
Chinese economy that slowly opened the nation to the world (Hayhoe, 1995). During this 
era, many state-owned enterprises were privatized, the economy was opened to foreign 
investment or local entrepreneurs, and rural China was decollectivized. Science and 
technology were key focuses of the reforms, and labeled as one of the “Four 
Modernizations” by the CCP (Lü, 2000). To recover from the damage done to education 
during the Cultural Revolution, students were sent across the world to learn from foreign 
universities, especially to the US. These students, called sea turtles, were expected to 
return home to help lead the modernization efforts of the Chinese economy, business, and 
other industry (Li, 2004b). With the influence from the West, Mok and Lo (2007) argued 
that “this has also led to the growing prominence of ideas and strategies along the lines of 
neoliberalism being adopted not only in reforming the economic sector but also in 
managing the public sector and in delivering social policy” (p. 316). With the reforms, 
performance rankings for CCP administration became more important, and added some 
desperation from officials to game the numbers to mask poor performances (Lü, 2000).  
Despite marketization reforms of Chinese economic and social structures, the central 
government still has been predominant in society and CCP leaders have been 
characterized as technocratic managers (Hayhoe, 1995). For education, personal 
freedoms and choices were expanded, such abolishment of career allotments by the 
government and opening of student major selection in colleges, but the higher education 
sector has remained mostly public and less open than Western universities (Hayhoe, 
1996). While some private (or minban) universities have been allowed to open in the 
post-opening decades, these institutions are seen as second-tier compared to public 
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universities (Mok & Lo, 2007). In 1985, the Ministry of Education was raised in status to 
a state commission, certifying its centralized authority over curriculum and management 
for all universities, even under those under other bureaucratic bodies (Hayhoe, 1989). 
 
International Ambitions of Chinese Universities  
In recent decades, the government has attempted to bolster its top universities through 
key elite-making policies. With a push from General Secretary Jiang Zemin, the nation’s 
supreme leader, the government proposed the high-profile 211 Project in the Ninth Five-
Year (1996-2000) Plan (Mok & Chan, 2008). The project’s name was derived from the 
goal of successfully managing 100 universities for the 21st century. This project targeted 
investment at the top tiers of the higher education sector, with explicit goals of meeting a 
“world standard” in teaching and research (Ngok & Guo, 2008, p. 546). The initial 
institutions with this status had access to project funding of around 2.2 billion USD from 
1996-2000 (Li, 2004a). The project later expanded to 116 universities and this inclusion 
granted these institutions higher status in the Chinese domestic sector.  
Following the success of 211 Project, in 1998, while making a speech at Peking 
University’s centennial anniversary, Jiang declared that the nation should have many 
globally recognized institutions, saying, “China must have a number of first-rate 
universities of international advanced level” (cited by Li, 2004a, p. 17). In the following 
year, the government officially unveiled another elite-making project to inject major 
investment into its higher education subsector known as the 985 Project (Li, 2004a; Ngok 
& Guo, 2008). The name was derived from the date the plan was first announced, May 
(5), 1998. Unlike with Project 211, the funding was targeted at a select few key elite 
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institutions, beginning with just two, Tsinghua University and Peking University, then to 
nine, and later to 34 in the initial stage of the project (Zhang et al., 2013). The first nine 
of these institutions have been organized into a grouping called “China 9 University 
League” (C9 League), which has been dubbed the “Ivy League” of China (Yang & Xie, 
2015)  
While the 985 and 211 projects focused holistically on university excellence and are 
non-ordinal classifications, the MoE has now moved focus to individual field or 
discipline rankings. Every four years, the Ministry has released the National Subjects 
Evaluation (NSE), a government ranking of subjects that is tied to funding for university 
researching (Song, 2017). In 2015, it was announced that both the 985 and 211 Projects 
would be phased out, and replaced by the new Double First Class (sometimes referred to 
as World Class 2.0), which would, like the NSE, focus on disciplines (Sharma, 2016). 
The Double First Class is a direct translation of the phrase  (shuang yi liu), which 
is a reference to the program’s focus on both universities and individual disciplines being 
world-class. Officially revealed in 2017, the project has basically retained the same 
hierarchies as the previous elite-making projects, with 42 universities1 designated in the 
top tier and another 95 in a second lower tier, according to the People’s Daily.2 The top 
tier universities have a focus on making the entire university world-class, while the 
second tier institutions only have a world-class distinction for designated disciplines. 
Furthermore, the government has installed ranking mechanisms for moving into or falling 
out of the various tiers depending on an assessment. 
																																																								
1 There are 36 institutions in the top of the first tier and another six in a second, lower class of the top tier. 
2 China to develop 42 world-class universities. (2017, September 21). People's Daily. Retrieved December 
5, 2017.  
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These elite projects domestically are connected with China’s ambitions abroad. 
Chinese higher education has become increasingly global, with steady growth from 
international students populations, joint-research by scholars around the world, and other 
global collaborations from its universities (Bodycott & Lai, 2012). For decades, China 
has been characterized for sending its students abroad, fueling foreign student numbers in 
universities across the globe, but especially in the US and other Western nations, with 
over 700,000 outbound students per year according to UNESCO. In recent years, though, 
it has also become a world leader in inbound student intake, sitting only behind the US 
and UK in terms of international students with over 440,000, according to Institute of 
International Education. Furthermore, the higher education sector is leading in 
internationalization efforts like branch campuses or other joint ventures (Song, 2017).  
 
Domestic Rankings and Chinese Education  
Similar to the US, China also has domestic institutional ranking systems; unlike in the 
US, these local league tables have somewhat struggled to gain a foothold (Liu & Liu, 
2005). In the 1990s, the first Chinese domestic ranking was released, called NETBIG and 
the other Guangdong Institute of Management Science (GIMS). However, these league 
tables have subsequently shuttered. One major scandal occurred surrounding domestic 
rankings when Wu Shulian, a famous Chinese economist associated with league tables in 
China, was accused of operating a pay-for-rank racket at the Chinese Academy of 
Management Science. The outcry sullied Wu and his ranking system. The Chinese 
People’s Political Consultative Conference even considered outlawing unsanctioned 
university rankings, but has never fully committed to a ban (Wang, 2009). In recent 
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years, the Chinese Universities Alumni Association (CUAA)’s domestic ranking has 
gained popularity in the sector, measuring institutional research output, faculty member 
and student awards, program offerings, governmental project status, and reputation (Luo 
et al., 2016). Jin and Shen (2012) have argued that these domestic rankings are 
potentially more influential than global rankings in China, though, this may vary 
depending on the institution.  
While domestic rankings have been muted compared to US News, China did spark the 
global ranking craze. In 2005, the Ministry of Education founded the Research Institute 
of Higher Education at Shanghai Jiao Tong University in April 2005, which hosts the 
Center for World-Class Universities, the original producers of the ARWU (Liu & Cheng, 
2005). While the government has not specifically indicated benchmarking to universities 
abroad, individual Chinese universities have made clear indications to such references. 
Luo (2013) reported that Tsinghua University has benchmarked itself with MIT and other 
Association of American Universities institutions, even using this US-based institution as 
a guide for organizational planning. Similarly, in an analysis of partnerships between top 
Chinese universities, Yang and Xie (2015) found that the elite C9 League institutions are 
more likely to partner with other elite British institutions in the Russell Group. These 
global connections are fostered from the top Chinese institutions to the top Western 
institutions. However, it is unclear exactly how much rankings factor in these 
connections, and I will explore this gap in my analytical chapters. 
The most substantial metric in popular global league table schemes comes from 
research measurements. Accordingly, Quan et al. (2017) reported a rapid increase in 
research and development expenditure related to Chinese higher education, illustrated on 
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Figure 2.1. These investments correlate with growth in research publications in the Web 
of Science by Chinese academics. To boost research capacity, the Chinese government 
and universities have attempted to recruit more researchers from abroad. In 2006, to 
boost the quality of researchers, the central government unveiled the Programme for 
Introducing Disciplinary Talents to Universities (Programme 111) with an aim to bring 
foreign trained experts to the 985 and 211 Project universities (Mok & Chan, 2015). 
Some institutions have turned to English language instruction to foster a better 
environment for foreign academics, and also to promote internationalization for domestic 
faculty (Ngok & Guo, 2008; Kim, 2015).  
Figure 2.1: Research Funding in China (1995-2013) 
 
Source: Quan et al. 2017   
 
This pressure to publish has especially been felt by local Chinese faculty members in 
recent years. Professors are now expected to consistently publish in highly cited journals, 
which are mostly in English (Liu et al., 2015). Chou (2014) described this drive to 
publish in prestigious indices as the Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI) Syndrome, 
which can be extended to all academic fields. She maintained, “the Asian region is 
continually affected by the strong managerial governance and academics are under 
intensified pressure to benchmark the international practices in the race of global 
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university ranking exercises” (p. xii). The demand for these publications is so great that 
universities have installed handsome incentives for academics. In a survey of the field 
across China, Quan et al. (2017) found that incentives range from a few hundred dollars 
in international journals to hundreds of thousands of dollars for publications in Nature. 
These parameters, though, call for professors to mostly be the lead author on these 
publications, with a few exceptions.  
These forces placed on individuals from institutional and global standards have had 
adverse effects on research and practices. There have been high profile cases of cheating, 
plagiarism, and other academic fraud in the Chinese sector; Lin (2013) claimed, 
“Academic frauds in China can be attributed to three factors: lack of severe punishment 
in the evaluation system; excessive pursuit of personal profits; and a lack of scientific 
ethics” (p. 26). Further, he predicted that this problem would only get worse as the 
pressures of global competition continue. Though, the government has recently unveiled 
a concerted effort to curb these kinds of fraudulent practices within the sector, threatening 
harsh penalties for any academic caught committing an offense (Cyranoski, 2017). 
 
Students in Chinese Higher Education  
While research on the global forces like rankings has focused on policymakers and 
institutions, students are a crucial factor in higher education. Student perceptions force 
universities to react, begetting changes to policies that send ripples across the sector 
worldwide. These types of studies on rankings, choices, and reactions have been well 
documented in the US, as illustrated by this literature review, but this intersection has not 
been fully explored in the Chinese sector. There has been some research on student 
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choice and societal characteristics that affect student choice; though, it has placed 
considerable attention on Chinese international students, as they are the largest segment 
of this population in the world. In recent trends, parents have chosen to skip the high-
stakes college entrance exam, gaokao, and focus on the SAT or other national tests 
(Yang, 2015b). College admission in China is solely based on gaokao score, so students 
with little promise of scoring highly have no hope of entering a prestigious university.  
Because geography has been such a key issue in China in recent decades, issues 
related to location and domestic migration have been important works in this area (see 
Wang & Moffatt, 2008; He, 2016). The east coast areas and urban centers have grown 
rich and affluent through favorable governmental policies and economic liberalization. 
The inequities caused through regional and urban/ rural resource disparities inhibited 
massive migration from the poor areas and countryside to the affluent east and urban 
cities (Hayhoe, 2012). Education plays a central role in this process. Citizens cannot 
simply move from one province or city freely because the government binds people 
through household registration, called a hukou (Wang & Moffatt, 2008). For primary and 
secondary education, students are forced to study within the jurisdiction of their hukou, 
but are free to apply to other provinces for higher education via the gaokao (Yeung, 
2013). The top universities, such as the 985 or 211 institutions, are mostly clustered in 
these desirable areas, especially in cities like Beijing or Shanghai. Residents in these 
cities with a local hukou have an advantage when applying to universities within the 
jurisdiction because other provinces or localities have smaller quotas; this means that for 
students hoping to gain entry to a top university in another province or city, they must 
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score astronomically high on the gaokao (Yang, 2015b). The uneven distribution of these 
universities within a few urban centers makes the competition fierce.   
Higher education has been one of the few ways in which rural lower and middle 
classes could obtain a coveted urban hukou. Yeung (2013) stated, “in China, higher 
education is a golden ticket for rural youth to gain an urban hukou status” (p. 55). 
Though, as Wang and Moffatt (2008) noted, there are some hukou stipulations depending 
on job type. Nonetheless, it is no wonder that studies have found geography to be such a 
crucial aspect in college-going decisions. He et al. (2016) found that “first-tier regions” 
are the top destinations for students in this university decision-making process, and 
characteristics like amenities hardly factor into the decision. Further, even non-elite 
universities have gained more desirability if they are located in these areas that can 
provide post-graduation economic and career benefits. Once students make it to a 
university in a desired city, they must find employment after graduation to fulfill their 
hukou transfer. In a large-scale study of graduates in Wuhan, Wang and Moffatt (2008) 
discovered that people from families with rural hukou more intensely searched for jobs 
and accepted lower paying positions in order to keep the university granted registration 
status. In recent years, the government has looked to loosen hukou restrictions to address 
some of these geographic disparities. 
Another crucial aspect of education is family background. In recent years, as 
inequalities have exacerbated in society, the divides between the Chinese upper and 
lower classes has widened. The class divide is growing in education, too, even as China’s 
examination system is a promise of social mobility. Affluent families can buy homes in 
the area with the best schools and can also invest in private tutoring or shadow education 
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(Yang, 2015b). By the time many students make it to high school where they will take the 
gaokao, the years of educational differences are too vast.  Many studies have shown these 
parental background disparities. In a mixed-method study of postgraduate university 
choices, Liu and Morgan (2015) found that less affluent families are often daunted by the 
college-going process and do not have financial mean or familiarity to navigate the 
system. Conversely, affluent families can wield their guanxi, personal connections or 
networks, to maximize their students’ educational outcomes. In another mixed-methods 
study of over 1,900 students with 50 parental interviews in Beijing, Sheng (2017) used 
binomial logistic regression to illustrate that those with higher self-reported wealth 
assessments were more likely to choose elite universities. Some studies show differing 
strengths of the parental effect, though; for instance, Liu et al. (2013) analyzed a sample 
of over 12,000 students through multinomial logistic regression and found that social 
class effects only related to degree choices in terms of law and medicine. The researchers 
have suggested that this kind of result illustrates the inundation that has thoroughly 
penetrated Chinese higher education, meaning all parents expect success and career 
outcomes, not just those in the elite circles. Though, studies like Sheng (2017), Liu and 
Morgan (2015), and Yang (2015b) have provided ample evidence that those from more 
affluent background hold an advantage. 
Because there are so many Chinese students choosing to study abroad for their 
education—including undergraduate, graduate, and increasingly secondary levels—
international mobility of Chinese students has been a popular research topic. In an in-
depth study of international school choices in China, Yang (2015b) reported that middle-
class to upper-class parents have the means to move their students abroad if they feel they 
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cannot score well enough to enter a prestigious university, while working-class parents 
had little knowledge or resources to provide this outlet. In a survey of 780 students at 
three different universities in China, Cao et al. (2016) found through hierarchical 
regression modeling that the impact from parents was the greatest predictor for students’ 
desire to study abroad. This means that with higher degrees of education, parents were 
more likely to push for schooling abroad. Reputation of academic quality, as defined by 
university rankings, was the next most important factor in the study. In qualitative studies 
of Chinese parents, Spires et al. (2017) and Gong and Huybers (2015) reported that pull 
factors, such as perceptions of education quality abroad, rather than push factors, like 
poor economic opportunities at home, were leading characteristics in the choice to send 
children abroad. 
Pull factors for Chinese students and parents are related to the perception that 
Western nations have superior academic institutions and technological advantages. 
However, the economic benefits for students are quickly falling. In an in-depth 
ethnographic study of international high schools with an explicit goal of sending students 
aboard, Yang (2015b) reported that families wanted to send their child abroad because it 
gave them a kind of elite status marker of wealth; the economic boosts that were formally 
so attractive to Chinese families was a muted factor. In fact, much of the economic gains 
from studying abroad have dropped in recent years for Chinese returnees (Yang, 2015b.). 
Nonetheless, there is still some cultural cachet attached to the ability to send students 




Critiques and the Future of Chinese Higher Education  
Despite the decades of looking towards the US, UK, or other educational 
powerhouses, there has recently been a growing pushback and reexamination of 
internationalization policies. In a study of China’s recent initiatives, Song (2017) quoted 
Chinese president Xi Jinping, saying that the nation needed “world-class universities… 
with Chinese characteristics” during a 2016 conference on higher education. Similarly, Li 
(2012) argued, the elite Chinese universities “are leading to the emergence of a 
distinctive model of the university” (p. 329). It is unclear exactly how these kinds of 
institutions differ from their Western counterparts. Yet, there are apparent differences 
that manifest themselves in significant disagreements of philosophy for education, such 
as government control, which I will further explore in the analytical chapters. 
A growing friction connected with China’s rise in the context of global higher 
education stems from differing conceptions of academic freedom. Some scholars have 
questioned whether China can truly compete globally without having true academic 
freedom (see arguments in Bawa, 2009; Altbach, 2012; Mohrman, 2013). Furthermore, 
Song (2017) added, “Although compared to previous years, academics have more 
freedom to express their opinions and comments, it is not easy for them to play the role of 
adversarial critics in social development and political reform, for the state consistently 
puts a strong emphasis on stability and unity” (online). While Western universities have 
instilled intellectual freedom within the academy for centuries, these ideals are hardly 
universal; and the authoritarian environment of China offers a direct counter to the more 
open institutions in Western traditions. Many important appointments in the Chinese 
university structure still go through the Party, such as university presidents, hindering 
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academic freedom (Altbach, 2012; Luo, 2013). The issue of Chinese institutional 
academic freedom has also arisen from both scholars outside of China and from 
stakeholders within. Weifang Min, professor of education and Party Secretary of Peking 
University, a high-ranking position, has even argued for expanding academic freedom in 
order to keep up with global pressures on research for faculty (as cited by Ngok & Guo, 
2008). 
Some scholars have defended China’s version of academic freedom as simply being 
different from the West. Through an analysis of the “Sinic or post-Confucian tradition,” 
Marginson  (2014b) argued, the “Sinic research university is less independent, on the 
whole less entrepreneurial, and more directly tied to policy agendas and state 
governance,” even if there can be frank discussion and debates within a university (pp. 
31-33). Similarly, Zha (2012) noted, in general, “the majority of Chinese scholars appear 
to be content with… a high level of articulation between their academic pursuits and the 
national interest, rather than seeking to be independent and functioning as a critical voice 
in national or global affairs” (p. 209). These arguments are closer to supporting national 
interests rather than free inquiry of the Western academy. 
For Western observers, the trend in Chinese higher education is moving further away 
from intellectual freedom. Metzgar (2016) lauded Chinese efforts of public diplomacy 
through higher education, but she still argued that the nation will be hindered in its 
educational outreach efforts due to the restrictions within academic inquiry. “Promoting 
China as a country with a rich history, an appealing culture, and a strong economy does 
not alter the reality of restricted political freedoms on the ground,” she said (p. 235). In 
2013, a high profile directive from the Communist Party that warned against anti-Chinese 
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principles seeping into the nation, including educational institutions, as reported by the 
ChinaFile. “When facing sensitive events and complex puzzles in the ideological sphere, 
we should implement the principle that the people in charge assume responsibility and 
use territorial management,” argued the directive. This so-called “territorial 
management” can be described as censorship. Signs of this directive affecting actual 
policy arose in 2017, when famous journals such as Nature and the China Quarterly were 
found to have removed sensitive articles from their Chinese websites, as reported by the 
New York Times (Tian et al., 2016). These new developments in Chinese education policy 
seem counter to past decades’ internationalization efforts. In a later chapter, I will explore 
the intersections between China’s global ambitions in higher education and strict local 
control at home.   
 
Synthesizing a Framework to Study the Impacts of University Rankings  
After considering various studies on university rankings, I have devised a framework 
for how these forces can impact universities. The model below offers a comprehensive 
understanding of the mechanism that drives reactions to university rankings by 
universities. Given the literature, universities do not directly react to their league table 
position, but rather they respond to the perceptions of other stakeholders: students, 
governments, peers, and administers or faculty. These actors react and change behavior 
depending on the university ranking.   
The first step in the model comes from the ranking metrics constructed by the various 
agencies. While all of the popular rankings have their own commensuration formulas, 
they all share some common traits that are usually weighted slightly different depending 
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on the agency. I have broken down these metrics into three categories: research, 
university characteristics, and reputational reviews. Research is the most dominant aspect 
in the most influential ranking schemes, ranging at a high of 90% of the metric in ARWU 
to 20% in QS. The rankings also attempt to capture various aspects of university 
characteristics through internationalization numbers, finances, and even teaching in some 
cases, such as student-to-faculty ratio. Finally, reputational reviews or surveys also 
heavily factor into university rankings, with, for example, QS weighing 50% of its metric 
on surveys sent out to actors in the sector. Each of these items is collected, processed, and 
produced into a final commensurate ordinal ranking that dramatically impacts the higher 
education sector.  For my study, I am only focusing on students and university actors 
given the limited scope of this inquiry. However, through this model, any of these 
assumptions can be tested and measured in future projects.  
Fig. 2.3: Model for Reactions to University Rankings 
 
Source: Synthesized by the author using ranking literature.  
Considering O’Meara et al.’s (2011) framework for understanding universities 
through stakeholders, in my model, the impact that university rankings have onto 
university faculty or staff is important to institutional actions or responses. University 
administrators have been shown to make decisions using the rankings for various 
projects, such as on academic exchange partnerships. The top-100 has been posited as an 
important cut point that administrators use in these types of decisions (Hazelkorn, 2015).  
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Likewise, academics must consider the rankings when conducting research, as the 
various metrics often emphasis highly cited journals such as Nature or other important 
indices such as SSCI (Chou, 2014). Because these indices are dominated by English 
language publications, researchers have been forced to publish in their non-native tongue 
or on topics that are more appealing to a global audience.   
Students, too, have been crucial in understanding the impacts of university rankings. 
Students are highly attuned to rankings for sense-making, especially those with elite-
going aspirations and international students. On the domestic level, the top-25 has been 
recognized as an important status that drives elite student decisions (Bowman & Bastedo, 
2009). On the global level, there has been some evidence that students have a similar 
conception for the top-100 in international rankings (Gong & Huybers, 2015). 
International students have been attracted to these types of rankings in their decision-
making process because they lack the local understanding of a higher education system. 
Further, they need the foreign university that they attend to be able to translate back to 
their home country as a respected credential. Rankings provide this kind of 
commensurate information for students.  
 
Conclusion  
While the model presented here can be used to generally understand how rankings 
can impact universities, much of the literature underpinning the mechanisms is rooted in 
the Western setting. Thus, it is crucial to test for localization in the model (see Ball, 
2012). Scholars have aptly likened the localization of global forces through a metaphor of 
light beaming through a prism. “The light beam represents a global script formulated in 
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and coming from world society,” asserted Pizmony-Levy (2011), “The prism represents 
an individual nation-state… as well as subnational elements. The refracted light… 
represents the global script after it has been negotiated and appropriated within the 
nation-state” (p. 604). Marginson (2017) used a similar metaphor in a description of 
global higher education convergences, which he alleged are only atheistic, contending 
that structures and policies may appear the same but actually reflect highly local 
characteristics. Because of this local “prism” conception, it is important to test ranking 
reactions from universities in diverse systems, and China provides an important 
comparison in this regard.  
As mentioned, China provides an interesting case for the understanding of university 
rankings for a variety of reasons. Chinese society has had recent and long-term historical 
reverence for hierarchies, reputation, and bureaucracy that has manifested within the 
educational structures. While the nation has had incremental marketization, the nation is 
still much more centralized than other Western nations, such as the US. The elite public 
universities have had global ambitions in recent decades, and their faculty and staff have 
had to balance both global with local expectations. Research has been missing some of 
the key connections to these actors and rankings, instead focusing on general 
internationalization aspects or local government controls. Within my model, these elite 
actors are important to the reaction that rankings have had on universities in China. 
Likewise, Chinese students are often considered in international mobility research, but 
rarely has the domestic intersection of these forces been understood through this 
population. Given how important students have been in understanding university 
rankings elsewhere, Chinese students should be considered as a key mechanism in China, 
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too. Given the prism metaphor, it should be no surprise that Chinese stakeholders will 
operate somewhat differently than their Western counterparts, capturing these 
localizations will be key for this research. 
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CHAPTER THREE: Methodological Approach to Understanding the Impacts of 
University Rankings in China  
 
Introduction  
The purpose of this study is to understand how university rankings have impacted the 
Chinese higher education sector. The effects from this phenomenon in China have been 
studied, but there are considerable gaps in the research, and much of the foundational 
understanding for reactions to league tables has centered on American or Western higher 
education settings. The model that I have constructed via this literature was heavily 
informed from these Western environments, though other geographic areas of research 
were also considered. Actors in other societies or areas may not react in the same manner 
as those in the US or Europe, which offered an opportunity to test these assumptions 
through comparative research. As argued in the previous chapter, the case of China 
presented an important imperative for this kind of inquiry, with its unique history and 
growing importance to the world.  
This research has been broken down into three separate empirical chapters, and their 
methods will be outlined in this chapter, with two focusing on administrators and 
academics while another uses student subjects. The first of these inquiries comes in 
Chapter 4 and considers the relationship between university rankings and the world-class 
university concept, illustrating how these metrics have been key tools in decision-making 
for Chinese universities. Next, Chapter 5 explores the intersections between global 
striving universities in China, such as the C9 League grouping, and the strong central 
government control of the domestic higher education sector. These two chapters have 
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incorporated interviews from faculty and staff who work for Chinese universities in the 
analysis. In the final analytical chapter, Chapter 6, I have switched gears from university 
employees to student perspectives of ranking effects. In this chapter, I tested student 
knowledge and familiarity with league tables, utilizing multivariate analysis.  
While the three individual chapters are separated and can stand alone, they are all still 
interlinked together through the overarching exploration of how university rankings 
impact Chinese universities, assessing the established comparative model from Chapter 2. 
They each fill a distinct gap to the larger literature, but work together as one cohesive 
study. As the study relied upon multiple methods for the research design, with both 
interview and survey data collected, Chapter 3 will present both the qualitative and 
qualitative methodology used in the analysis. Likewise, the limitations associated with 
this kind of research design, topic area, and analyses will also be discussed and addressed 
in detail to conclude the chapter.  
 
Research Design: A Tale of Two Methods  
This study relied upon a multiple methods approach to the inquiry and incorporated 
both qualitative and quantitative data. Creswell (2008) argued that qualitative and 
quantitative methods should not be viewed as “polar opposites or dichotomies,” and 
instead can work together along a continuum (p. 3). A summary of my data and methods 
can be seen on Table 3.1. The individual analytical chapters have focused on one 
methodology—the qualitative interviewing was used in the analysis in Chapter 4 and 
Chapter 5, while Chapter 6 was carried out via quantitative survey analysis. In the 
concluding chapter, these results will be synthesized to support the larger investigation. 
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Through both qualitative and quantitative methodologies, this study maximizes the 
strengths of each to gain an in-depth understanding of the impacts of rankings on this 
sector (Matveev, 2002).    
Table 3.1: Summary of Data and Methods  
Research Method Data Type Data Source  Chapters Analyzed  




Quantitative Survey  Students Chapter 6 
Source: Personal data collection for this research.  
 
The combination of quantitative and qualitative studies provides expanded insight 
into social phenomenon (Creswell, 2008).  This project relied upon “concurrent” study 
the impact of university rankings in China to match the “timing” of the multiple actors 
included in the analysis (Creswell, 2008, p. 2016).  Creswell (2008) suggested that 
research of this nature should make examinations from “multiple levels” and methods (p. 
219). This study uses qualitative faculty and administration from inside the operations of 
the university, while the student quantitative survey offers consumer-like perspective.  
The individual chapters only focus on one method and population, while the final chapter 
will synthesize the results from the three empirical chapters, providing a “mixing” of the 
analysis  (p. 220).  The construction of these multiple sources and methods standing 
separate, but linked in the findings or conclusion is called “component design” (Greene, 
2007, p. 122). These strategies allow researchers to paint a “comprehensive picture” of a 
given phenomenon, which is described as, “the quantitative and qualitative data were 
collected and analyzed separately” (Maxwell et at., 2015, p. 17-19). Collecting 
quantitative and qualitative data from the same subjects can make integration easier, but 
it is not necessary in this kind of research and multiple population types (such as students 
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and university employees) are acceptable if they together inform the larger study 
(Maxwell et at., 2015, p. 23)  
 
Introduction to the Interviews  
According to Creswell (2008), qualitative research has allowed for “exploring and 
understanding the meaning individuals or groups ascribe to a social or human problem” 
(p. 4). As illustrated in the previous chapter, university faculty, staff, or other stakeholder 
are often used as key research participants in qualitative studies looking at trends in 
higher education and larger social issues in the sector. There has been considerable 
research illustrating how these actors deal with prestige striving through the rankings in 
the West, especially in the US (see work by O’Meara, 2007). While there has been 
research on how local actors within Chinese elite higher education experience the current 
internationalizations of the sector (see Yang & Welch, 2012; Rhoads et al., 2014), this 
research overlooks the centrality of rankings to the greater phenomenon.  
I build upon the important tradition of using lived experiences in education research 
or other social sciences (Alvesson, 2010). This exploratory research gains valuable 
insight into this increasingly relevant sector in both China and on the world stage, one 
that is rapidly challenging Western domination in the sector. All participants provided a 
collective, localized view of the encroaching globalized forces, giving a more expansive 
perspective than could not be done through a similar study of just one institution or of 
quantitative approach (Creswell, 2008).  
Interviews offer improvisation and adjustment throughout the process, in order to 
coax deeper responses that can be beneficial for the study (De Groot, 2002). This 
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advantage is especially beneficial in understanding complex systems like China’s place in 
the global higher education sector. Individual professors or administrators offer personal 
experiences that might only offer one perspective of the larger puzzle. Weaving together 
the intricate tapestry from these perspectives allows for an in-depth understanding of the 
elite higher education sector, tying together knowledge and viewpoints from across the 
country. For instance, professors reported an increase in pressures to publish in highly 
cited research in recent years, but they did not always connect this practice to rankings. 
Yet, corresponding other interviews with more experienced stakeholders and to wider 
international education literature, I was able to make the connection to increased 
publication burdens and global rankings. This kind of interpretations would not be 
possible without in-depth interviews from a range of actors across the sector, a key 
advantage to the method (Blommaert & Dong, 2010).  
 
Introduction to the Surveys  
Quantitative research, according to Creswell (2008), has provided the “means for 
testing objective theories by examining the relationship among variables” (p. 4). For this 
study, I look to understand the relationship between students and rankings. As illustrated 
in the previous chapter, some of the most influential rankings literature has utilized 
quantitative data from students in a given sector. Oftentimes, these studies are focused on 
domestic rankings in the US or global rankings for Chinese students (see examples in Liu 
et al., 2013; Liu & Morgan, 2016; Bowman & Bastedo, 2009). Thus, similar to the 
impetus on faculty and staff interviews, because there have been few studies on the 
reactions to rankings from Chinese students within the domestic contexts, my study was 
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designed to rely on student survey responses. This data provides an unprecedented look 
into how students in China are affected by this global force, but while also accounting for 
localization.  
Qualitative studies of this nature can help to confirm larger theoretical and 
exploratory research or assumptions (Rencher, 2003). The method brings precision to 
data across a large sample size, allowing comparable information that can be measured 
and analyzed in a variety of ways through statistical modeling (Matveev, 2002). Through 
these tools, this kind of research can be verified and replicated by the larger community 
of researchers, providing a higher degree of objectivism to the approach (Creswell, 
2008). Though, scholars have long debated the reality of statistical objectivity (Berger & 
Berry, 1988); nonetheless, these methods have been central in social science research and 
I will continue that tradition. In recognizing the critiques, though, studies using 
qualitative methods must be concise and accountable given the specific rules of the 
selected statistical modeling. 
Furthermore, while this project is deconstructed into three separate empirical 
inquiries (two using interview data and another using survey data), the research is aligned 
under one goal of understanding the impact of rankings on the Chinese higher education 
sector. The use of multiple methods undercuts the weaknesses inherent to both qualitative 
and quantitative studies, while maximizing their strengths (Matveev, 2002; Maxwell, 
2013). Thus, I used two distinct samples (staff/ academics and students) in the larger 




Data Collection  
Since the proposal stage of this research, I planned to collect both student survey data 
and qualitative academic/ administrator interviews together during a short tenure of 
fieldwork in China. Even before arriving in China, I had been working within Columbia 
University’s larger community of China watchers for six years, building initial networks 
and laying the groundwork for this research project. As the early stages of fieldwork can 
be quite isolating and overwhelming (Blommaert & Dong, 2010), the success of the 
project was aided by contacts with academics and staff established before arriving at the 
site. Though, I knew that I could not solely rely on my New York connections, even as I 
intended to focus on the elite higher education spectrum, I wanted to attempt to minimize 
some bias in the sample selection. 
During my field research, I was embedded at Beijing Normal University (BNU) for 
six months in 2017 sponsored under the Hanban’s Confucius China Studies Program 
Fellowship. I was technically enrolled as a doctoral student at BNU’s Faculty of 
Education. This campus in Beijing was my headquarters as I built my datasets during my 
six months in China. While at BNU, I was hosted under Dr. Baocun Liu, professor and 
Director of the Institute of International and Comparative Education. Through BNU and 
Dr. Liu, I was introduced into a network of students, faculty, and researchers that 
provided the foundation of my sampling.  
While BNU was an important starting point, my research was not simply isolated to 
this campus. Beijing offered an ideal location for sampling the elite end of the Chinese 
higher education sector. The capital city hosts two of the top universities in the county 
(Tsinghua and Peking Universities, both only a short bus ride from my dorm room), the 
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most Project 985 institutions, the most Project 211 universities, and a range of other 
internationally-focused programs or institutions. To build a network, I immersed myself 
into educational and academic happenings across the city. Almost every night in Beijing, 
there was an opportunity to listen to lecturers from authors, academics, or other educators 
in some kind of public forum or meeting, such as history lectures at Peking’s Yenching 
Institute or author chats at the Bookworm, a popular English bookstore. At these events, I 
would meet local academics or other researchers to build my network. While not every 
event or interaction was fruitful for sampling, the process was nonetheless insightful in 
understanding these larger elite academic and intellectual spaces.  
Of course, even as Beijing was one of the most active intellectual hubs in the country, 
it is still just one Chinese city. The advantage of field research through the fellowship 
was that I had time and money for traveling to other parts of the country. I was able to 
use these resources to travel to several other cities in Greater China for more sampling: 
Nanjing, Jinan, Shanghai, Ningbo, Xiamen, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. The high-speed 
rail network in China made it logistically possible for me to move across the country for 
interviewing and surveying. Furthermore, I was able to attend several conferences that 
brought together attendees from other cities across China, too. While my research cannot 
be considered ethnographic, field research embedded inside the elite sector has offered 
me a viewpoint and reach similar to that of ethnographers.  
 
Qualitative Data: Interviews with Faculty and Staff  
During the sampling for qualitative interviews of professors and administrators, I 
gathered informants in two ways using a snowball method (Dilly, 2000). First, I would 
	 56 
meet people face-to-face at the various events that I described above and would trade 
contact information. In China, this often meant communicating via WeChat, a 
WhatsApp-like system that is ubiquitously used throughout the country. I never got fully 
comfortable using WeChat in a formal academic way, as it is much more informal than 
email correspondence. Nonetheless, in alignment with IRB protocol, I would solicit these 
contacts that I already met in person for an interview. For the second method, a contact 
that I had met would make an introduction to me through email, WeChat, or sometimes 
in person, hence the “snowballing” of informants. Once the first introduction was 
complete, I would follow the same IRB-approved correspondence to gather interviewees. 
I will on elaborate the limitations of this method in a later section.  
 
Interview Sample Description  
The characteristics of the qualitative interview sample can be found on Table 3.2. The 
sample contains 48 total university stakeholders from across the elite segment of the 
Chinese higher education sector. Illustrated on Chart 3.1, I interviewed 12 participants 
from the C9 League, 17 from 985 Project universities, seven from 211 Project 
universities, and 12 from other globally focused institutions, which include universities 
that emphasize international connections, host considerable foreign students and faculty, 
organized as branch campuses, and teach mostly in English. Further, my sample contains 
11 administrators and 37 academics, illustrated on Chart 3.2. For the academics, I 
accounted for a range of subjects: 12 from the social science or humanities, seven from 
the natural sciences, and 17 from the field of education, illustrated on Chart 3.3. While 
44 of the interviewees were Chinese nationals, a total of 17 of the informants had 
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received at least one degree abroad, while the other 31 were educated completely in 
China, illustrated on Chart 3.4. Of the four foreign faculty members interviewed in the 
study, one had received his Ph.D. from a Chinese university. These participants also 
represented a variety of experience levels: 18 early career, 16 mid-career, and 14 late 
career.  
Table 3.2: Full Sample Breakdown  
University 
Type 
Career Point Position  Location of 
highest 
degree 
Discipline*  Chinese 
National 
None Early career Academic China SS Yes 
None Late career Academic China SS Yes 
211 Late career Academic China S Yes 
211 Early career Academic UK S Yes 
985 Late career Academic China SS Yes 
C9 Mid-career Academic US S Yes 
985 Mid-career Academic China SS Yes 
985 Mid-career Academic China SS Yes 
C9 Early career Academic  China SS Yes 
C9 Late career Academic China SS Yes 
None Early career Admin US A Yes 
None Early career Admin Canada A Yes 
985 Mid-career Admin China A Yes 
985 Early career Academic China E Yes 
C9 Late career Academic China E Yes 
C9 Mid-career Academic China S Yes 
None Early career Academic UK/China E Yes 
985 Mid-career Admin China A Yes 
985 Mid-career Academic US E No 
985 Late career Academic UK E No 
C9 Late career Academic China E Yes 
211 Early career Academic US E Yes 
211 Early career Academic UK S Yes 
985 Late career Academic China E Yes 
985 Mid-career Academic China S Yes 
C9 Late career Academic China E Yes 
985 Late career Academic Australia  SS No 
None Mid-career Academic China E Yes 
211 Early career Admin UK A Yes 
211 Mid-career Academic China SS Yes 
C9 Mid-career Academic China E Yes 
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None Late career Academic US A Yes 
C9 Mid-career Academic China E Yes 
None Late career Admin US A Yes 
985 Mid-career Academic UK E Yes 
C9 Early career Admin China A Yes 
None Late career Admin China A Yes 
None Early career Admin China A Yes 
985 Mid-career Academic China E Yes 
985 Early career Academic China E Yes 
985 Early career Academic China SS Yes 
211 Early career Academic US E Yes 
C9 Late career Academic Japan E Yes 
985 Early career Academic Korea SS No 
C9 Mid-career Admin China A Yes 
None Early career Academic China S Yes 
None Early career Academic China S Yes 
985 Mid-career Admin China A Yes 
Data source: Research gathered by the author.  







































Interview Design  
For the interviews, I crafted a semi-structured, one-on-one protocol, which can be 
found in its entirety in the Appendix. The method of development for my interview 
protocol was based upon the “main branches of a tree” interview style, which is a style 
that divides the research questions into roughly equal parts (Kvale, 2008; Rubin & Rubin, 
2011). With this construction, I focused on broad, expansive questions, and then followed 
up with more in-depth or nuanced probing questions, depending on the answer. The 
protocol included five broad categories: background, ranking conception, world-class 
conception, Chinese elite-making policies, and what-if scenarios. In this method, it is 
important to understand the logic and structure of each section of questioning, which 
needs to be anchored by a core question, tied together with probes. Transitioning is 
especially imperative, as jumping from core question to the next can be awkward and 
incoherent, which I tried to minimize through improvisation to other questions if an 
interviewee preempted the inquiry (Rubin & Rubin, 2011).  
The preparation of the instrument went through several rounds of tests, edits, and 
revisions before implementation. First, in the writing stage, I adapted questions and 
methods from related educational research (Capobianco, 2009; Pizmony-Levy & Doan, 
2016). The protocol was pretested by researchers in both China and the United States for 
preparation before the fieldwork. All of the interview materials were approved by the 
university’s Institutional Review Board (IRB), which can be found in the appendix. 
Likewise, the project was also approved by the Hanban before I was awarded the 
research fellowship; however, this quasi-governmental organization did not screen my 
questions at any time during the project.    
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To create a more comfortable interview environment, I used the first part of the 
interviews as the demographic collection. By focusing on easy personal experiences to 
begin with, I warmed up each interviewee to get them at ease with what-could-be an 
uncomfortable process (Blommaert & Dong, 2010). On many occasions, frosty 
professors began the interview with me cold and blunt, but soon warmed up as they dove 
into their own stories. Furthermore, my research is directly related to their experiences 
and education—it made sense in my design to listen to the telling of these details.  
The qualitative interviews were conducted in two different methods. First, I 
conducted one-on-one interviews in person or over the phone. These interviews were 
mostly in English, but I did use my student research assistant for a few interviews where 
the interviewees requested a translator. All of the in-person interviews were held in a 
location of the informant’s choosing, often in their campus office, a “natural setting” for 
these academics (Creswell, 2008). The second method was through email exchanges. I 
only utilized this second method of interviewing for three informants who preferred not 
to speak in English and who also did not want to utilize a translator. I tried to offer the 
most convenience to the interviewees, as they were not gaining anything from 
participating. I made myself available at any time of the day for the interviews, 
sometimes meeting in the very early morning or late at night.   
All of the meetings were standard, following a semi-structured protocol. As required 
by IRB guidelines, each of the interviewees gave explicit permission for me to interview 
them. The paperwork approved from IRB can be found in the appendix. The interviews 
lasted anywhere from 20 minutes to an hour and a half, with an average of about one hour 
long. I used an audio recording device (either a smartphone or laptop) to capture the 
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audio dialogue from the interviews. The files were stored in a password-protected folder 
on my personal computer, which was also password-protected. My research assistant 
translated any of the Mandarin interviews into English. None of the identities of my 
informants can be attained through a reading of this research, as I have anonymized all 
characteristics and my analysis only offers vague descriptors. In accordance with IRB, all 
materials will be destroyed once the project is complete. 
 
Interview Coding 
All of the recorded audio from the interviews was fully transcribed utilizing private 
contracting professionals from the Fiverr network. Once I received an initial 
transcription, I individually confirmed the validity by listening to audio while reading 
along the transcripts, ensuring the accuracy of each recording. Upon the completion of 
the transcriptions, I uploaded the data into the NVivo for Mac (version 11.4.2) to allow 
for a coding analysis. My research assistant converted all audio Mandarin conversations 
into English transcripts for the analysis.  
The NVivo software helps to ensure data validity given certain procedures. First, I 
could easily check and fix any transcription mistakes in the interview texts even while 
coding (Creswell, 2008). Next, the software allows for notes and flexible coding to guard 
against coding drift, in which parameters widen or change in the coding process 
(Creswell, 2008). I made a habit to continually check back to the coded passages in each 
node as I progressed into my data. NVivo makes this process much simpler and more 
efficient than traditional methods. Likewise, re-reading through the interview transcripts 
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and codes is also an important step in this process. I continually built out new codes to 
incorporate emergent ideas during the process. 
Qualitative research is often inductive in nature, which Creswell (2008) described as 
“generating meaning from the data collected in the field” (p. 9). However, because this 
research was already rooted in theoretical paradigms driven from the literature on the 
sector and society, I relied upon a deductive approach to coding. According to Newman 
(2014), in the deductive approach, “theory guides study design and the interpretation of 
results” (p. 87). Though, I maintained broad, open coding during the early rounds of the 
process in order to provide basic labels and to build overarching themes (Blommaert & 
Dong, 2010, p. 12). With this method, I followed the data with a more in-depth analysis 
to coalesce labels and expand themes into categories or concrete patterns. I was able to 
progress through the coding, moving from an open engagement into a more focused 
analysis that connected with the theoretical underpinnings proposed in the framework.  
From the beginning sweeps of the data during the coding process, I identified three of 
overarching themes that I could organize all other data points under: ranking connections, 
world-class conceptions, and local policies.  As my research design was heavily rooted in 
past literature, these three themes aligned closely with my interview questions (Newman, 
2014). The basic coding chart can be seen on Table 3.3. As the process of coding 
progressed, though, I realized some quotes could be double coded. I decided to use Crilly 
et al. (2008)’s graphical representation of the data to show how subcoded nodes actually 






Table 3.3: Qualitative Coding Chart of Stakeholder Interviews 
Codes Subcodes Level 1 Subcodes Level 2 
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Source: Coding for this project  
 
Given that this research centered on ranking, “ranking conceptions” were established 
as the first high form code. Any mention of league tables was placed within this code, 
while nested subcategories quickly emerged. One of the obvious codes to have emerged 
was from specific ranking schemes. During the interview, I recorded the specific 
mentions of QS, US News, ARWU, THE, and another section on Chinese domestic 
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rankings. Likewise, any mentions of interactions or connections to agents or consultants 
from these schemes were also coded in the larger subcode; although, most interviewees 
had no dealings with these actors. Also during the early stages of coding, I used an 
“interaction” subcode for any reported behaviors and ideas that participants bestowed 
upon ranking. These were so abundant that I quickly began to nest other codes under this 
“interaction” heading, including items such as “benchmarking,” “administrative use,” 
“partnerships,” and “ranking cut-offs.”  
Given the considerable critiques of ranking discussed in the previous chapter, it 
should be no surprise that another category that arose under rankings came from any 
complaints of these metrics. Professor and administration alike were quick to offer 
problems that they saw stemming from league tables. Stories of “isomorphism,” “gaming 
the system,” or other “publishing” complaints became codes.  
Interestingly, interviewees oftentimes had either used rankings themselves during 
their student days or had a family member that had used them. This became the “personal 
use” code. Similarly, some professors reported on their own students’ reactions or 
interactions with rankings, which I split into both an “international” and “domestic” code. 
Though, despite the reports in the literature, “media” mentions surprisingly did not factor 
too heavily in my interviews, but I still tracked this code as a nested node under rank 
conceptions.  
Because the localization of global forces is a central theme to this research inquiry, it 
was important to code for “local policies” germane to the Chinese sector. This large code 
had several nested codes within it. The Chinese university groupings were held within in 
this larger node. Likewise, a critical aspect of studying China has been the moniker 
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“something” with “Chinese characteristic,” such as the most famous example “Capitalism 
with Chinese characteristics.” This emergent concept did arise in an important way in the 
interview, providing a key code that also had several ideas nested within it: such as the 
issues related to “foreign policy,” “censorship,” and even the idea of “Western 
influence.” The “Ministry of Education” was revealed to be a key influence within the 
focus of the research. Any of the elite policies like the “985/211” Projects or the new 
“World Class 2.0” changes became codes. The MoE helped to shed light on the strong 
governmental involvement in the Chinese sector.  
The third top-level node that I identified was the “world-class conception,” which 
was a central piece for almost every interview. Any descriptions for these types of elite 
universities were coded in this section. However, because this concept is actually highly 
dependent on the other two concepts, rankings and localized Chinese ideals, I actually did 
not fill this theme with a significant amount of subcodes. I only included specifically a 
code for “Peking and Tsinghua” Universities, as these universities seemed to occupy the 
world-class space on the Chinese hierarchy. Likewise, respondents would often mention 
a university that they considered to have this status, which I recorded under a “reference” 
subcode. Additionally, because these universities are seen as atop a given hierarchy, I 
also added a “hierarchies” subcode. However, all of these codes could have arguably 
been put into the other two groupings.   
As I moved deeper into the coding, I began to realize that most of my categories 
could not simply be separated from the other larger nodes—they were all interconnected. 
Creswell (2008) stated that oftentimes “researchers interconnect” themes, going beyond 
“basic descriptions” for a more sophisticated analysis or narrative (p. 189). In my study, 
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for instance, the Ministry’s discipline ranking could be labeled under both “Chinese 
characteristics” and “specific rankings” codes. A topic like “foreign faculty” could be 
connected to all three of my large thematic codes. This kind of crossover possibility was 
a factor for over half of my codes, yet it was not a problem. Instead, the connections 
revealed a complicated intersection produced by university rankings in the Chinese 
higher education sector.  
In order to better understand the coding of the data and crossover of topics, I 
illustrated my codes and subcodes into a graphical representation using concentric circles 
on Chart 3.5. According to Crilly et al. (2008), this kind of graphical representation 
“offers the opportunity to thoroughly examine a problem from a number of perspectives 
using visual representations to both record and stimulate thought” (p. 345). Organizing, 
spacing, and illustrating these relationships are “formative” to the exploratory phase of 
the research project and it allows for deeper development for analysis (Crilly et al., 
2008). The visualization forces researchers to consider data on multiple levels during the 
coding process (Bagnoli, 2009).  
The center of these three concentric circles contains several important subcodes. The 
“interaction” code was the most obvious, as rankings were seen as key indicators of this 
status for professors and administrators. I included an intersection of “government” and 
university “administrative” leaders working within these three larger themes and under 
reactions. Furthermore, as rankings have had considerable isomorphic effects across the 
global, this phenomenon is also present in China and it became a key code for this 
analysis, which strongly connected to the publishing pressures, another important code in 
the center of the three themes. While I expected references to play a more central factor 
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in this research, I was left unsatisfied with this code during the interviews. Nonetheless, 
the concept still sits between all three of the larger themes.    
Chart 3.5: Concentric Circles of Coding  
 
Source: Coding from this research. 
 
Conceptualizing the coding through the three concentric circles helps to illustrate the 
interconnectedness for this area of research. In Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, I dive deeper 
into these intersections, showing through my analysis of how universities must balance 
between global ranking pressures and strong local characteristics. Likewise, in Chapter 6, 






Quantitative Sample: Surveying Students  
For the quantitative sampling of students, I used two different collection phases. The 
instrument was built upon Qualtrics system in order to efficiently and widely sample 
students. I utilized my networks described above to disseminate the survey via the 
popular WeChat and other social media. Students could connect to the survey via a QR 
code, which is a common feature of WeChat in China, or simply through a shared link. 
Further, I also utilized in-class sampling in five Chinese universities in three different 
cities: Beijing, Nanjing, and Jinan. For the live sampling, I gave brief lectures to classes 
and then asked the students if they would like to participate in the survey. Students were 
free to opt-in/out to participate and, to entice recruitment, I offered a very small lottery 
reward of 20 Chinese RMB1 that students could choose to enter. The small reward 
decreased the chances that someone would take the survey simply to enter the contest.   
For the second phase of survey sampling, in order to bolster the sample beyond my 
personal network, I contracted a Shandong-based private research firm that specializes in 
using university students in market research. Similar to the growing use of Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk in the US, this small firm works with a large pool of student 
participants throughout China, offering potential respondents small fees to take online 
surveys on a range of various topics. In parallel to my personal data gathering, the 
students accessed the instrument via a link or QR and connected directly to my Qualtrics 
survey. In order to ensure the legitimacy and validity of the responses, I observed 
respondents’ IP addresses, access time for the survey, and time of completion.  
 
 																																																								
1 This is roughly equal to a cup of Starbucks coffee.  
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Survey Design  
I drafted the survey instrument using past studies and literature related to higher 
education, ranking impact, and explorations of education’s normative effects (see surveys 
in Pizmony-Levy & Doan, 2016; Pizmony-Levy & Green-Saraisky, 2016). The 
instrument consisted of four sections: demographics, ranking experiences, world-class 
conceptions, and future plans/ scenarios. Most of the questions were multiple-choice, 
with a few fill-in-the-blanks to account for variation in some topics. I chose to minimize 
sensitive topics and attempted to focus only on conceptions of education or rankings.  
Upon completion of the first draft of questions, I allowed professors to review the 
instrument in order to maximize the eventual data’s relevance to the larger literature. I 
had all of the questions translated into native Chinese speaker and scholar familiar with 
the project. After this stage, I entered the pre-test phase by sending the pilot survey to a 
small group of Chinese students to ensure all of the questions were understandable and 
relatable. I went through this process a few times to hone a few specific questions that 
were causing confusion for the testers. After the pre-test, my survey was brief (10 
minutes), easy-to-read, and assessable—aligned with optimal survey design according to 
Bradburn et al. (2004). The instrument was approved in both Mandarin and in English by 
the IRB. Further, all of the participants took the survey anonymously as prescribed in the 
guidelines.  
For the demographics, I only asked standard questions often found in social science 
research: gender, parental education, which is often used as a proxy for affluence, 
geography, education level, and major. I also ask students to provide the name of their 
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university through a fill-in-the-blank question, as I wanted to make sure to capture every 
university type possible. I later standardized every one of these answers for data analysis.  
For the ranking experience section, I first asked students to provide a couple of self-
assessments: one related to the attention paid to educational media and another was on 
familiarity with rankings. These self-assessments are often used in social science research 
and provide important measures of experiences (Spector, 1994). However, given the 
flaws inherent to self-assessment survey response, I also implemented a check on these 
answers (Spector, 1994). To audit the responses, I had students guess their universities’ 
rankings internationally and domestically with a range of five choices and an optional “I 
don’t know.” Because the respondents had provided their university, I was able to later 
crosscheck their answers within the most popular Chinese and international ranking 
schemes.  
In other ranking related questions, I also had the students report which specific 
rankings that they were familiar with from a list of the most popular schemes 
(Marginson, 2014). Further, I gathered information on how students knew about 
rankings, derived from a list of popular sources like family or teachers (Hazelkorn, 2015). 
The final question in this section had students rate several factors on a Likert scale of 
importance in their college-going decision, including rankings. My goal for this question 
was to gauge how crucial rankings have been for Chinese students compared to other 
factors, such as amenities or majors.   
The third section of my survey focused on world-class university conceptions. While 
a short section of only four questions, these were all carved out of past research on 
globalization and higher education, especially considering reference societies, as 
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illustrated in the previous chapter. These high-minded conceptual questions were 
considerably different from those in previous sections that directly related to student 
experience. The first question asked if the best Chinese universities were comparable to 
the best universities in the world. In conjunction, I asked if China has some of the best 
universities in Asia. I was hoping to tease out a regionalism from the population. Finally, 
I had the students consider if the best education equaled the top-ranked universities. In 
the end, I did not use these questions in any of the analysis because of limited space. I 
intend to consider these leftover data for future analysis, though. 
Finally, for the section on future plans, I wanted to connect this survey to literature on 
international mobility. I asked students to gauge their interest in studying abroad in the 
future. As shown in the literature review, students who study abroad are much more 
attuned to rankings, so this factor was quite important for my research. With the 
respondent group who reported at least some interest in studying abroad, I added a few 
items for them to gauge as important in their future decision, such as location and 
ranking. However, given the domestic nature of this ultimate study, I did not use these 
extra responses. I will use the data in a future research project on international students 
from China.  
 
Sample Demographics    
For the total sample, I received a total of 1,120 students from Chinese universities, 
which included 500 respondents from the private firm. However, for the analysis of this 
research, I removed graduate and exchanges students because I wanted an apples-to-
apples comparison across the respondents. Graduate students have differing experiences 
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than undergraduates, especially considering rankings. After this purposefully culling, the 
total sample of Chinese undergraduate students totaled 924. While not a generalizable 
sample, the robust number of responses can still provide insights into larger trends within 
the sector, as similar past research has argued (see comparable works by Chen, 2007; 
Gong & Huybers, 2015; Cao et al., 2016; Liu & Morgan, 2016).   
Shown on Table 3.4, the sample contained wide range of demographics in the 
Chinese higher education sector. In the sample, 31.4% of students came from the elite 
985 universities, an over-representation from the larger sector, and 7.7% from the 211 
institutions. For the non-elite project universities, students from regional institutions 
accounted for 56% of the sample, while respondents from local institutions accounted for 
the other 11.5% of representation. Women were overrepresented by just under three to 
one in the sample, an undercount of men. China’s tertiary education system is 1.19 
female to one male, according to the World Bank data.2 For population distribution, 
47.4% of the sample came from provinces on the wealthy eastern coast, where a plurality 
of the elite and strong universities are located, around 29% were from the Western 
provinces, including Sichuan, 19% originated from the central inland areas, and only 






2 Data accessed from “School enrollment, tertiary (gross), gender parity index (GPI)” indicator on the 
World Bank website: 
<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.ENR.TERT.FM.ZS?end=2015&locations=CN> 
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Table 3.4: Student Survey Sample Demographics 
Variable Definition and Metrics  Frequency 
(%) 
University Type      Local   
     Regional 
     211 Project  





   
Gender      Female 
     Male  
67.8 
32.3 
   
Grade level       Freshman 
     Sophomore  




   
Region       East coast  
     Central 
     Northeast 
     West 






   
Parental education      Below high school 
     High school 
     Some college 
     College degree 






Source: Compiled for this research by the author.   
 
Multivariate Analysis  
Multivariate analysis has been a key methodology used in some of the most 
influential studies in the impact of rankings (see Ehrenberg, 2005; Espeland & Sauder, 
2007; Bowman & Bastedo, 2009). According to Rencher (2003), multivariate analysis 
has allowed researchers to “peer beneath the tangled web of variables on the surface and 
extract the essence of the system” (p. xv). Because my study is looking to understand a 
phenomenon sector-wide, the analysis provides an understanding of complex outcomes 
of almost 1000 different experiences. Analyzing the collective measurements from the 
students has provided a rich insight of the localization in global forces.  
In recent decades, statistical software has proliferated rigorous methods like 
multivariate analysis. For this research, I utilized StataSE software. I downloaded my 
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dataset from Qualtrics and first uploaded it to excel for cleaning. I removed the 
respondents without any data.3 I also relabeled the variable headings to prepare for 
modeling. After the initial cleaning, I uploaded the dataset into Stata. Upon first 
exploring the dataset, such as checking basic frequencies and other descriptive statistics, I 
began to organize variables for testing. This initial variable organization is saved as a Do-
File that I called Dissertation Data Cleaning. In order to minimize mistakes, I created a 
code for any changes that I made to my variables and used CLEAR to revert these 
changes during a new session with the dataset. Every time I opened Stata for analysis, 
this cleaning file had to be run first. For the actual modeling, I had a separate Do-File 
called Final Model that I only used after running Dissertation Data Cleaning. 
For the analysis in Chapter 6, I utilized two types of multivariate analysis: 
multinomial logistic regression (MLR) and binary logistic regression (BLR). These are 
models that can be used with either categorical (Ex: yes, no, maybe) or binary (Ex: yes, 
no) outcome variables. In this kind of logistic regression, the relationship between the 
independent variables (the predictors) and the dependent variables (outcome) is 
predicted. In the model, all of the predictors are considered together to assess the 
predictability while controlling for each effect (Williams, 2017). My results were 
reported through odds ratios, meaning the constant effect of the predictor on the models’ 
outcome.  
There are a set of assumptions that must be met in various multivariate tests. The 
make-up and nature of my data led me to the selection of multinomial and binary logistic 
regression in my analysis. First, the relationships that I tested were not linear, meaning 																																																								
3 Some respondents opened the survey and answered none of the questions, which provides me with no 
data. These were removed from the dataset.  
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that I could not use linear regression analysis. Further, my predicted variables were also 
binary and unordered categorical; thus, I could not use ordered logistic regression (OLR) 
analysis because it operates under strict rules and it was not feasible due to my sample 
distribution (Peterson & Harrell, 1990; Stokes et al., 2012). I ensured that my models did 
not meet the proportional odds/parallelism test that would be needed to use OLR (Brant, 
1999). Likewise, OLR is ideal when predicted outcomes have a clear hierarchy. My 
models did, though, pass multicollinearity tests that are needed for both MLR and BLR.  
In Chapter 6, I used two types of multivariate analysis for this study. For the MLR, I 
used the variable of how familiar students were with rankings in three different tiers: 
familiar, somewhat familiar, and totally unfamiliar. This test has allowed me to 
understand the kinds of characteristics that predict ranking familiarity. The model 
contains both demographic and ranking-related traits for each student. In the second test 
of Chapter 6, I use BLR modeling with the outcome variable of students’ tested rank 
knowledge and, again, reported via odds ratios. On the survey, I tested whether students 
actually knew their universities’ local and global rankings. Through the BLR modeling, I 
am able to infer which type of students could actually pass this test, which is analysis that 
has never been conducted before. Similar to the MLR analysis, the model contains 
demographic and ranking-related traits for each student, with a few variations. I will 
provide further details for the statistical modeling and analysis used in Chapter 6. 
 
Limitations 
There are several limitations to my study, as every study contains some set of 
limitations. Despite any of these issues, the research is still relevant to the wider literature 
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on university rankings and comparable to other studies in this area. Furthermore, none of 
the limitations discussed are outside the normal scope of research as listed by Creswell 
(2008).  
This study naturally contains some bias germane to issues in social science research 
validity. As the lead and lone investigator, my conceptions, analyses of the data, and 
results have my own personal partiality imprinted onto them (George & Bennett, 2005). 
Like in other social science studies, I have attempted to minimize these personal biases 
through two key steps. First, I have rooted the inquiry in established and vetted theories, 
as cited in the previous chapter and throughout the analytical sections. Building upon 
influential research and important studies has provided guidance in all phases of this 
project, from implementation to the write-up. Next, I have considered the advice and 
feedback of my advisor and others during the entire process (Maxwell, 2013). They are 
expert researchers with years of social science experience. Following their advice has 
allowed me to avoid pitfalls that could threaten the research validity (Maxwell, 2013). 
While these are all important steps to minimize my personal bias, there will always be 
some partiality in research. Yet, I believe that despite these limitations in personal bias, 
this dissertation research is an overall valid and additive to the field in the understanding 
of global university rankings and the Chinese experience.  
Another issue is that the findings produced cannot be taken as generalizable because 
of biases within the samples (George & Bennett, 2005). First, qualitative studies do not 
aspire to be generalizable (Creswell, 2008); instead, these types of researcher look to 
paint pictures or provide snapshots into societal phenomenon—my interview data can 
provide these narratives. However, qualitative studies do often aspire for generalizability 
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(Creswell, 2008). My dataset, unfortunately, is not a true representative sample to the 
larger Chinese higher education population. The lack of any true experimental design and 
the overrepresentation and underrepresentation from certain populations disallows any 
generalizability. 
Survey research in China is expensive and quite difficult. Even with my access and 
fellowship funding, I could not replicate scientific polling in universities throughout the 
county. During my proposal stage, a professor offering advice for my project told me that 
she had a team of graduate students and years of funding to gain a generalizable survey 
sample in a study of Chinese urbanization. Because of these barriers, other studies similar 
to my own have simply used non-generalizable samples, in methods comparable to my 
design (Chen, 2007; Gong & Huybers, 2015; Cao et al., 2016; Liu & Morgan, 2016). My 
study can still provide strong understandings of the higher education sector in China, just 
as other studies have done in the past.      
Furthermore, in survey research, respondents sometimes lose interests and hurry 
through or simply quit in the middle (Bradburn et al., 2004). I minimized these issues by 
keeping the surveys tight and crisp. Likewise, I pre-tested multiple versions of the survey 
to address issues in readability. If the survey is readable, understandable, and relatable to 
the target audience, then respondents will be more likely to finish (Creswell, 2008). 
While I did predictably have some participants drop out in the middle survey, there were 
actually not that many relative to the over 1,000 respondents who did finish.   
In terms of interview research, my presence in the field as an investigator also 
provides some drawbacks (Creswell, 2008). Originally dubbed the Hawthorne Effect, this 
concept predicts that participants will alter behavior in order to contort researcher 
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expectations (Cook, 1962). Accordingly, informants in this kind of research have been 
known to attempt to please the interviewer (Blommaert & Dong, 2010). Participants may 
mask dissatisfactions or negativities for fear of retribution. Because China is a society 
more closed off to criticism than the Western system, I had always been concerned with 
these limitations of interviews since the project’s inception.    
I did attempt to minimize any masking or interviewer effects in a few ways. While 
there might have been some aspects of my research that could be considered sensitive, I 
did not really focus on problematic aspects of Chinese society during my inquiry, such as 
regime stability. Instead, I have focused on conceptions of experience with 
internationalization and domestic pressures, which seem to be topics that have been 
freely discussed in China. After all, the Hanban vetted my project proposal by granting 
me the fellowship to study in the country. Likewise, I only interviewed people through a 
snowball method, giving me an extra layer of acceptability as a researcher (Dilly, 2000). I 
built on this familiarity by conducting interviews in the most comfortable manner the 
informants requested, such as in their offices and at any time of the day. My education-
focused research design, connections with BNU or the Hanban, and interview flexibility 
allowed me to maximize trust for the interviewees.  
Another limitation stemming from the interviews comes from my weak Chinese 
language ability. While I studied for two years to prepare for my fieldwork, gaining the 
skills needed to communicate on the academic level would have delayed my process by 
another five years. I had to make due with my elementary communication skills in 
Chinese, help from my assistant, and the English ability of my informants. During the 
interviews, we mostly spoke in English, but I could understand some key higher 
	 80 
education terms and other basic communications. A few interviews were done through a 
translator, most often with my research assistant. Given that English dominates the global 
higher education sector, there are expectations that professionals should have basic 
English communication skills. Indeed, most of my contacts and connections could speak 
English. In fact, this dominance was even a topic of discussion for my research.  
For the analysis of the interviews, the coding of data was rooted in the logic behind 
my instrument, as theoretical and methodological considerations provided the 
foundations to my research design. Researchers do not simply show up without 
background knowledge for fieldwork, despite aspirations to inductive research (Creswell, 
2008). During coding, I attempted to stay open to themes or concepts that may have not 
been expected in the initial design. Using NVivo’s capabilities and tight guidelines for 
coding were important ways for me to stay somewhat neutral in the process and analysis. 
I could successfully and efficiently re-read my interviews for more coding without having 
to start all the way over again. Further, the visual mapping of my codes helped to 
comprehend and interact with the data through a complex perspective. Social science 
often attempts to fit society into measurable boxes, but the real world is not always that 
simple (Creswell, 2008). 
Finally, the findings in my study are not static, as Chinese society and education 
sector have been going through considerable dynamism in the past thirty years. These 
changes may actually increase in the coming decade, too. Thus, it will be important to 
consider these results as a snapshot of a temporal period within the Chinese setting. But, 
even within the more stable American system, there have been considerable changes that 
provided impetus for constant study and analysis. Concurrently, given the very nature of 
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the annual release of new rankings, there is an expected movement of every institution 
listed on the league tables. Responses to the fluidity are exactly what this study is trying 
to capture. Yet, it can only be captured for years that have already happened. New results 
lead to new responses, which beget new trends. There will be a continued need for 




CHAPTER FOUR: Making Sense of the World-Class University Concept through 
Rankings: Commensuration and Elite Global Status in China  
 
Abstract 
The concept of the world-class university has proliferated throughout the global 
higher education sector, yet there is no universal consensus on how to define these elite 
institutions. Some scholars have argued that these globally elite universities are the large, 
research-intensive kinds that are often found in the United States or Britain, but that have 
also popped up in places across East Asia. Others have argued that world-class 
universities can only be found in learning environments that are intellectually open, free, 
and innovative. Because there is no agreed upon definition for this concept, I argue that 
rankings have become a proxy sense-making in the global higher education sector. 
League tables have provided a commensurate indicator that decision-makers can use to 
understand the world-class concept. Through interviews with 48 stakeholders from the 
Chinese higher education sector, I explore how institutions in China conceptualize world-
class status through university rankings. First, I show that the sector in China has intently 
focused on league table positioning, with the top-100 as a popular credential for 
guaranteed world-class status. Next, explore which global rankings have been the most 
influential—QS, THE, ARWU, and US News. Finally, I discuss how actors living in this 
competitive higher education environment have changed research behaviors to align with 





Educators, administrators, and policymakers across the globe have been chasing 
world-class university status in recent decades (Deem et al., 2008; Salmi & Liu, 2011). 
Yet, a universal definition for this concept is difficult to determine (Shin & Kehm, 2012; 
Marginson, 2017). In this same period, higher education has witnessed a rapid increase in 
global engagement through international student and scholar mobility, branch campuses, 
multinational research partnerships, and other global projects (see Montgomery & 
McDowell, 2014; Cantwell, 2015; Kolesnikov et al., 2017; Altbach & Yudkevich, 2017).  
How, then, do universities determine which school abroad to partner with, which 
international faculty to hire, or what other universities are world-class? While national 
hierarchies are steeped in familiarity of tradition, culture, and history, these factors are 
muted on the global stage (Hazelkorn, 2015). The global higher education system is 
complex and immense. There is no recognized global regulatory agency that grants 
university status and an expertise in education on a global scale is elusive because the 
system is far too complex. Aside from Harvard, Oxford, and a few other ubiquitously 
recognized global universities, it is perplexing to fully comprehend the global system of 
higher education (Altbach & Knight, 2007; Hazelkorn, 2012). Even an astute scholar of 
international education might be unfamiliar with universities of certain regions where 
they lack knowledge  
Given a complex environment, such as the global higher education sector, decision-
makers in education have been attracted to simplified measures or indicators to make 
sense of a system (Dill, 2007). Espeland and Stevens (1998) called this quantification of 
abstract ideas into smaller, easier-to-define measurements “commensuration.” These 
	 84 
simplified commensurate concepts often manifest into kinds of rankings that can be used 
for direct comparison to other systems, including global university rankings. While 
global league tables have only been around since 2003, these indicators have quickly 
proliferated across the world (Rust & Kim, 2015). Effects from global rankings vary 
widely depending on institution type, stakeholder, or other contexts. For instance, local 
community colleges have likely ignored global league table; conversely, the elite end of 
the spectrum in almost every nation has been intently glued to the rankings (Hazelkorn, 
2015). Parents and students, especially the international variety, use rankings1 in the 
college-going decision process (Drewes & Michael, 2006; Perraton, 2017). Policymakers 
and alumni, too, have been monitoring their respective sectors or institutions to ensure 
they are keeping up with peers (Salmi, 2009). Universities themselves, despite critiques, 
must stay attuned to league table positioning.  
While scholars have noted the connection between global university rankings and the 
world-class university conception, there has been little research that shows how these 
indicators are actually used as a tool for sense-making by stakeholders (see Salmi, 2009; 
Shin & Kehm, 2012; Kim et al., 2017). For instance, Bowman and Bastedo (2009) 
illustrated how US News & World Report ranking creates a commensurate elite top-25 
grouping from those institutions that make the “front-page” of that year’s ranking issue. 
The effect has dramatic impact on student application behaviors, causing a frenzy of 
completion from institutions to join or stay in the top-25. Hazelkorn (2015) posited that a 
similar effect exists for the top-100 of global university rankings, but the concept has not 
been empirically tested. Given these gaps, it is unclear exactly how stakeholders in higher 																																																								
1 In literature on university rankings, studies and pieces from domestic and global league table research is 
often used interchangeably. While the two types of rankings can be distinct, there presences are seen to 
have similar affects on higher education sectors (see Altbach, 2013; Hazelkorn, 2015; Marginson, 2014). 
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education have used global rankings as sense-making for the world-class concept and the 
multitude of decisions related to it, such as hiring, scholar exchanges, joint-partnerships, 
research, or other international cooperative measures.  
Chinese universities offer important cases for understanding the centrality of 
university rankings to the world-class conception for a few reasons. First, Chinese society 
has had historical reverence for top-down hierarchal structures, with affinity for status 
and ranking, such as through the keju or the Imperial Examination System (Hayhoe, 
1996; Lü, 2000). Furthermore, the nation has had a strong, centralized governmental 
structure with recent history of technocratic rule by the Chinese Communist Party, 
especially throughout the Reform and Opening Era (Hayhoe, 1989). Next, as Deng 
Xiaoping opened China to the world, it sent its students out to learn from Western nations 
like the United States; the goal was for these students to return to China in order to 
modernize various sectors, especially the education system (Li, 2004b). Indeed, Chinese 
universities have undergone unprecedented transformations during this era in attempts to 
reaching a perceived international standard (Mok & Chan, 2008).  
Since the early 2000s, many Chinese institutions have skyrocketed in the rankings, as 
policymakers there have invested heavily in the top range of the sector (Liu et al., 2016; 
Altbach, 2016). Through high profile government initiatives, Chinese universities have 
been besieged with research funding and have pushed internationalization ventures that 
can be accounted for in rank metrics (Ngok & Guo, 2008). The aspirations of Chinese 
institutions and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP or the Party) are backed behind 
investments into global recognition and prestige (see Schneider & Hwang, 2014). While 
there has been considerable research looking at these elite-making initiatives in China 
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and the nation’s quest for world-class universities, the effects of global league tables in 
the sector have not fully been explored (see Rhoads et al., 2014; Tian et al., 2016; Kim et 
al., 2017). There has been no research on Chinese universities considering the role of 
commensuration in terms of higher education globally, which has been a crucial concept 
for how universities in the US have made sense of domestic higher education (Kelley et 
al., 2015).  
To fill these gaps in the research, I explore how global rankings have become 
commensurate measures to the world-class university conception in China. In my inquiry, 
I specifically ask two questions: 1) What kinds of global ranking metrics are important to 
the Chinese conception of world-class universities? 2) To what extent have university 
rankings been used by Chinese university stakeholders as credentials in navigating the 
quest for world-class universities? Through interviews with university faculty and staff, I 
illustrate the ways in which actors in China have used league tables as an important 
sense-making tool in understanding the global higher education hierarchy. Given the 
commensurate power of rankings, league table positioning has provided a kind of world-
class credential for Chinese universities.  
 
The World-Class University   
The concept of the world-class university has proliferated across higher education 
sectors worldwide. Scholars have argued that nations across the world have some policy 
or goal of establishing or maintaining these types of institutions (Altbach & Knight, 
2007; Salmi, 2009). The vagueness in definition may actually allow for global 
malleability to local characteristics (Deem et al., 2008). The Western-style research 
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university has been the preferred model for emulation in world-class university races and 
these institutions are often large, research focused, including master’s degree and Ph.D. 
programs, and contain a full range of disciplines (Hazelkorn, 2012). While first appearing 
in the West, particularly in the United States, institutions that fit this description can be 
found across the world now, especially in East Asia, where governments have heavily 
invested into the upper echelons of their university sectors (Marginson, 2011).  
Policies surrounding these world-class institutions have often reflected a human 
capital approach to development (Shin & Kehm, 2012). These elite kinds of institutions 
around the world foster research, development, and the knowledge economy, key facets 
to human capital theory. Likewise, universities are have been considered as key 
mechanisms in fostering knowledge economies (Philpott et al., 2011). A report by Salmi 
(2009) for the World Bank promoted the university as an economic engine model in 
terms of the world-class university. The highly cited report summarized the concept into 
three broad qualities as displayed in Fig. 4.1: concentration of talent, abundant resources, 
and favorable governance. The combination of financial resources and research capacity 
encompass many aspects of the characteristics that the World Bank advocates in these 









Figure 4.1: Characteristics of a World-Class University: Alignment of Key Factors 
 
Source: Salmi (2009). 
There are other aspects, of course, that help to characterize general world-class status. 
University affiliation can factor into this conception—peer universities will band together 
with other global elite institution to reinforce the status (Hazelkorn, 2015). For instance, 
in the US, the Ivy League or Association of American Universities are sets of universities 
with common missions, which collectively consider themselves an elite peer group 
(Graham & Diamond, 2007; Altbach, 2015). Likewise, there are global affiliations with 
similar characteristics, without the same pedigree, though. In the summer of 2017, 
Tsinghua University led an initiative of 15 regional universities called the Asian 
Universities Alliance, as documented by the International Consultants for Education and 
Fairs (ICEF) Monitor. This grouping coalesced the top regional universities into a peer 
grouping to boost mobility, research, and other collaborative efforts. Age and location 
have also been attributes associated with these elite types of universities. Hazelkorn 
(2015) argued that the older an institution, the more likely it is to be considered 
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prestigious; while this “time-lag” (p. 82) advantage is not always present, most of the top 
institutions in the world are also some of the oldest. Relatedly, location is rooted in the 
dominance of Western colonial history, as the US, UK, and the rest of West tend to have 
a disproportional concentration of elite institutions (Deem et al., 2008). Some scholars 
have argued that Western higher education systems attained excellence built on a 
foundation of academic freedom (Altbach, 2013; Marginson, 2014b); to innovate and 
create at a world-class level, researchers and thinkers must be free of any reprisal from a 
government. Yet, not every elite global university is located in the West, and societies 
such as the Asian Tigers have grown some globally respected universities (Lo, 2011). As 
the global sector becomes more complicated, these traditional characteristics have 
become less used in world-class conceptions in favor of ranking metrics (Hazelkorn, 
2015).  
 
Theorizing Rankings as a World-Class Credential  
The process of simplifying complex sectors, systems, or institutions into more 
fathomable metrics is known as commensuration (Espeland & Stevens, 1998).  Porter 
(1996) contended that there is a growing “governance by numbers” whereby 
policymakers use indicators in formulation of various policies because these indicators 
are considered more objective. Shore and Wright (2015) described this movement in 
education as an audit culture, defined as, “The use of indicators, measurements, and 
rankings have become increasingly pervasive, both as instruments in the internal 
management of organizations and in the external representations of their quality, 
efficiency, and accountability to the wider public” (p. 421). Some critical examples 
	 90 
include: the creation of the Research Excellence Framework (REF) to spur accountability 
and competition in the United Kingdom higher education sector and nations making 
policy decisions by PISA benchmarking  (Dill, 2007; Takayama, 2010)  
Conceptions of policy and governance have spread across the world, not just in 
Western societies. Post-Soviet nations have had histories of relying on indicators for 
bureaucratic decision-making, lionizing these methods as scientific rationality (Steiner-
Khamsi, 2003; Kojevnikov, 2008). China has been especially keen on this kind of 
technocratic rule after it began to adopt more free marketizations into its economic 
system in the 1980s and beyond (Lee, 1991). In recent years, Cooley (2015) argued that 
global rank metrics have gained importance across the globe because of the proliferation 
in (1) “techniques of performance evaluation in modern political and social life” (2) 
“strengthening of global governance networks,” (3) and “new information technologies 
and open data sources” (p. 10). Commensurate league table indicators provide powerful 
influences onto domestic policies because they are seen as objective tools in decision-
making (Porter, 1996 Steiner-Khamsi, 2003). These policy tools simultaneously simplify 
information, while also providing an authoritative foundation for decisions.    
Organizations and nations use rankings to exert pressures onto other societies or 
states in order to establish norms and standards that are shared globally. These indicators 
are used for “naming and shaming” or by forcing comparisons against other peer states 
(Cooley, 2015, p. 6). Oftentimes, these are tools of Western powers to constrain 
behaviors that are deemed unfit for the current world order, such as Human Rights Watch 
(Risse-Kappen et al., 1999). Nations that have ranked poorly on various lists have been 
coerced to change behaviors or national policies in order to regain reputation. The 
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process promotes systems and institutions around the world to look more similar, which 
is a theory referred to as isomorphism (Schofer and Meyer, 2005). China has even been 
influenced to some degree in terms of human rights by this stick and carrot approach of 
the international community (He, 2002).  
Using indicators for decision-making has been an international widespread trend for 
education sectors in recent decades. Because the global higher education sector is highly 
stratified, and within systems that are highly stratified, credentials are critical in 
identifying one stratosphere from another (see Collins, 1979). Collins (2002) stated that 
“credentialling indeed is a manifestation of organizational myth, and it has come to 
define the respectable culture of modernity” (p. 230). While Collins’ theory was 
conceived in regards to individual students in the sector, credentialism can also be useful 
to conceptualize university-wide action and responses. Students in elite universities feed 
credentialism by building networks that allow them to advance in prestigious career 
positions (Tholen et al., 2013), just as elite global universities build their networks and 
partnerships to provide distinctions. O’Meara (2007) described universities that chase this 
kind of prestige as “strivers” (p. 122). She contended that these types of institutions are 
much more attuned to rankings because of the focus on elite symbols like rankings. High 
league table position has arguably become the credential for institutional ambitions in 
these striving universities, signifying membership to an exclusive club. 
University rankings deliver concrete evidence for prestige by organizing an anarchic, 
complex system of higher education and simplifying it into a neat, ordered hierarchy. 
According to Salmi (2009), these schemes have produced “more systematic ways of 
identifying and classifying world-class universities” (p. 6). The leading rankings, such as 
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AWRU, Times, and QS, often measure research output as the key foundation for the 
metrics, but there are also aspects of internationalization, peer recognition, and 
sometimes even subjective evaluations from stakeholders within the sector (Marginson, 
2014a). Parents, students, alumni, business, and a range of actors all utilize college league 
tables for various decisions and processes (Drewes & Michael, 2006; Hazelkorn, 2015; 
Perraton, 2017). Because of their importance, college league tables have also been 
powerful norm agents (see Espeland & Sauder, 2007; Sauder & Espeland, 2009; 
Hazelkorn, 2012). Stakeholders must comport to the narrow metrics that are used for 
measurements, sometimes changing institutional missions in order to align (see Bowman 
& Bastedo, 2009). With pressures from influential international organizations like the 
World Bank, there are intense normative forces and real consequences bearing on local 
actors (Ball, 2012).  
The various metrics on the most popular ranking schemes are quite powerful, as 
universities comport to standards in order to vie for position. The most influential global 
university rankings (Marginson, 2014a), their metrics, and weights are displayed on 
Chart 4.1, including ARWU, QS, THE, and US News. While the organizations might 
have different labels for their indicators, I have reorganized the factors into four distinct 
categories: Reputation, Research, Internationalization, and University Characteristics. 
None of the rankings are exactly the same, but there are considerable overlaps. All of the 
schemas give at least some weight to research, from a high of 90% in ARWU to a lower 
of 20% in QS. Three of them account for reputation, internationalization, and university 
characteristics. Relevant for this research, none of the rankings directly consider 



























The Chinese Quest for World-Class Universities  
China has been a keen player in global higher education over the past few decades. 
The CCP, with a history of technocratic rule, has been especially interested in high-level 
investments into the national knowledge economy, reflecting a highly human capitalistic 
conception (Tsang, 2000). Expanding the scientific capacity for the nation has been key 
in these endeavors. In the early 1990s, the government unveiled the high profile 211 
Project, with the explicit goal of moving to “world standard” higher education (Ngok & 
Guo, 2008, p. 546). The selected 100 universities, later added over a dozen more, in the 
project have become key institutions in the domestic sector and have expanded their 
reach across the world through partnerships or other ventures. In 1998, following the 
success of the 211 Project, the Chinese government targeted an even smaller elite few for 
the 985 Project. Jiang Zemin, China’s supreme leader at the time, declared that the nation 
“must have a number of first-rate universities of international advanced level” (cited by 
Li, 2004a, p. 17). This grouping, which expanded to 39 universities, was established as 
the domestic elite and also became the most recognized internationally (Yang & Welch, 
2012). The first nine of these 985 institutions also organized into a so-called “Chinese Ivy 
League,” dubbed the C9 League (Allen, 2017). All of the universities with any of these 
statuses became the de facto leaders in the Chinese higher education sector. While, in 
2015, the government officially ended both projects, announcing a new venture, entitled 
ShuangYiLiu (World Class 2.0 or Double First Class), the new program has kept most of 
the established hierarchies of the past in place (Sharma, 2016).  
	 95 
Chinese institutions have been expressly interested in creating connections with 
others in the West (Song, 2017). Likewise, Western universities, too, have flocked to 
China in search of partnerships that could become lucrative pathways to students, such as 
NYU-Shanghai or Nottingham University-Ningbo. Chinese universities already have 
impressive global partnerships across the world, for instance, Oxford and Tsinghua 
announced a dual Master’s program; MIT organizes an official “China Lab” program 
with four other Chinese universities; London School of Economics and Political Science 
has planned to launch a joint-degree with Shanghai’s Fudan University by 2020. These 
are just but a few examples that encompass an inundated sector of Chinese-foreign 
collaborations (Kolesnikov, 2017). Further, these foreign institutions are ranked quite 
highly in the most popular ranking schemes.  
The top universities in China are significantly competitive and professors are under 
significant pressure to publish. The Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI) Syndrome is a 
term coined by Chou (2014), a scholar in Taiwan, describing how publishing in top 
journals drives intuitions, placing extreme pressures on academics. And while Chinese 
universities have rocketed up on highly cited academic publishing because of the funding 
and extreme pressures, this has also led to wholesale cheating, such as plagiarism and 
fraudulent data (Lin, 2013). Government agencies have taken notice recently and have 
been working to combat this kind of academic fraud, but the pressures remain 
(Cyranoski, 2017). In more recent years, instead of simply copying Western institutions, 
Chinese universities have made concerted overtures to carve domestic identities, even 
while keeping global standards. In 2016, at the National Conference on Ideological and 
Political Work in Universities, Chinese President Xi Jinping declared that a shift in policy 
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was needed in the creation of “world class universities” with “Chinese characteristics,” 
meaning that the nation did not need to simply copy the West (as cited in Song, 2017).  
Despite these impressive developments since the reform and opening of the late 
1970s, scholars have questioned the CCP’s ability to realistically foster world-class 
universities. Salmi (2009) admonished this as a “serious issue” in the nation’s push for 
elite institutions (p. 59). Altbach (2016) further provided critique of the Chinese system, 
saying that the elite universities would hit a “glass ceiling” due to an overbearing 
government and the lack of academic freedom. He argued that moving up in the rankings 
would not provide Chinese institutions with true elite status because of these barriers with 
academic freedom. However, a few scholars have contended with these critiques of 
China. The argument is that China already contains world-class universities such as 
Tsinghua University and Peking University, which are both perennially the highest 
ranked Chinese universities (see Yang & Welch, 2012; Rhoads et al., 2014; Yang, 2017). 
Though, the commensuration of this world-class conception through rankings in China 
remains unclear in the research.  
 
Data Collection and Methods   
Researchers have used interviews with university stakeholders in past studies in 
explorations of societal links or changes (Kvale, 2008; O’Meara et al., 2011). I conducted 
48 one-on-one interviews with a purposeful sample of administrators and professors 
within the landscape of the elite end of the Chinese higher education over the period from 
February to August 2017. These participants are considered to be “elite” experts in the 
sector (Littig, 2009, p. 99). The interviewees provided quantitative data that allowed me 
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to capture the “social reality” of Chinese universities balancing both global and domestic 
forces in ways that cannot be done through quantitative methodology (Alvesson, 2010, p. 
2660). I focused my sampling on stakeholders from elite Chinese universities as 
distinguished by government status and universities that are self-described as globally 
ambitious, including foreign partner campuses, often characterized by programming 
almost exclusively in English, hiring foreign staff, and recruiting large foreign student 
populations (Flowerdew & Li, 2009). I narrowed my focus on the elite sector of Chinese 
higher education because concern for rankings and international recognition are more 
crucial to these universities and actors.  
I used a snowballing method to gather the sample, garnering interviews through 
networks and referrals (Dilly, 2000). I did not blindly solicit participation for this 
research; instead, I used six months of field research in China to build a network of 
interviewees through conferences, meetings, academic events, and public lectures. I was 
embedded as a visiting research doctoral fellow at Beijing Normal University (BNU) on 
the Chinese government’s Confucius China Studies Fellowship during the spring and 
summer of 2017. While my base at BNU provided ample research networks, I also 
branched far beyond Beijing to create a fuller sample. I traveled to several cities—
Shanghai, Shenzhen, Hong Kong, Jinan, Nanjing, and Ningbo—to maximize sampling of 
the elite higher education sector.  
The interviews were almost exclusively conducted in two ways: one-on-one in-person 
or through the phone in English. The in-person interviews mostly took place on campuses 
in the offices of the interviewees, and at basically any hour they requested (some were 
very early in the morning, others were late at night). I conducted phone interviews mostly 
	 98 
from my accommodations in Beijing, but a few were done in hotels (also at the time of 
the interviewees’ preferences). I wanted to ensure these interactions were easy for the 
participants to keep them comfortable and open (Blommaet & Dong, 2010). However, 
three interviews were conducted via email to accommodate respondents’ preferences. 
The meetings were recorded and took anywhere from a minimum of 20 minutes to a 
maximum of an hour and a half, with an average of around one hour. Almost all of these 
interactions were conducted in English; however, I also relied on a student research 
assistant for a few interviews where the participants were more comfortable speaking in 
Chinese.  
As prescribed by the guidelines of Intuitional Review Board (IRB), the participants in 
the study provided explicit permission to be part of the sample, this included audio 
recordings of the interactions. In alignment with the privacy guidelines, the identities of 
participants have been anonymized, along with any identifiable characteristics, such as 
university name or specific program. I have offered only vague descriptions in the 
analysis that cannot be used to trace back the informant. Additionally, all identifying 
materials will be destroyed, including the audio, at the conclusion of this project.   
 
Sample 
As for the characteristics of the sample (n=48), a breakdown can be seen on Table 1. 
The sample includes 12 interviewees from the C9 League, 17 from 985 Project 
universities, seven from 211 Project universities, and 12 from other globally focused 
institutions. None of the respondents come from the bottom or middle tiers in this study 
and all of institutions included have clear global ambitions to varying degrees. 
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Furthermore, of the 48 interviewees, 44 were Chinese nationals, with an additional four 
from foreign stakeholders. But, only 31 of the respondents were educated in China for all 
of their degrees, while the other 17 received at least one degree abroad, mostly from 
Western institutions. I also had a range of academic backgrounds: 12 from the social 
sciences/ humanities, seven from the natural sciences, 17 from education, and 11 others 
were administrators. I additionally included people with varying level of experience in 
the sample, from early, mid-, to late-career stakeholders.  
 
Coding  
I transcribed the recorded interviews and entered the transcriptions into NVivo, a 
qualitative coding application. I first began by open coding through themes that were 
apparent via the focus of the interview instrument (which can be found in the appendix). 
Through these early observations, for instance, I coded any mentions of “rankings” from 
the interviewees, “world-class universities,” which included the basic definitions offered 
for these types of institutions, and any “governmental policies.” Through these 
observations, I established the larger codes for which I would nest more nuanced sub-
codes under (Blommaert & Dong, 2010).  
As the coding continued, I further subcategorized rankings that continued to arise in 
the interviews, such as “QS,” “ARWU,” “US News,” and “THE.” Likewise, the specific 
governmental policies, such as “Project 985,” “Project 211,” and the “World Class 2.0.” 
The discussions of these specific projects often led into new coding areas relate to 
“Chinese characteristic,” a larger code that I filled with important sub-codes, such as 
“censorship,” “foreign influences,” “Western,” and “foreign policy.” Furthermore, I sub-
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coded for ranking “cutoffs” that interviewees mentioned universities needed to attain for 
elite status. While not every interview gave an exact number, I was able to later code 
“administrative” requirements related to rankings and “partnerships,” two sub-codes 
added under the larger code.  
Once the coding was ready for a final analysis, I had identified three overarching 
themes: ranking conceptions, world-class conceptions, and the domestic setting. Within 
each of these larger themes nested specific codes that I mentioned above, but I discovered 
clear overlap between these different areas of the data. Exploring how these triangulated 
together allowed me to understand the intersections between global forces and local 
characteristics that stakeholders must balance in the Chinese higher education sector.   
 
Limitations   
Qualitative interviewing methodology does not aspire to have a representative sample 
(Blommaert & Dong, 2010). The method cannot offer generalizable claims that can be 
made through experimental design or scientific sampling in quantitative work. I focused 
on the elite end of the Chinese higher education sector, meaning the experiences of 
stakeholders in other parts of the sector have not been considered (see comparable studies 
with similar methods: Rhoads et al., 2014; Hazelkorn, 2015). Further, the interviewees in 
my study mostly could speak English and were willing to meet for a formal interview. 
While I had a translator for some of the interviews in order to minimize this issue, it 
remains an uncertainty that I must mention in the limitations.  
Any research that relies on participant interviews faces some risk of capturing human 
error through misremembering, protecting the organization or themselves, or 
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misunderstanding of other kinds (Blommaert & Dong, 2010). For this research, there 
were no real risks involved, but some participants could have felt apprehension in 
critiques of their university or the Chinese higher education system. I attempted to 
minimize trust issues by sampling through the snowball method (Rubin & Rubin, 2011). I 
gained legitimization through referrals from other academics or other stakeholders. 
Comparable studies related to rankings have used similar sampling design (Rhoads & Hu, 
2012; Kim et al., 2017; Song, 2017).  
Finally, while there have been recent concerns and issues regarding Chinese 
censorship, this project was actually vetted by a government agency, the Hanban, before I 
was granted entry into China. One interviewee even mentioned that the topic was not 
controversial and that I should expand my sampling beyond universities and into 
stakeholders in the Ministry of Education. Through these steps, I believe that generally 
the respondents in my sample had mutual trust between the topic and myself, minimizing 
limitations from this kind of study in China.        
 
Findings  
World-Class University, a Difficult Conception  
The concept of the world-class university is often debated, and without a consensus 
definition. Respondents in this qualitative exploration expressed the same uncertainty as 
reported previously in the literature, despite ubiquitous exposure—all the professors and 
administrators had heard the term on multiple occasions. One professor of education even 
said that he basically heard it “every day” during his work at an elite 985 university, even 
if he could not provide an exact definition. Others agreed that they could not provide a 
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definition for this term. “The definition? Wow, it’s very difficult. Personally, myself, I try 
to get a definition for a world-class university... But after all, no one agrees on the 
definition [laughs]. Nobody agrees,” explained a late career professor from a C9 
university. Similarly, an early career administrator from a C9 university said, “In my 
personal idea, it is hard to give a definition for the world-class university. During the 
discussion with my colleagues, we do not think the definition for it is clear now.” This 
“vague” description mirrored the consternation in the research on this topic, and a few 
professors even specifically cited Jamil Salmi in their responses, one of the most famous 
scholars studying these kinds of universities. The ubiquity of the term should be no 
surprise because the Chinese higher education sector has put a critical emphasis on this 
ideal in recent years. However, just as in the varying conceptions of these types of 
universities across the world, the academics and administers in this study also did not 
provide a unified definition.  
Of course, respondents did attempt to conceptualize their idea of world-class 
university. These definitions were sometimes in relation to educational impact or 
institutional outcomes. A C9 professor said of the concept, “[It] means that what 
universities should have in the perspective of education, work, and culture; and how it 
impact on the human beings.” Another from a 211 university added, “I think in China, we 
define world-class, or famous university, or important university… is the rate of the 
graduates... If they can find a job after graduation, then it is higher,” Similarly, an 
academic from a non-elite university agreed that world-class institutions needed to “have 
some great academic performance or they are successful in teaching students or 
mentoring students,” adding that their “professor is famous in the world.” “Famous” 
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name universities such as “Harvard,” “Cambridge,” and “Columbia” often arose in these 
conversations as obvious world-class institutions 
Many of the conceptions remained close to Western discourse on world-class 
universities. “I think world-class in every university is about talented people… then about 
your impact… The impact to the society, the impact academically and also when you talk 
about intellectual impact, which also means you are defining the new direction rather 
than following others,” said one administrator from a non-elite project university, 2017. 
Just over a third of the sample held a degree from a university abroad, mostly from the 
West. These interviewees who had more experience in other educational systems often 
cited characteristics from their previous institutions. “I have been in American 
institutions so long, I am trained there, I am educated there, transform there,” said an 
administrator from a non-elite university. “And I think about the University (of) 
Michigan is a great public institution and so that is the world-class to me. That is the 
meaning.” When I asked why Western universities are often considered world-class, an 
early career faculty who had trained in the UK complained about the bureaucracy of 
Chinese universities, saying that at his old British university, they “don’t need to spend 
too much time on the bureaucratic things,” while administrative duties take up a 
considerable portion of duties for professors in China. Another social science professor 
from the C9 pointed to the standards in doctoral research. “I do think in general the 
training is better… at least the American training. In the US, …because there is so many 
thresholds to pass the PhD, otherwise you are just, you drop out or kicked out of the 
program.” 
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Even with some attempts to conceptualize the world-class idea, the interviewees in 
this study reflected the same uncertainties about this term as reported in past literature on 
the topic, providing differing viewpoints, standards, and ideals. Because of the vagueness 
and disagreement of the concept, simple commensurate metrics can be used to fill in the 
definition for decision makers. League tables, then, are operationalized to make sense of 
the world-class concept, which will be illustrated in the following sections.     
 
Reaching a World-Class Rank  
A consensus conception eluded the sample as a whole, as various actors in the study 
proposed multiple definitions or struggled with the question. Because of the 
disagreement, rankings have filled the operational role of understanding the world-class 
concept. Decisions often cannot be made upon amorphous definitions, and need clear 
indicators or measure for objectivity. League tables provided a tangible, actionable metric 
for the world-class university concept. Stakeholders in the Chinese institutions asserted 
that there was generally cutoff points in the league tables for world-class universities, 
meaning that rankings provide guidelines for some universities in conceptions of world-
class. Of the 48 total stakeholders interviewed, 19 gave explicit concrete numbers on this 
cutoff, only two of the interviewees specifically stated that there was no ranking cut point 
for world-class, and the other 28 were either unsure of an answer or they were never 
directly asked about this issue. Given the nature of exploratory interviews in the 
qualitative process, I did not always follow the same line of questioning, but rather 
followed a growing exploratory method that allowed for variation (Rubin & Rubin, 
2011). Still, over a third of the respondents gave a specific number used for their 
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institutions’ conception or for their general understanding of the status. The collected 
responses have been visualized in Chart 4.2.   
 
Chart 4.2: The specific cut-off for determining world-class universities by university type 
 
Source: Qualitative interviews conducted in this research.  
 
As seen on Chart 4.2, the most common conception of world-class status was a 
ranking within the top-100. “Mostly I should say in the 100. 100 is world-class. The first 
100 is world-class. So actually that produces a lot of tension,” said a late-career professor 
from an elite C9 university. A professor from a 211 university concurred, “World class 
just like the top-100 universities,” and added, “some people say only two universities in 
China could become world-class universities,” referring to Tsinghua and Beida. Though, 
a few of the observers believed that the only agreeable cutoff was in the top-50 and 
below. Few Chinese universities have made it to these top spots globally, such as the two 
mentioned in the previous quote, but others are rapidly rising to these ranks.  
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There were other cutoffs from the interviewees, as well. A few offered that a 
university could be world-class if it was listed within the top-200, top-500, and even top-
1000, the latter would constitute simply being included in the rank scheme at all. 
Concurrently, some universities simply had a goal of joining the ranking, which provided 
a signal that the institution was amongst elite peers. One dean at a non-elite Chinese 
university described how his university has a specific cutoff of the top-500, though he 
was unsure of who established this metric, just that it was not from local Chinese 
rankings. He continued, “So that’s why China is trying to get more and more Chinese 
universities to rank inside the top-500, that’s the international ranking, as well as pushing 
towards the maybe top-100, the top-50, the top-30.” Another from a 985 institution 
agreed, “The best 500 [in the] world ranking, I think they are a world-class university.” 
There were indeed a variety of responses to the cutoff and many respondents simply 
did not know. But, in a potential trend, all of the C9 League respondents who answered 
this question agreed that the top-100 was a cutoff, which could be explained through the 
collective global outlook of this elite grouping. These institutions, especially Tsinghua 
and Peking Universities, are all rapidly rising in the global rankings. Additionally, 
stakeholders from non-government project universities seemed to be less aware of this 
issue or could not provide an answer. These types of universities have other 
considerations or focuses, such as partnership, over the rankings. Despite disagreement, 
one professor at an elite C9 university attempted to synthesize the feeling of the sector: 
“The idea of world-class, it’s hard to define… But for practical usage, actually the top-
100 is more or less agreed as world-class university. Not everyone agrees, but it’s a much 
more agreed than the definition itself. It’s much more difficult to get a definition for 
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world-class university itself than the practical use from ranking. So, top-100 is more or 
less.” 
Because a precise definition of world-class university is elusive, the rankings become 
a de facto proxy. Although, some professors did attempt to push back against the 
importance of rankings, contending that higher education should move beyond simple 
metrics and focus on more holistic approaches. Even with the consternation of the 
interviewees, there was conceit that there were connections between league tables and 
world-class status. “In my mind [it] is much less measurable,” said a 985 professor. 
“[But] the concept is something that you can’t avoid and again it seems to me, the world-
class university is a thing that is existing in people’s minds based on the world ranking.” 
Similarly, an early career administrator from a C9 League university thought it was 
difficult to define, but agreed, “Generally, for normal people, world-class university is 
more related with the rankings.” These measures are especially apparent for top 
universities, “the global ranking is more important for if you think we are world-class 
institution,” said a C9 League professor. The following section will show how these 
indicators have been operationalized as key decision-making aspects by these elite 
Chinese universities.  
 
University Rankings and Partnerships  
Many of the interviewees clearly saw the connection to rankings and world-class 
universities, and explicitly stated various cutoff points during interview sessions. 
However, the advantage of qualitative methods allows for the researcher to read between 
the lines of the responses through deeper analysis (Blommaert & Dong, 2010). Of course, 
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some respondents did not feel comfortable making the connection directly between 
rankings and world-class status for the institution. Yet, I found other signals that provide 
evidence of the coupling between the rankings and elite global status, especially related 
to university connections and partnerships. Through the interviews, it was reported that 
rankings provided concrete decision-making tools related to world-class conceptions for 
Chinese universities represented in this study.  
The criteria for the complex decisions made by various bureaucratic and 
administrative bodies are uncertain. Sometimes, the reasons for a joint-program or faculty 
guest lecture simply related to connections, or guanxi: an administrator had attended a 
specific university for their undergraduate, for instance. An administrator from a none-
elite university said, “we start with those whom we have personal connections, we start 
with who collaborate with us.” Rankings, though, were admittedly indicators used by 
many university administrators in their selections of partnerships. That same interviewee 
added, “of course everybody want to befriend those highly ranked institution.” Another 
specifically mentioned that connections were the “most important” aspect in building 
these relationships, but that league tables were indeed crucial to the process.  
An administrator admitted that her university would not even consider any university 
partnership if they were not highly ranked. She stated, “because [our university is a] 
world-class oriented university and it aims highly to only pursue highly ranking 
universities all over the world, like in the US and all European countries, Hong Kong, 
Singapore. If the universities were not highly ranked, we would not consider them to be 
partners.” This is an institution that is not even ranked in any scheme, not locally or 
globally, but had extremely high goals for internationalization. Similarly, another 211 
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administrator said that her university would look for speakers and guest lecturers from 
highly ranked institutions first, and only later would they reach out or accept professors 
from low ranked colleges. Naturally, hiring decisions for faculty were also predicated on 
rankings. This same respondent said that they were exploring how to cut ties with an 
American university that they had a close partnership with because the ranking was too 
low. They would then seek a new higher ranked partner in the US.        
Professors and administrators were aware that partnerships related to a university’s 
brand. Institutional branding has been a key part of recruitment of students for 
universities in a rapidly competitive sector, both domestically and globally. Concurrently, 
being associated with top-ranked institutions provides a signal that a university is also in 
the elite club. This is why the choice to partner with an institution is seen as such a 
crucial decision. For universities not in this club, connections could be difficult to 
establish. Two administrators mentioned that their universities were not good enough to 
make high-level partnerships at that current time, but they would like to pursue them in 
the future. These lower or unranked universities were forced to seek partners that held 
similar status in their respective domestic context. Chinese policymakers have been 
especially pushing faculty to have international experience in recent years and partner 
institutions often make the mobility process simpler, either through recruitment of faculty 
or exchanges. There is considerable financing available for scholars to move abroad 
through the government and universities. Respondents said this funding often came from 
the China Scholarship Council (CSC), an appendage of the Ministry of Education. The 
CSC provides substantial financial contributions towards research, development, and 
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academic exchange for Chinese academics. Faculty members often go abroad for 
yearlong sabbaticals to boost international and research efforts.  
Several of the respondents had received scholarships, funding, or were in the process 
of applying for resources. All of them mentioned that only proposals to highly ranked 
institutions would be granted. Professors claimed that they could not simply choose any 
institution abroad and that rankings played an overt factor in institutional approval. The 
destination universities abroad had to be highly ranked or else the money would likely 
not receive approval. In fact, some even mentioned that the administration had a cutoff at 
the top-100 for these kinds of overseas exchanges. “[S]ince government who funds those 
student going aboard requires us to cooperate with those university higher than top 100 
globally, the rankings do affect our choices,” said one C9 League professor. Another 985 
professor added, “We have students go to Columbia and Harvard every year as the 
exchange student, and since government who funds those student going aboard requires 
us to cooperate with those university higher than top-100 globally, the rankings do affect 
our choices.” This echoes the same top-100 mark reported by those with a world-class 
cutoff. It seems that the policy is using global rankings as a de facto measure for the 
concept.    
Interestingly, partnership decisions through rankings are not just a one-way street. 
Western institutions are also concerned about their peer partnerships within China. One 
professor from a 211 university told me that he tried to establish a connection with a 
highly ranked UK institution that was keen on a partnership within China. However, the 
British institution rejected the proposal to formalize a relationship, even after their 
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programs had already unofficially worked together, because the British administration 
wanted one of the top Chinese universities with more global recognition.  
 
Which Rankings?  
League tables, in general, provide concrete, actionable boundaries for the amorphous 
world-class university conception. But, the number of university rankings has exploded 
in recent years, each with their own methodology and metrics. It is worthwhile to 
understand which of the schemes are even important to the Chinese sector because each 
one has differing metrics, which can have differing impact on actors and institutions in 
the sector.    
The QS ranking scheme appears to be the most popular international league table 
according to the interviewees. This ranking is not the longest running continuous ranking, 
that distinction belongs to ARWU, but it has had the longest running specific discipline 
or subject ranking, since 2011. The professors I interviewed had an affinity towards this 
more nuanced measure, rather than the larger university number. Breaking down the 
larger university into specific departments has helped propel the scheme to industry 
eminence. Even leery professors must pay closer attention to these disciplinary scores 
because they more directly connect with their work. Not all professors viewed this 
ranking as the most crucial, though. Some professors complained that this ranking was 
too commercialized and their representatives were more disagreeable.  While the QS 
ranking was the most mentioned, other schemes clearly have some foothold on the 
Chinese sector, such as THE and US News. The THE ranking was mentioned throughout 
the interviews, but it seemed to take a backseat to its British rival rankings, which split 
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from QS in 2009. But, there it took a clear backseat to the QS ranking in terms of 
recognition. Similarly, US and World News Report is also relevant to the Chinese sector, 
as many Chinese students use this indicator while choosing universities in the US. But, it 
has only had a global ranking since 2013, and most of the interviewees associated it with 
an American-only ranking. In this way, local actors or institution with a focus on the US 
are more likely to consider this ranking as opposed to the other peer schemes.  
One major criticism of these three rankings was concerning the use of reputational 
indicators. QS, THE, and US News all include some kind of peer evaluation metric that is 
calculated with little transparency, accounting up to a half of the metric. The 
organizations send out peer assessment surveys across the world to various stakeholders 
in the sector. These scores are calculated and processed as part of the larger output 
metric. The opaque process did not sit well with interviewees. “QS is flawed. Among its 
many flaws, one of them is the halo effect, so people will say, ‘Cambridge has a great 
department of X,’ even if they don’t have one. These places have higher reputations, 
whether they actually teach a program or not. And QS is really about reputation 
primarily,” said a foreign faculty professor at a 985 university. In another complaint 
about this process, several interviewees had been solicited in recent years to participate in 
these ranking activities. “They send out questions, send out surveys. Asking you to rate!” 
said one annoyed professor. Because of the disillusionment, stakeholders reported that 
they have just ignored the requests because they do not want to be part of the process. 
One scholar even mentioned that his colleagues encouraged him to fill out the survey to 
have a voice in the results. Others agreed that peer reputational aspects have created a 
self-replicating cycle. For instance, an administrator told a story of her old university that 
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used to have a renowned physics department, but it had fallen down in quality. Despite 
the apparent drop, the department had remained high in the rankings because people 
simply recalled its glory days. This process is sometimes called the “halo effect” in 
higher education literature (Marginson, 2008).  
Because of the halo effect, it can be difficult for universities to climb the rankings. 
Perceived as the most popular foreign ranking from the interviews, the QS ranking is the 
highest weighted reputation score, measuring in at 50% of the scoring output, with the 
other two holding at 33% and 25%. The inputs for these rankings rely on metrics 
completely outside the control of individual institutions. There are actions that a 
university can do to potentially boost their scores in the reputation surveys, such as 
establish partnerships, but these efforts are not directly transactional. It would, then, be 
more logical to focus efforts in areas that are under full intuitional control. One ranking, 
the ARWU, does discard these reputational survey factors, to a degree, but there are other 
trust issues for this Chinese-based scheme.  
The ARWU is actually the longest running global ranking of relevance in the sector; 
but, one problem that was uncovered during the interviews was with ARWU’s Chinese 
roots. It was founded as a research tool of Shanghai Jiao Tong University, an elite 
Chinese university. But, because the reverence for Western know-how, some 
stakeholders in China do not trust a domestic-made system, favoring schemes from the 
US or UK. “I never believe that the Chinese has the capacity to evaluate great modern 
university, I do not believe that,” said one administrator from a non-elite university. 
Another professor mentioned this kind of attitude and specifically criticized it as a kind of 
impact from colonialism. While China was never colonized formally, there were aspects 
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and areas of total Western domination that affected education (Hayhoe, 2004). Even 
today, China is leading the world in international student outflows, according to Open 
Doors data from IIE. Because of these issues, it appears that the ARWU is somewhat 
discounted by actors in the Chinese system.  
Despite concerns, ARWU still has considerable name recognition from many Chinese 
academics and staff. Because it has a keen research focus, over 90%, professors 
appreciated that it was measuring serious academic inquiry. One professor at a C9 
League university specifically recalled that his institution perceived the Shanghai 
Ranking as being more “objective” than the others. Similarly, there was a shared 
appreciation of the value the scheme placed upon “academic research” compared to the 
others. Though, some also criticized it for too narrow and impossible metrics, specifically 
for the Nobel Prize metric included.  
 
How Rankings Impact Academic Research  
Research is a significant aspect measured in all of the global rankings schemes, 
accounting from 90% to 20% of the indicator depending on which league table. China 
has been powering up the charts of most cited research papers. Just in 2017, the nation 
ranked only behind the US and the UK on the Highly Cited Research List, defined as 
articles that “rank in the top one percent by citations for field and publication year,” 
according to a report from Times Higher Education. The top Chinese universities are 
catching up to traditional Western powers in scientific endeavors, with the government 
providing incentives and bonuses for publications. Several of the academics described 
potential bonuses equal to thousands of US dollars for publications in highly cited 
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journals. Professors did see the direct connection between these efforts and rankings. 
“The leaders will talk to us about being the world-class level, so we have to publish 
papers, we have to do our great research so we'll get high rank and what we should do is 
to do research and apply for grant and publish,” said one respondent. Another professor, 
annoyed by pushes from his “university president” and “college dean,” said he must 
publish “more papers in journals of higher Impact Factors, and less papers in journals of 
lower Impact Factors for it has little contribution into ranking.”  
An interesting finding that came about through the interviews was that some 
professors claimed to reject the rankings or said that they were not really affected. Yet, 
when asked about research and publishing, all of them reported an intense pressure from 
administrations to publish in top journals. “It is a lot of pressure to publish or perish, we 
are adopting the US approach to tenure-track faculty,” said one professor from an elite 
985 university. “So we are all sensitive to the ranking, the impact factor, on the journals 
we are submitting how much citation and etc.” SSCI or SCI journals were the most talked 
about, reflecting Chou’s (2014) SSCI Syndrome. These journals provide key indicators 
for all of the ranking metrics. A few faculty members even relayed the same joke, calling 
SCI the “stupid Chinese ideas.” Authorship dynamics, too, was a crucial concern, as 
some colleagues reported that if they were not the lead author, then a paper would not be 
counted by their administrations. Clearly, these stipulations are connected to ranking 
metrics, even if the professors did not fully make the connection.  
Foreign faculty members are heavily recruited by Chinese programs to boost output 
in highly cited indices. Even this internationalization effort intersects with the intense 
focus on research output. US News’ global ranking uses joint-research internationally as 
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part of their metric. One foreign faculty at a 985 university echoed his Chinese peers in 
decrying the ranking, “I don’t plan my research in order to improve the ranking of the 
university.” Though, when I pushed on his role in the system, he added, “Well, in a way I 
do, because that’s what I’m here for, to improve the international profile of the 
university.” The most sought-after indices are mostly dominated by English journals and 
many Chinese faculty members have struggled with writing in the foreign language. All 
of the native English speaking academics have been expected to publish in these highly 
cited publications. One American faculty member working at a 985 university said that 
she is contractually obligated to publish one SSCI article per year. The expectations have 
left bewilderment on these foreign respondents because often the publishing cycle is out 
of their control.  
The rankings have been factoring into Chinese academic research experiences 
whether they realize it or not. The pressures generated from the administration onto 
departments and individual faculty members to publish more in highly cited indices stem 
from ranking activities. While some researchers have highlighted the increases in 
academic fraud, such as plagiarism or falsifying data, stemming from these publishing 
pressures (Lin, 2013; Cyranoski, 2017), these issues were not reported during my 
interviews. Though, a few professors claimed to hear rumors of other impropriety in the 
ranking process, including the payment of “bribes” to move into better position. The real 
concern from the group was that research had been relegated to just a cog in a machine. 
Their work had become a simple indicator in the commensuration process. One professor 
summarized this collective frustration, “one of the things I’m critical of, in the ranking 
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system, they just take a lot of indicators and add them together, which is a stupid thing to 
do, it’s a stupid way of doing it.” 
  
Discussion and Conclusion 
The conception of the world-class university is simultaneously ubiquitous across the 
global higher education sector and, at the same time, lacks a unified definition. The 
complexity of this expansive sector allows for local actors to envision their own 
characterizations for these types of elite institutions. With increases in global connections 
through multinational research projects, branch campuses, student and scholar mobility, 
and other international collaborations, stakeholders must have some mechanism for 
making sense of this global hierarchy. Commensuration is a process that simplifies 
complex systems or sectors through a calculation of indicators and measures, often 
producing a neat, unified ranking. Global league tables have become important 
commensurate credentials for decision making in higher education sectors across the 
world, whether students, parents, administrators, or even policymakers.   
The content of league tables is important because these commensurate indicators give 
order and meaning to this messy landscape (Espeland & Sauder, 2007). Given the 
perception of objectivity and scientific authority of these simplified metrics, institutions 
across the world align to a standard university as measured by the schemes, which looks 
on the surface like a large, comprehensive Western university. Thus, institutions can rise 
in the rankings and gain world-class status in the same theoretical vein as a credential, 
even if this strategy has been criticized for being a “glass ceiling” (Altbach & Wang, 
2012; Altbach, 2016). Accordingly, Chinese universities can continue moving up in the 
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rankings and gaining world-class status without incorporating the same openness seen in 
the West, especially from any of the four key schemes—QS, ARWU, THE, and US 
News—which are viewed as most authoritative in the global sector within China.  
The stakeholders in the Chinese higher education sector contended that these rankings 
have provided a credential for the global elite status. There are even strong signals that 
entry into the top-100 of the four prominent ranking schemes guarantees world-class 
consideration, through explicit cutoffs or other bureaucratic markers, similar to studies on 
domestic rankings in the US (Bowman & Bastedo, 2009). Even university partnerships in 
China are heavily predicated upon these metrics, as institutions look for perceived peers 
that hold similar rank. Much of the findings for these decision-making processes align 
with Porter’s (1996) contention of bureaucratic preference for indicators as objective 
measures. Future research should consider a replication in the exploration for these cutoff 
points in universities around the world to see if this top-100 line has proliferated through 
isomorphism.  
Individual universities have been scrambling to move up in the rankings, with efforts 
centered on increased research capacity. Professors are burdened by their administrations 
to publish in SSCI or SCI because these indices are actively measured within the popular 
rankings. Because these highly cited journals are mostly in English, returnee Chinese and 
foreign faculty are heavily recruited to push out publications. The environment is so 
pressurized that there have been several high profile cases of academic fraud within the 
sector (Cyranoski, 2017). Though accounts of academic fraud were not widely reported 
in this sample. Their biggest collective complaint remained on the haphazard and narrow 
ranking metrics that forced accountability metrics onto their research output.      
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Despite the complaints by faculty and Albach’s (2016) “glass ceiling” critique, there 
are signs that the intense focus on ranking metrics working to bring Chinese universities 
more prominence globally. Already, institutions like Tsinghua and Beida are considered 
to be some of the best universities in the world, with elite partners in the West lauding 
their academics (Yang & Welch, 2012; Rhoads et al., 2014). Likewise, other findings 
have shown that students, administrators, and policymakers are using ranking metrics for 
their decision-making, eschewing critiques by academics. It is likely that as Chinese 
universities continue their ascent, they will be the ones that are seen as the sector leaders, 
establishing standards and norms to other nations. As it has been illustrated in this 
research, will other societies accept the global rankings as a credential for world-class 
status like in China? 
Given the focus on ranking metrics, future studies should look at how Chinese 
universities are perceived around the world by various actors. Mapping Chinese 
institutional reputation and relationships with peer universities could provide important 
measures of success to the quest for world-class status. Potentially, if other societies 
share the Chinese conception of world-class status through the ranking credential, then 
China might increasingly be viewed for emulation of best practices, as their universities 
have rocketed up the ranks in recent years. Similarly, these findings could dispel or 
entrench the concept that Chinese universities are only going to hit a “glass ceiling” if 
they do not adopt more open, Western educational practices (Albach, 2016). In 
divergence from the West, university rankings do not even account for any measures of 
academic freedom. As rankings have been shown to provide a commensurate measure for 
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world-class status, then future studies should look at the intersection between university 




CHAPTER FIVE: Balancing Global Striving Ambitions and Influential 
Government Rankings: Lessons from Chinese Universities   
 
Abstract 
While university rankings have permeated across the globe to almost every higher 
education sector, not every university reacts the same to these metrics. O’Meara (2007) 
described universities that are more attuned to rankings as “strivers.” These striving 
universities chase prestige through rankings by altering policies to improve their metrics, 
such as tightening admission practices or reallocating resources to research-rich areas. 
These institutions also commonly benchmark and compare themselves to the elite in the 
sector, which has often been represented by the Ivy League in the United States. This 
model, though, has mostly been applied to universities in the US and little is known about 
how it operates in non-Western societies. Through interviews with 48 academics and 
administrators from Chinese universities, I explore striving behaviors in elite Chinese 
universities and expand the model to include international competition with international 
rankings. Different from their American counterparts, I find that striving universities in 
China have placed considerable emphasis on international ranking, but distinction and 
rankings associated with the central government have still dominated competition within 
the domestic hierarchy. These new considerations to the striving model can be considered 






University rankings have had considerable impact on universities across the world, 
but not every institution reacts the same way to these performance indicators. O’Meara 
(2007) described universities that are more attuned to rankings as “strivers.” In her 
striving model, universities chase prestige within the hierarchy of higher education, as 
measured through league tables. Striving behaviors include changing admission practices, 
creating steep incentive structures for faculty or staff, and reallocating resources to areas 
of the university, all with the expectation of boosting institutional ranking (O’Meara, 
2007, p. 122). Some of these universities have even attempted to game the system to 
move up in the league tables, including the use of data fabrication (Kim, 2018). O’Meara 
contended that these striving universities can be broadly defined as those with aspirations 
of becoming elite and that emulate and benchmark against prestigious universities that 
already dominate league tables. In the case of the United States, the Ivy League 
universities have often been these top elite institutions chased by strivers. 
To date, O’Meara’s striving model has only been applied in consideration to national 
hierarchies concerning domestic rankings in Western nations, and mostly in the United 
States with rankings from US & World News Report. Studies have, for example, 
chronicled a range of universities exhibiting striving behaviors, such as a working-class 
American university with newfound status in its region that looked to increase its prestige 
(Gonzales, 2014), a private liberal arts university with some history, but viewed as just 
outside of the very elite (O’Meara, 2011), and a land-grant university that sought to 
extend its research reputation (Gardner, 2013), In a case from outside of the United 
States, one study examined a recently-established Central European university that had 
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aspirations of elite status (Kascak, 2017). All of the universities in these studies displayed 
typical striving behaviors like funneling funding to research areas, increasing institutional 
publishing capacity, recruiting top faculty from elite universities, and increasing 
selectivity of students for admissions.   
Despite the range of studies on types of striving universities, research has mostly been 
focused on national higher education hierarchies and domestic rankings in the West. We 
know little about the impact of global rankings on striving behaviors or how this model 
operates in non-Western contexts. For example, other societies have considerable 
differing government roles in their higher education sectors compared with the United 
States, which is exceptionally decentralized. Striving behaviors in other, non-Western 
societies might operate unlike those institutions examined in the United States. 
Furthermore, other systems do not necessarily have the same historic distinctions for elite 
Ivy League-like comparisons, with more recent hierarchies still maturating. On top of 
these expected differences in domestic experiences, in recent decades, the impacts of 
global university rankings have proliferated across the world (Hazelkorn, 2015). With a 
dramatic rise in foreign student mobility, branch campuses, and global research 
initiatives, comparisons through international rankings have become more prevalent and 
necessary. Because of these factors, the striving model should be considered beyond 
national contexts of domestic ranking, and viewed through an additional international 
lens with global rankings.  
In this study, I explore how O’Meara’s striving model operates in China through 
interviews with faculty and staff. China provides a productive case to consider striving 
through university rankings because it has long had historical reverence for hierarchical 
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structures, status and distinction within education, and a strong central government 
(Hayhoe, 1996; Lü, 2000). In recent decades, the government has initiated ambitious 
funding projects to boost the international standing for its universities (Mok & Chan, 
2008). Much of these investments and development have gone to the elite end of the 
higher education sector, especially to universities in the C9 League, often referred to as 
the “Chinese Ivy League” (Yang & Xie, 2015). These nine public institutions were the 
first to be included in the government’s prestigious 985 Project that poured funding into a 
handful of universities in order to compete globally. However, little research has been 
conducted on the C9 League grouping, Chinese higher education elite hierarchy, and how 
stakeholders balance both global and local rankings in the sector. In contrasts to the 
United States, the government in China has a much stronger role in the nation’s higher 
education sector. All of the very elite universities in the system are public rather than 
private, differing from the Ivy League experience, and run under the authority of the 
Ministry of Education.  
In an exploration of the striving model in China, this study intends to examine two 
questions: 1) How have Chinese universities balanced between global striving ambitions 
and a dominant central government? 2) To what extent does the elite segment of higher 
education in China contribute to striving behaviors within a global context? Through 
faculty and staff interviews, I find that the O’Meara’s model does not quite operate in the 
same manner in China as in the United States. While there is clear reverence for global 
rankings, domestic government distinction and rankings promote the most critical 
striving behaviors in China. Furthermore, the C9 League as a grouping does not hold the 
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same comparative standing for striving institutions in China as the Ivy League does in the 
US.   
 
Striving in Higher Education  
In terms of university rankings, not every higher education institution will be 
impacted by these indicators in the same manner. Some universities are more attuned to 
league tables than others. In a research report for RAND, Brewer et al. (2002) identified 
three types of institutions. First are the prestigious types that already sit atop the national 
hierarchy. These top domestic universities do not focus on rankings, instead, deriving 
prestige from history, notoriety, and other local factors. Next, they identify prestige-
seeking universities that crave status and are especially attuned to rankings. Finally, they 
introduce reputation-based institutions, which focus on aspects unrelated to status 
symbols (p. 35). The very elite and bottom tier institutions are less concerned with 
rankings compared to their prestige-seeking peers in the middle.  
Building upon this taxonomy, O’Meara (2007) described these prestige-chasing 
institutions as “strivers.” In her conception of these universities, she said, “Striving 
behavior might include campuses amending their admissions process, reward structures, 
and resource allocation decisions” (O’Meara, 2007, p. 122). These behaviors are all 
actions connected to isomorphic pressures in the sector. Furthermore, O’Meara and 
Bloomgarden (2011) argued that these strivers pursue those practices in order to rise in 
the “academic hierarchy” (p. 40). The scholars specifically contended that “prestige” 
refers to “external national rankings,” (O’Meara & Bloomgarden, 2011, p. 40). Strivers 
especially rely on university rankings as benchmarks because they provide tangible 
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evidence of status. These behaviors have been illustrated in a variety of universities, but 
have mostly been studied in the context of the American higher education sector (see 
O’Meara, 2011; Gardner, 2013; Gonzales, 2014; Kim, 2018a). 
O’Meara (2007) cautioned that it is difficult to isolate exactly which universities are 
strivers. She said, “striving decisions are inevitably linked to a specific history, market, 
competitors, institutional identity, and leadership at any given time. Every institutional 
decision or behavior is influenced by a complex set of internal and external forces” (p. 
129). Further, she noted that contexts always matters, “there will be regional differences 
and ways in which public versus private institutions and institutions that are part of state 
systems are striving for different levels and kinds of prestige” (O’Meara, 2007, p. 129). 
In the model, though, institutions with elite ambitions are especially susceptible to 
striving through rankings in order to gain status.  
Stakeholders within striving universities often make comparisons to the very elite of 
the sector through ranking benchmarks and best practice emulation. In the American 
setting, the Ivy League represents the top of the domestic hierarchy and these elite 
universities provide benchmarks for strivers. In an examination of the striving model, 
Kim (2018b) recounted, “with the connotations of elite institutions or Ivy Leagues 
schools, there have been efforts to systemically determine institutions’ standing” (p. 100). 
In a study of a striving liberal arts university, O’Meara and Bloomgarden (2011) found 
that faculty members who pushed for more academic rigor labeled the best students at 
their institutions as “Ivy League quality” (p. 57). In another study of a selective public 
university, an administrator told O’Meara (2014), “Ivy League institutions run the ‘game’ 
and places like [this] would always be playing catch up” (p. 291). Ivy League universities 
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have the historical legacy, but they also dominate positions in the rankings. While 
striving universities cannot manufacture history, they can dedicate resources to areas 
measured by league table indicators to improve their standing.   
 
Characteristics of Global Striving  
While O’Meara’s (2007) striving model was theorized through national rankings in 
the American sector, this study ascribes the model in a global context by considering 
international rankings in China. National policymakers and individual institutions have 
displayed striving behaviors around the world, but often with desires of global prestige 
(Hazelkorn, 2015). In O’Meara’s American-centric definition, these striving intuitions 
aspire to join their more elite peers, often manifested in comparisons to the Ivy League, 
by chasing domestic status symbols like US News rankings. These same attributes can be 
extrapolated to the global sector. Elite universities in nations around the world have been 
chasing their peers in the Western sector, relying on global rankings, instead of the 
domestic variety, as the prestige symbols (Hazelkorn, 2015). Just as with domestic 
strivers, universities around the world have attempted to move up in the global rankings 
through strategies like funneling funds to research-intensive projects (Kolesnikov et al., 
2017), investing in top faculty from elite universities (Altbach & Yudkevich, 2017; 
(Flowerdew & Li, 2009), boosting recruitment of international students (Cantwell, 2015), 
and creating global partners with other top-ranked universities (Montgomery & 





Table 5.1: Hierarchy of Domestic and Global Higher Education Striving  





Description   International 
Context  










Strivers  Universities chasing 






Tier I. Nationally 
prestigious universities 
chasing international 
prestige only through 
global rankings. 
 
Tier II. Other Universities 
chasing prestige through 
both global and domestic 
rankings. 
   Domestic 
Strivers  
Universities chasing 





Institutions not chasing 
prestige.    
Reputation-
based 
Institutions not chasing 
prestige.    
Source: Adapted from O’Meara (2007) and Brewer et al. (2002) by the author.  
 
As O’Meara’s striving conception is ascribed to the international space, the 
environment gains complication because national hierarchies must be considered 
alongside the global. Universities must simultaneously compete for status symbols 
nationally and globally. Illustrated in Table 5.1, there is a new dynamic that is not present 
in the nationally focused striving model. Mirroring O’Meara (2007) and Brewer et al. 
(2002), the international dynamic accounts for an additional university taxonomy. First, a 
few intuitions, such as Harvard or Oxford, represent the very elite in both the domestic 
and international hierarchies. They are not striving in either sector. But, there are other 
universities atop their own national hierarchies that are striving for international prestige, 
adding a complication not present in the domestic-focused conception. Conversely, other 
institutions may only have national striving expectations, completely ignoring the global 
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sector. China offers an important case for testing the global striving model, as the nation 
has been keen on boosting international standing in recent years.  
 
The Chinese Higher Education Hierarchy 
The Chinese government’s approach to creating elite universities has mirrored the 
striving behaviors in the US system. The nation has been a key player in the global higher 
education sector for the past few decades through government elite-making efforts for its 
nations universities. In 1995, the Ministry of Education (MoE) first announced an 
ambitious project to overhaul the top end of the Chinese higher education sector in order 
for its institutions to meet the “world standard,” called the 211 Project (Ngok & Guo, 
2008, p. 546). Eventually, over 100 universities joined this project that came with billions 
of USD in research funding and status as National Key Universities. In an even more 
ambitious policy initiative, in 1998, at the centennial anniversary celebration of Peking 
University, General Secretary Jiang Zemin announced the 985 Project. This new plan 
was not only geared at meeting a global standard but also elevating institutions to 
“international advanced level” (as cited by Li, 2004a, p. 17). These universities were 
designated to be global leaders. The grouping was even more elite than the 211 Project, 
only 39 institutions reaching this status for the massive funding that would make these 
selected institutions world-class and the top of the domestic sector.  
The 985 Project first began funding of only two universities, Tsinghua University 
and Peking University (Beida), and then expanded to seven more, before adding the 
other 30 (Rhoads et al., 2014). Along with Tsinghua and Beida, the next seven 985 
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universities became known as the China 9 (C9) League1, a grouping of some of the 
oldest and most prestigious comprehensive research universities in China, all with 
enrollments of over 16,000, officially solidifying the grouping in 2009. Sometimes this 
grouping is known as “China’s Ivy League” (Allen, 2017). The initial plan for these 
universities featured many collaborative ventures, such as student-to-student exchange 
programs, cross-course listing, shared credit systems, and postgraduate training (Yang 
& Welch, 2012). However, since the establishment, there has been little research or 
information available on these collaborative efforts.   
There are some common traits for the C9 League universities. All of the institutions 
are located in large metropolitan areas; Beijing and Shanghai host four of the nine 
universities; and another is located in Anhui, the smallest city with over seven million 
people. Research is critical for the C9 League universities—while these nine schools 
make up around 3% of China’s research and development output, they receive around 
10% of all research and development funding, according to a report from a 2011 Times 
Higher Education report. Additionally, the league accounted for over 20% of Thomson 
Reuters indexed publications that year, and over 30% of all Chinese papers considered 
highly cited research.2  By 2003, China had created high tech science parks throughout 
the nation that incubated free-market firms, and according to Shi and Ma (2014), of the 
40 companies listed from these parks, 30 were affiliated with C9 League universities.  
																																																								
1 This group consists of Tsinghua University, Peking University, Fudan University, Zhejiang University, 
University of Science and Technology of China, Nanjing University, Xian Jiaotong University, and Harbin 
Institute of Technology. 
2 According to Times Higher Education, highly cited papers are “those defined as ranking in the top 1 per 




Despite various academic, university, and government lauds of this grouping, there is 
little research considering on C9 League. Some research has been done on the 
international partnerships for these institutions, as both Yang and Xie (2015) and 
Montgomery (2016) discovered that this group of elite Chinese universities has biased 
preferences for elite Western university global partnerships, often from the UK’s Russell 
Group. In research considering the C9 League through elite hierarchies in higher 
education, Allen (2017) found that the elite Chinese universities showed separation from 
other top-ranked Chinese institutions and that the league was rapidly catching up to 
Western peers in terms of rankings. Research being a key factor for these global 
institutions, Zong and Wang (2017) explored output capacity of the C9 League compared 
to elite global peer groups, including the Association of American Universities (AAU), 
Russell Group, and the Group of Eight (Go8). The scholars contended that the C9 League 
still sits at the bottom of this peer comparison and suggested that there should be a focus 
on quality over quantity in journal research output. 
In 2015, the Chinese government announced a new plan that phased out the 985 and 
211 Projects, and there were reports that the C9 League could also be disbanded (Sharma, 
2016). The new replacement project was called ShuangYiLiu (World-Class 2.0 or Double 
First Class), which was officially implemented in 2017. The new initiative combined the 
old projects into one entity, but still kept the tiered system with 42 intuitions in the top 
segment3 and another 95 in the second-tier, according to a report from the People’s 
Daily.4 Whereas the previous projects had holistic strategies of creating world-class 
universities, Double First Class emphasizes individual subjects, disciplines, or 																																																								
3 There are 36 institutions in the top of the first tier and another six in a second, lower class of the top tier. 
4 China to develop 42 world-class universities (2017, September 21). People's Daily. Retrieved December 
5, 2017, from China to develop 42 world-class universities 
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departments, especially for second-tier institutions, according to a release from Ministry 
of Education, Ministry of Finance, National Development and Reform Commission in 
late 2017.5 The narrow focus aligns with the Ministry of Education’s discipline ranking, 
which will be discussed in detail in a later section. Additionally, with 985 and 211, 
universities were locked into the funding schemes and there were little mechanisms for 
oversight built into the awards. World-Class 2.0, however, is now based upon an audit 
funding mechanism for each level. It is unclear how the C9 will factor into the new 
hierarchy. 
 
Data Collection and Methods  
For the study, I used qualitative interviews with on-the-ground experts within the 
institutions, namely administrators and professors. The firsthand experiences of the 
interviewees provide an expert holistic account of the effects brought from the rankings 
(Littig, 2009). Past studies on Chinese universities and their international ambitions have 
been limited to singular institutions or limited cases studies, with many focusing on 
Tsinghua and Beida (see Yang & Welch, 2012; Rhoads et al., 2014; Kim et al., 2017). 
While these vertical case studies provide appreciated in-depth understanding of one 
university, a wider study of the unified sector can provide valuable insights in larger scale 
issues and phenomenon system-wide, particularly of those that are in global scale 
(Hazelkorn, 2015).  
I replied upon a purposeful sample of professors and administrators to garner the 
“social reality” from the C9 League, 985 Project universities, 211 Project universities, 																																																								
5 The press release announcing the project can be accessed via the MoE website: 
<http://www.moe.gov.cn/srcsite/A22/moe_843/201709/t20170921_314942.html> 
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and other universities that are considered either specialized or those with big global 
aspirations (Alvesson, 2010, p. 2660). With its wide scope, this study can uncover effects 
that transcend across institutions in the elite spaces of the sector. Moreover, the role of 
the academic in Chinese higher education actually is interlocked with the duties of 
administrators. Thus, the faculty members actually provide a sense of the 
administrations’ thought process on these matters, with an added eye for wider 
scholarship and field. I employed snowball sampling for the data collection portion of 
this qualitative study  (Dilly, 2000, p. 132). I gathered a total of 48 administrators and 
academics from the Chinese higher education sector, including 12 from the C9, 17 from 
985, seven from 211, and 12 from the other type. Included in the sample are also a variety 
of fields: hard sciences, social sciences, and education, along with different positions, 
from early career to late career.  
All of the interviews were conducted in a one-on-one phone or live discussion format, 
except three email exchange interviews. The interviews were mostly conducted in 
English, but I occasionally used a student assistant translator for those participants more 
comfortable speaking in their native language. The interviewees were recorded and 
provided their explicit permission to participate via guidelines prescribed by the 
Intuitional Review Board. In order to ensure privacy, I have anonymized all of the 
universities and participants’ exact programs. Every interviewee was well aware of the 
purpose of this research project. Any material that could be used to trace them down has 
been destroyed.   
The interviews averaged approximately 45 minutes, with some ranging from as short 
as 20 minutes to others as long as 1.5 hours. I utilized a semi-structured protocol to guide 
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the interviews, but followed the conversations for deep exploration depending on each 
experience in accordance with the “tree branch style” (Rubin & Rubin, 2011). All of the 
conversations were transcribed verbatim by myself and with the help of private 
transcription contractors via the Fiverr network. In order to ensure accuracy, I personally 
rechecked each transcript to make sure that the transcription aligned with the spoken 
word. Direct quotes have been provided in the findings, but, as they are naturally spoken, 
they do include some grammatical errors.  
 
Coding 
For the data analysis, the interview transcripts were uploaded into the NVivo and 
systemically coded for trends, which is useful for data organization, quality transcription 
control, and avoiding coding drift (Creswell, 2008). I first used an open coding method to 
establish early codes that could be further expounded upon during follow-up readings of 
the collected nodes of data (Blommaert & Dong, 2010, p. 12). The initial coding sessions 
followed a deductive method that aligned with the larger themes from the protocol, which 
were established through literature and pre-testing before the field research.  
Coding naturally followed the course of the interviews, rooted in the previous 
literature, pre-tests, and other preparations, as subjects discussed various topics, they 
become codes for the analysis (Blommaert & Dong, 2010). In an obvious theme, any 
descriptions of ranking conceptions went into a “university rankings” code. However, as I 
moved further along in the process, I began to add sub-codes, such as specific ranking 
schemes (THE, QS, etc.). Sub-coding is an important part of the process that provides 
deeper and more nuanced inspection of the data that “interconnect” the analysis or 
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narrative (Creswell, 2008, p. 189). This process yielded larger codes like “Chinese 
characteristics” and the “world-class university” concept. As I progressed, I added new 
sub-codes, often under these larger themes: such as “isomorphism,” “elite projects,” 
“administrative efforts,” and national “hierarchy.”  
Of course, even with the thorough literature review and pre-testing, not every 
emergent code was something that I foresaw. Finding the unexpected is a natural part of 
qualitative research (Blommaert & Dong, 2010). Themes were also uncovered that were 
not initially expected when the project began, such as intense pressure from the “MoE” 
and its “discipline” rankings or the complete “lack of awareness” for rankings, which all 
became sub-codes. Further, while I expected the “C9 League” to emerge as a code, I did 
not expect its theme to center on irrelevance.  
Eventually, as I began to better understand trends and connections in the data, I 
realized that three larger themes tied all of the codes together (as prescribed in Crilly et 
al., 2008). The three themes that captured all of the coded items were: 1) university 
rankings, 2) world-class universities, and 3) Chinese characteristics. Through this 
triumvirate organization of the data, I was able to gauge how striving universities in 
China have balanced global ambition and a strong authoritarian government.  
 
Limitations  
The sample used in this research cannot be generalizable to the larger Chinese higher 
education sector. While Blommaert and Dong (2010) argued that quantitative 
interviewing methodology does not intend to represent a generalizable population, the 
information driven from the data and analysis can still provide a narrative or trends 
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within the given part of explored society. These 48 interviewees only come from the elite 
end of the sector, and even within this sliver of society, there are still biases. I mostly 
used the medium of English for the interviews, with a few translated sessions. I could be 
missing from those within this elite end of the sector who cannot speak the global 
language. Additionally, due to my own network sampling, I also overemphasized 
academic areas such as education and under-sampled others, such as hard sciences.  
The sample used in this research cannot be generalizable to the larger Chinese higher 
education sector. While Blommaert and Dong (2010) argued that quantitative 
interviewing methodology does not intend to represent a generalizable population, the 
information driven from the data and analysis can still provide a narrative or trends 
within the given part of explored society. These 48 interviewees only come from the elite 
end of the sector, and even within this sliver of society, there are still biases. I mostly 
used the medium of English for the interviews, with a few translated sessions. I could be 
missing from those within this elite end of the sector who cannot speak the global 
language. Additionally, due to my own network sampling, I also overemphasized 
academic areas such as education and under-sampled others, such as hard sciences.  
While I recognize the limits of this study, these are actual standard in research of this 
nature. Studies using interviews with professors or academics often contain some bias 
distributions, and lean on purposeful sampling (see O’Meara, 2011, Hazelkorn, 2015). 
Further, studies in China have also recognized the difficulties of researching in a less 
open environment. Building upon and snowballing through networks have been key 
methods in similar studies (see Yang & Welch, 2012; Rhoads et al., 2014; Kim et al., 
2017). My research aligns within the norms of past research on this topic.  
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Findings 
Striving Through Global University Rankings   
In the American striving model, universities use domestic rankings like US News to 
make sense of their location in the national hierarchy, often in attempts to catch the elite 
Ivy League (O’Meara, 2007). In the Chinese sector, actors in striving universities also 
must balance global rankings with domestic government pressures. These international 
rankings often reflect large, comprehensive research universities in the West, and 
Chinese institutions do not always align within these standards (Marginson, 2017). The 
Chinese government has been keen on international standing, and Chinese administrators 
and academics are burdened with these ambitions. Yet, they must also operate within the 
domestic government’s own standards and demands, which are directly tied to public 
funding for institutions, emboldening stronger striving behaviors in the sector. This 
competitive, government-driving environment bears out a different hierarchical 
organization of striving model than in the United States. 
Chinese leaders have been explicit in goals on joining the global “standard” for it the 
nation’s universities (Ngok & Guo, 2008, p. 546). Though, the government has not 
released specific goals, this has been interpreted as catching American and other Western 
educational sectors. The first global ranking, established at Shanghai Jiao Tong 
University in 2003, held the specific goal of comparing China’s elite universities to their 
counterparts around the world (Liu & Cheng, 2005). Interviewees reported striving 
aspirations for their universities related to global rankings. “Yeah, as I said pressure is 
translating down, is going down all the way to individual faculty, because the university 
president will have pressure when… the ranking is released, they are all on their feet 
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eager to know the results. And then for each dean, the university will say your ranking 
has dropped by fifteen places, what is going on?” asked one C9 League professor. The 
interviewees emphasized that “leaders” of universities paid considerable “attention” on 
global ranking. 
Global university rankings promote a single standard for an elite university that is 
often a reflection of large, expansive research universities of the West (Shin & Kehm, 
2013). One scholar at a 211 university complained that her field of sociology is more 
closely attached to the arts and humanities rather than the social sciences and that the 
international rankings cannot properly compare across these cultural divides. It is 
demanding to accurately capture the disciplines under the exact organizational structure 
requested by the ranking agencies. The administrators tasked with gathering information 
complained about the difficulties of the task. “They have the standard template,” said a 
985 administrator. “That's a different system. Different methodology. But then the 
terms have their own definitions, sometimes when you're trying to provide the relevant 
data then you have to think about it you have to figure out which data should be mapped 
into their domain. So, this kind of technical issue.” 
Likewise, in China the rankings have forced globally striving universities to focus on 
short, quick gains because the standings are released each year and there is no reprieve. 
Recognizing this critique, one professor from a non-elite project institution conceded, 
“Although setting a clear goal is good for development, we should know that education is 
not a quick business, it needs time to develop and grow.” Echoing with similar striving 
behaviors found in the West (Kim, 2018b), tightly following the metrics was clear cause 
for concern. “So, I mean the ranking system for us probably, I think it’s going to make us 
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less special because when... the ranking in general. Because you want to be, the Chinese 
people, we want to be the best, this is the Chinese way of method, so if we want to be the 
best then, we have to play the rules, then we have to cut some of our corners to fit into the 
system,” lamented a non-elite project administrator.  
The interviewee also added that they must specifically look at the rankings to see 
where they are doing poorly and then invest in those areas. Relatedly, other scholars more 
focused on local society and community thought it was unfair that schemes often do not 
capture any homegrown imperatives, instead focusing everything on the global scale. 
One administrator from a non-elite project institution heard criticism that her university 
was just a “local university” because it “does not rank so high as the system.” This 
especially came across in reference to teaching institutions, which do not see gains in 
global rankings in training the nation’s future teachers. 
One professor of education at an elite 985 university, which is more known for hard 
sciences, specified that his university recently explored expanding educational studies 
programs in order to become more competitive both in the international and domestic 
hierarchies. The program was already strong, but too small to actually be ranked in any 
leading discipline rankings. The university even hired some of the most famous 
international scholars in the field to evaluate the possibility of expansion, all of who 
counseled against this growth development strategy and advised to instead continue a 
focus on strengths. The final decision by the administration had not been made during the 
interviews. One professor from a 985 institution said, “I think that’s the way at least for 
Chinese institutions, not educational research, every subject. If you want to compete 
globally, you have to focus your research. I mean, if the resources, financial resources are 
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the same you really want to focus on the same parts of the subjects, but then you lose 
your competence inside the China for the ranking, but they have the balance you know…. 
(laughs).” Many of the education-focused intuitions across China have not heeded this 
advice and it is believed that they are now oversaturated with too many fields, according 
to the interviewees.  
 
Striving Through Research and Publishing Agendas  
All of the major rankings put a central focus on research, to some varying degree 
(Hazelkorn, 2015). ARWU accounts for 90% of its scoring from research focus, while 
others at the low end are around 25%. They are calculated through highly cited research, 
often more prestigious journal indices, especially the Science Citation Index (SCI) and 
the Social Science Citation Index (SSCI) (Chou, 2014; Hussain et al., 2015). All of the 
academics and administrators agreed that the intense focus on this central area created 
problems for the sector. Professors were especially concerned that this way of measuring 
impactful research was flawed and that administrators were too focused on these metrics, 
similar to complaints of American academics at striving institutions (O’Meara & 
Bloomgarden, 2011). Some of the administrators were sympathetic to the burden placed 
onto faculty, as they were former academics themselves. But, the administrators still 
conceited that indicators at least provided a good measuring tool for understanding the 
university.  
There was a sense from the academics that university “leaders” were increasingly 
interested in these research metrics because they had no other way to “evaluate” research 
and publications. A few professors pointed out that only a handful of academics in the 
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entire world could truly be considered their peers; thus, how could an administrator 
accurately understand what was happening? Administrators were expected to have 
expertise in all disciplines, and with a global perspective. The only way for these decision 
makers to have a grasp on all of these complex matters is through ranking indicators 
(similar to accounts in Espeland & Stevens, 1998; Hazelkorn, 2015). Some areas of 
research have become more valued because their weight within rank indicators. These 
metrics are driving research topics in ways not imagined or intended. One 211 professor 
expressed concerns for the impact these indicators were having: “I think the system is 
kind of reversely shaping our minds. So if this time we didn’t get first place, because we 
publish too few papers in this specific journal, but too many in another one. It’s not 
because this journal is better than the other one. It’s just because this one got higher 
impact factor. Maybe they are from a totally different field and with totally different 
readers.” He continued, “Those readers might not be very interested in our research. But 
just because the journal got a higher impact factor, it gives us more credit in the ranking 
competition. So the next time, we may have to publish more in those irrelevant, but 
higher impact, factor journals. It’s really going to change our research policy, our 
research strategy.”  
Chasing these globally recognized publications has led to a focus on topics more 
tailored to an international audience. Local inquiry that is more germane to domestic 
concerns is cast aside because it is more difficult to publish outside of China. This leads 
to similar output in areas that are easier to pursue for academics and jeopardizes potential 
new areas of research that are left behind. Because these international publications are 
mostly in English, academics that had not studied abroad or who are not bilingual have 
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had research marginalized within a domestic setting. Additionally, there is a greater 
pressure to cheat or plagiarize for all scholars. Indeed, there has been an uptick in 
academic scandals of this kind in recent years (Lin, 2013), which I contend is precisely 
related to striving pressures. Gaming the system has been an issue with striving 
universities in the US sector, too (Kim, 2018b).  
These striving behaviors pushing on research agendas are common practices by 
professors throughout the sector. One problem mentioned by the foreign professors was 
that their colleagues encouraged publishing in any area tangentially related to their fields 
because it boosts the departments’ citations. A mid-career 985 professor explicitly stated 
that while she understood the pressures, she ultimately pushed back on this practice, as 
she felt there was a sense of morality in simply moving to new areas of research so 
flippantly. However, all of the foreign faculty members also cautioned that they were in a 
highly privileged position as foreigners in China and it was easier for them to break from 
common practices than for their Chinese counterparts.    
 
The Ministry of Education’s Own Discipline Ranking   
While the findings do show that actors within Chinese universities are hampered by 
expectations of global rankings, these domestic varieties are far more impactful. Unlike 
in the US, these are not rankings produced by private enterprises, but rather the Chinese 
government has distinctions and rankings that contribute to striving behaviors in the 
sector. The Chinese Ministry of Education (MoE) is a powerful force for education in 
China’s top-down governmental environment, with policy and directives trickle 
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downward to subsidiaries. Distinctions and status from the government, such as 985 or 
211 Projects, have become important to organizing the national hierarchy of universities.  
The MoE actually employs its own ranking of academic disciplines for Chinese 
universities called the National Subjects Evaluation (NSE) that is evaluated every four 
years (Song, 2017). This governmental ranking system is incredibly important to the 
universities, and overwhelmingly believed to be more crucial for institutions than with 
global rankings. Global university rankings have only captured the attention of the global 
strivers, but the Ministry’s ranking has the full attention of every university because it is 
an official governmental marker. Interviewees believe that, in China, anything “official” 
has much more of an impact than other outside indicators and, in this case, the global 
rankings take a back seat to the Ministry in terms of attention; though, the government’s 
ranking does have some shared characteristics to its global counterparts.   
The MoE discipline ranking shares characteristics with the global schemes. One 
professor from a 985 university said that the Ministry ranking is much closer to the 
Academic Ranking of World Universities because it mostly puts emphasis on 
publications and research output. I have illustrated the four metrics used in the MoE’s 
discipline ranking on Table 5.2.  While it is unclear how exactly each area is weighted, 
the information does allow for an analysis to examine how indicators reflect global or 
local characteristics. The Teaching and Resources categories share both local and global 
reflections. Specific national fellowships, grants, or other distinctions are indications of 
domestic emphasis, while the student-teacher ratio and full-time professor indicators are 
conceptions that originated within US & World News Report. The Research metric 
actually reflects both local and global characteristics through its indicators. Publishing in 
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global indices, such as SSCI or AHCI, represent the complaints heard from professors 
that too much emphasis is placed on international journals (Chou, 2014). Yet, there are 
also government awards and domestic publications that provide credit within this 
categorization. Though, some of these areas are also unclear given the information from 
the MoE, such as monographs publications. The Training Quality variables also represent 
local and global refractions, as national awards for teaching and dissertations are counted 
among the indicators, along with foreign students and international sporting competition. 
The final metric is a Subject Reputation of academic rankings, reflecting both a local and 
global tradition. While the perimeters of these criteria are opaque, this kind of 
reputational indicator is used in most of the top global rankings, even as the national 
domestic hierarchy most likely dominates these scores. Again, the exact weights for each 
of these categories are not available.  
 
Table 5.2: The Chinese Ministry of Education’s China Discipline Ranking (CDR) Metric   







1.Expert faculty  Specific fellowships and 
various government 
program recruitment 
programs, such as the 
Thousand Talents Plan.  
Local Emphasizes national 
government characteristics.  
2. Student-
teacher ratio 
 Global Similar concept in US & 
World News Report.  
3. Full-time 
professors  
 Global Similar concept in US & 




Already predetermined by 
the government.   













Published ESI, SSCI, 
AHCI, CSSCI, CSCD, 
and Class A papers.  
Global and 
Local 
Global indices are 
mirrored in other major 
rankings; but inclusion of 
Chinese versions adds 
local element.  
2. Research 
Awards 
From the Chinese 
government, such as 
National Natural Science 
Award.  




Excludes editorials or 
translations.  
Unclear Perimeters do no specify 
publishers or language.  
Patents  Applied patents or Local Specifically focused on 
	 145 
national defense patents, 
with proof. 




research projects that 
have been granted.   




Only for related 
disciplines. Evaluated by 
panel of experts.  
Unclear Likely local, but 




Only for related 
disciplines. International 




Emphasizes awards from 










National teaching awards.  Local Emphasizes national 
government characteristics. 
2. Dissertations National dissertation 
awards. 




Conferred degrees and 
total numbers.  
Global  Counting international 
students is key measure in 
other major rankings. 
4. Sports  Only for related 




Emphasizes awards from 
China and abroad. 
 5. Students and 
Graduates 
As rated by subject 
experts or employer 
evaluations. 
Unclear Likely local, but 
parameters are not specific 
enough. 
 6. Degrees  Number of Doctorate or 
Master’s degrees.  
Global Similar concept in other 






Evaluated by academic 
and industry experts, 
based on academic 
reputation, social 
contribution, ethics, and 
other impressions. 
Global  Reputational awards are 
found in other comparable 
rankings. 
Source: Chinese Ministry of Education’s Degree Center Discipline Assessment Results (2012). 
 
Juxtaposed with the global rankings, professors have a nervous reverence for the 
MoE evaluation, while at the same time carry a grumbling aggravation with the outside 
league tables. In illustration of this concern, one 985 professor offered an example: 
“[M]uch more important is the Ministry’s own ranking… When QS ratings come out, the 
president of the university calls the deans of the faculty to his office to explain why [a 
rival] is higher than [our university].  So you see a response to it, but it’s sort of 
peripheral. If they lost the status with the Ministry, like that would be devastating for 
everybody.” Faculty members and administrators all reported considerable stress during 
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the application collection period, where all work and materials that they have been 
produced over the years were documented to send to the Ministry. Sometimes this work 
is dumped upon a lower ranked faculty member or even a post-doctoral researcher 
because it is tedious and grinding.  
The chief reason for the almost universal devotion to the official ranking is because a 
considerable amount of finances hinges on the results. “If we rank low by the Ministry 
that means you will have implications on how much funding you will get,” said one C9 
professor. While no professors could fully articulate how exactly the funds were allocated 
based on ranking, the top ordering was of considerable importance. A group of natural 
science professors from a 211 university said that their institute ranked number one in the 
most recent Ministry ranking and it allowed them to dramatically expand their operations, 
including hiring a foreign faculty member and funding a post-doc position, which was 
filled by a Chinese national who had received a PhD abroad. They even were able to 
compete with 985 universities of the same discipline, despite being lower in the national 
university hierarchy.   
Not every subject at each university partakes in the MoE discipline ranking, which 
complicates intra-university department relationship. Some interviewees mentioned that 
their departments were not even evaluated within this system because of their limited 
size. Only larger programs with considerable resources were considered, which means 
that during the evaluation periods, programs move resources around in order to beef up 
programs that were included. “In the report there was something that’s not so real. I think 
it’s the same for every university,” said a professor from a 211 university. When I 
followed up on this point, he elaborated on how programs have been gaming the system: 
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“Yeah, you would, kind of rearrange the resources based in the way. Like, this 
department they have no hope of getting really good spot in the ranking, they would 
contribute something to the department who has a chance to get a really good chance in 
the ranking.” He continued, “So, it’s redirecting the resources, basically. So, I think it’s 
really not necessary. That is just because ranking the first and ranking the second is a big 
difference.” These instances are similar to reports of universities gaming the system in 
order to appear more favorable in rankings of other contexts (Ehrenberg, 2005; Volkwein 
& Gruing, 2005; Kim, 2018b). The incentives for moving around resources and creating a 
false narrative far outweighed the consequences of getting caught for striving 
universities.  
 
Elite-Making Government Projects   
While not technically rankings, the 985 and 211 Projects have provided sense-making 
to the Chinese higher education sector similar to rankings in other sectors. For many 
professors, when I first asked about rankings, they mentioned these government projects. 
Given the hierarchical nature of the striving model, these government statuses are 
important to the understanding of O’Meara’s model in the Chinese sector. Further, the 
updated version of these projects does implement a ranking-like mechanism that I will 
also explore. Even years after the 985 and 211 Projects have technically been terminated, 
they have had visible effects on the sector akin to ranking schemes. Students, 
administrators, professors, and even employees are intently focused on these 
stratifications. Many professors revealed that their programs have “unofficial” policies 
that discriminate against the lower institutions in the hierarchy. For instance, a 985 
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university would only hire people that went to a 985 university, and a 211 university 
would only hire people from 211 or 985 universities. Similar reactions have been 
reported in the private business sector. Universities were still strongly emphasizing these 
distinctions during these conducted interviews in spring and summer of 2017, despite the 
announcement of the new replacement policy, Double First Class, two years prior.  
Unlike with movement each year from rankings, elite statuses in the projects have 
been frozen for universities within each of the segmentations: “Because once you’re 985, 
you’re 985 forever,” said one professor. I have presented this system graphically in 
Illustration 5.1. Along with 211 institutions, there was no real mechanism for movement 
into these elite statuses; meaning, it created a permanent higher education hierarchy. This 
permanence did disincentive some striving behavior nationally because the hierarchy was 
set. However, there was still considerable chasing of prestige, especially on the 
international stage.   
The Chinese government has recently replaced these old policies with a new elite-
making project called Double First Class (ShuangYiLiu), which is geared at alleviating 
some past drawbacks and has supposedly created opportunity for mobility—operating 
more akin to ranking schemes, also on Illustration 5.1. The interviewees were keen on 
replacing the old system that kept universities in specific groupings, to one that had built-
in opportunities for program and university progression. Programs that once did not have 
a chance to gain elite domestic status now had a theoretical chance, which should 







Illustration 5.1: Lock Boxes vs. the Ladder: Representation of Elite Hierarchy from Projects 
Established in the 1990s to the New Double First Class System  
 
Source: Created by Ryan Allen.   
 
However, there was also concern about the consequences that could result in 
relegation or removal from the funding projects. Because of the possible movement 
within the new system, national striving behaviors should increase. “[It] will break the 
entitlement or guarantee status or tenure, like a tenure… And it establish dynamic system 
to adjust this so that university can go in and out of this 2.0 project. For those who make 
real mistakes and have no signs of improvement after warning, so basically they will be 
kicked out,” said a C9 League professor. During the period of time the interviews were 
conducted, policy details were still murky for the new plan and many participants were 
unclear of the exact nature of the new system. Sometimes, rumors on WeChat, China’s 
most popular social media service, filled in the gaps that were not provided by officials. 
“There were even formulas going around saying that if you discipline is rated by this 
domestic exercise, you rated below a certain then you will be given so much less, floating 
around on WeChat, but quickly the Ministry of Education came out denying that,” said 
one mid-career academic from an elite C9 university.  “But if those were any indication, 
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then these discipline rank lower are at greatest risk of being closed down. Because you 
dragging everything down.” While the MoE discipline rankings already factor into some 
funding choices, it has been unclear whether they will be used within this system. It is 
likely that these two operations will merge, using the MoE’s metrics as the movement 
mechanism for Double First Class distinctions.  
The concern about being shut down due to poor rankings was universal and also 
something already faced by Chinese institutions. “[I]f one subject in [the university] is 
bad, then the university would have no choice but cancel it. That is what our leaders have 
told us,” cautioned one 985 university professor. Another C9 professor confirmed, 
“several important key universities” at “very famous” institutions had “closed their 
educational schools” because their administrations felt pressure from the changes made 
from the government programs. Smaller and less prestigious programs are now under fire 
because they basically have no chance to compete. Larger programs at least have the 
opportunity, even slim, of making a move in these domestic discipline rankings because 
they have resources to participate. One administrator from a non-elite project university 
in a smaller city felt consternation with the entire process, because she believed that it 
was good policy to have universities focus on their strengths, yet she also thought it 
concerning that programs and disciplines would actually become restricted, “[we] train 
the people for the whole region as a public service, is that going to be enough to just offer 
a couple of disciplines?”  
Some professors were sympathetic to the mission of the MoE and their administrators 
who had to implement these policies. China, after all, is a massive country with the 
largest education system in the world, they mentioned. With a ballooning population of 
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new academics produced each year, one asked how could all of these people become 
professors? Space and resources are limited, echoed those encouraged by the new 
competitive system. A few scholars also lauded the focus on disciplines over the previous 
models’ holistic university approach. One early career 211 professor explained that his 
university where he earned his PhD had top programs in education and physics, but the 
administration has been forced to allocate considerable resources to other areas in which 
the school had no tradition because of this holistic approach. He believed that the totality 
attenuates education in all departments and that the ShuangYiLiu would release 
universities from these burdens. Further, there was some hope, especially from 211 and 
non-elite universities, that the new program would provide opportunities to move into 
elite status. It could be a map to positively grow an institution, smartly investing in one 
program at a time instead of throwing everything against the wall to see what sticks. 
“They say that they want to become a good uni, so they need to take a discipline first. 
They need to become the best in that discipline first,” said one foreign-trained, early 
career 211 university academic. “So they pick that discipline that is the smallest… They 
spend a lot of money on this small discipline. And then they will become the top uni in 
this area first, then maybe expand from there.”  
Despite some positive spin, overall, most of the interviewees were dubious of any real 
changes happening in the project. The announced universities basically mirrored the 
previous hierarchies and universities are hesitant to give up any advances. Universities 
are not willingly giving up their advantages within the system, many of them argued. 
When asked if the elite projects will continue to shape institutional perception, another 
211 university professor said, “I think yeah, these things will carry on. Because… they 
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wouldn’t throw it away, not voluntarily. We are 211, why not mention it? We should 
mention it. [laughs].” In the end, the new policy is likely going to increase striving 
competition in China compared to the previous projects. 
 
The Faltering C9 League 
O’Meara’s striving model emerged from the American context, in which the Ivy 
League is often upheld as a reference of comparison by striving universities. The C9 
League in China is often referred to as the Ivy League of China (Yang & Xie, 2015). 
Because I am testing this American model on the Chinese case, it is important to 
understand to what extent does the elite segment of higher education in China contribute 
to striving behaviors within a global context. Specifically, I am seeking to understand if 
the C9 League operates as a reference for Chinese striving universities similar to the case 
of the Ivy League in the United States. 
The C9 League is comprised of the first nine 985 universities. Because these 
institutions were first in this renowned program, there has been a sense of pride and 
distinction over other elite institutions, leading to some calling the grouping the Ivy 
League of China. However, the coalition is actually not government-led, as the 
universities themselves solidified the cooperation. In March of 2003, Tsinghua University 
organized a conference in cooperation with the eight other future would-be C9 League 
universities and other invited researchers from outside of China, entitled “Theory and 
Practice of Building the WCU.” This is the first large-scale, public event that was 
organized around the concept of the nine institutions as a kind of unified body. The focus 
was on the concept of the world-class university, how to properly evaluate them, and 
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what are their proper practices. At this time, global rankings were not a worldwide 
phenomenon. 
Each subsequent year after the initial 2003 conference, one of the nine universities 
would usually host a conference on similar themes of world-class universities, rankings, 
and global higher education. The meetings offered a platform for university professors 
and leaders to share ideas and new ways of thinking about higher education and the 
coalition. The gatherings were fruitful and provided for meaningful discussions on 
student exchanges and credit recognition reciprocity. “In the middle of somewhere, the 
idea of having an association, like AAU or Russell Group, was not going anywhere in the 
first few years,” said one C9 professor who was part of the early development of the 
coalition. It took a few years, but the organization was finally formalized, in the vein of 
the AAU or Russell Group, and not as a “Chinese Ivy League,” which I discovered is a 
misnomer often applied, even by the government. The solidification centered on 
enhancing the research collectivity of the entire group, according to one 985 university 
professor of education. “So, I know the latest development of the C9 and its 
collaborations, similar associations worldwide. What I learned, I think there is not much 
practical collaborations going on among the different associations,” reported a late-career 
C9 League professor. 
Despite the early lofty promises of the coalition, the visions have not sincerely come 
to fruition, as the league is currently not a strong alliance and the connections are frayed. 
One C9 professor believed that the disparate universities were just too different to form a 
meaningful alliance. The professor elaborated that some C9 universities even have closer 
ties to universities in Hong Kong, rather than their Mainland peers. Furthermore, he 
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claimed that histories of specialization in the Chinese education have had lasting legacies 
on structures. For example, while all the C9 League universities are fully comprehensive 
now, they were formerly specialized institutions and these vestiges have created strengths 
in certain areas that do not neatly align with the others. Likewise, Tsinghua and Peking 
formed a coalition with other high-profile Asian coalition of universities in 2017. None of 
the other seven C9 members joined this grouping, in what I notice was a trend separating 
the top two institutions from the others.  
Another key factor in downplay from early goals in this union comes from the 
government. Interviewees believed that the C9 League was a university-led initiative and 
that it lacked proper backing from the government, describing, “It is a loose league and 
does not have any influence, because our university system is led by government not by 
universities.” One professor explicitly said that the government had actually stifled some 
cooperative measures attempted by the group, “For the enrollment of the new students, 
they try to form such kind of organization similar to C9, but the government cannot 
allow.” Despite the sharp divides created through the 211 and 985 projects, an 
administrator from a 985 university said the government does not want to increase these 
kinds of distinctions “because it makes a kind of privilege” for the members. These 
governmental barriers have prevented the C9 League from “influencing” the sector.  
There is also a sense that the competition born from the Chinese higher education 
system hinders any meaningful cooperation. The institutions see funding and gains in the 
hierarchy as zero-sum games. “However, there are a lot of other competition going on 
between them. So on the surface, yes, it’s cooperation,” said one professor from 
specialized university. “[But] when we get down to the operational level, it will not be 
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something too concrete. Because they will be competing for resources.” In an illustration 
of this, the C9 League and its peers around the world, AAU, League of European 
Research Universities, and Australia’s Group of Eight, released a joint document in 2013 
affirming characteristics of their universities; but while the other peer groups had one 
representative sign for all members, each C9 League institution signed the document 
separately. The new Double First Class elite university project should only increase this 
kind of competition, as there are mechanisms from losing status.  
Given these obstacles, it is no surprise that the C9 League has not grown stronger 
since its inception. It is surprising, though, how little relevance the association has in the 
general sector. Most of the interviewees had actually never even heard of this grouping, 
even professors and administrators from universities in the league. This would be akin to 
a Harvard professor who had never heard of the Ivy League. Though, it makes more 
sense when considering the organization had its roots in referencing the less well-known 
AAU. The only two institutions that were generally seen as the top of the domestic 
hierarchy were Tsinghua and Peking in a similar manner to the Ivy League in the US 
striving model. There was a basic consensus amongst almost every interviewee that 
Tsinghua and Peking we clearly the top two universities in China. Universities look up to 
these two institutions atop the sector hierarchy. Importantly, for the striving model 
comparisons, these two universities are not really focused on domestic rankings. One 
professor from one of these universities said, in a comment echoed by others interviewed 
from these universities, “as a faculty, and administrators at my university too, we don’t 
see those kinds of domestic rankings very seriously. Because Tsinghua always rank at the 
top. So Tsinghua or Beida. So it’s not an issue, we don’t take that too seriously.” Unlike 
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the university led C9 League, the government has chosen to invest heavily at these top 
two institutions compared to any other in the sector.  
I also explored other groupings that have popped up to challenge the C9 League. But, 
because the elite grouping does not actually have much influence, these other cooperative 
unions were even less significant in my findings. The Excellence League, which arose 
soon after the C9 League, is a group focused more on “technical engineering domain 
area” institutions, according to one administrator from this grouping, yet it had almost no 
name recognition during my interviews. Additionally, there were a few others, such as 
the cooperation amongst the “normal” universities, related to educational collaborations 
and conferences, or the language-focused universities,6 but nothing akin to an official 
union. One late career professor gave his frank assessment for these types of groupings, 
“any voluntary alliance or organization out of the framework of government will not be 
sustainable and influential.” There just is not much power through non-governmental 
policies.  
 
Discussion and Conclusion  
Theorizing Global Striving Hierarchy in China  
Given the findings from the interviews, striving in Chinese higher education operates 
somewhat differently than in the US. While global rankings are given reverence by 
stakeholders in top Chinese universities, they have an even greater focus on government 
distinctions and rankings. Differing from the US with private ranking firms such as US 
News, striving behaviors at Chinese institutions center on appeasing the Ministry’s 																																																								
6 These institutions were formerly language training schools but have all expanded into full degree-granting 
universities now, with significant international focuses and large foreign student bodies. 
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discipline ranking or not losing elite project status. Furthermore, the so-called Chinese 
Ivy League does not hold the same status as its American counterpart. Striving 
universities are not seeking to emulate or benchmark against the C9 League. I have 
illustrated the findings of the striving model in China in Table 5.3. The only two 
institutions that were universally seen as the top of the domestic hierarchy were Tsinghua 
and Beida. The two universities are globally known and have long been seen as the top 
tier of Chinese higher education. In the global striving model, these Beijing-based 
universities can be considered Tier I global strivers, as they can claim domestic prestige 
atop the national hierarchy, but still crave global status through international rankings.   
 
Table 5.3: Global Striving Hierarchy in Chinese Higher Education Sector   
International Context  Description   Elite Chinese Higher Education  
Global Elite  Globally prestigious universities. 
 
 
Global Strivers  
(2 types) 
Tier I. Nationally prestigious 
universities chasing international 
prestige through global rankings. 
 
Tier II. Other Universities chasing 
prestige through both global and 
domestic rankings. 
 




Other C9 league members; all 
World Class 2.0 Class A* and B; 
some Class C+  
Domestic Strivers  Universities chasing prestige only 
through domestic rankings. 
 
Other Class C 
Reputation-based Institutions not chasing prestige.     
* Class A universities in the new system are the former 985 universities.  
+ Class B and C universities in the new system are the former 211 universities.  
Source: Devised from O’Meara (2007), Brewer et al. (2002), and this research.  
 
The other C9 League members cannot be viewed as Tier I global strivers, but rather 
only Tier II. They are viewed in the same manner as the other 985 (now Class A) 
universities, and a step below Tsinghua and Beida. Without the two prestigious 
institutions, the C9 League would lose the little clout that it has. Interestingly, though, it 
was professors from these universities that first pushed the formalization of the C9, 
according to multiple interviewees. Finally, lower tiered World Class 2.0 universities 
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represent the domestic-only strivers in this model. Within this striving model in China, 
there is an added layer of global pressures, even as most of the focus remains on domestic 
standing offered by the government. This system is quite different from the American 
context in which these kinds of striving behaviors were first theorized by O’Meara.  
Future research on the striving model should be more diversified. This is one of the 
first studies to expand the model to a non-Western context. Though, my study only 
examined the elite end of the Chinese sector, and the lower tiered universities in this 
context should also be considered. Similarly, other systems around the world deserve 
attention from scholars thinking about striving behaviors, especially from societies that 
are rapidly developing and maturating a domestic hierarchy similar to China. Finally, 
while the US sector has been heavily studied in this model, there have been no studies 
into global striving through the international rankings. It is just taken for granted that 
these do not matter in the US, but this notion needs to be tested. With this global striving 




Despite global striving ambitions, Chinese policymakers have not totally reshaped 
their domestic higher education sector. Instead, the Ministry of Education has been 
playing a heavy hand in processes involving normalization across the sector. The MoE’s 
discipline ranking mirrors its global counterparts in mechanisms and reactions from local 
actors. Indeed, the schemes place considerable focus on research indices and reputational 
indicators, among other aspects. But, stakeholders in the sector have a greater reverence 
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for the official ranking compared to the outside league tables. There are direct financial 
incentives tied to this government ranking of disciplines, which are so tempting that 
institutions are willing to cook their books in order to ensure success, similar to gaming 
that is present in the West (Kim, 2018). Less competitive departments are being merged 
or folded in order to adhere to this kind of competition. Future studies should attempt to 
track these specific accounts of folding departments.  
The new Double First Class elite university project only exacerbates standardization 
effects of rankings because it will encourage more domestic striving behavior. No longer 
can institutions be assured that they will be included in the static 985 or 211 Project 
stratifications, as the Ministry now has the explicit mechanism to remove institutions. 
While some have approved the new application, contending that it will be more 
egalitarian by allowing programs from across China to compete for the funding status, 
others are dubious that the older hierarchies will be deconstructed in any real, meaningful 
way. This Chinese system, just like with global rankings, has created a self-referential 
cycle in which the rich continue to become richer. The announced ShuangYiLiu 
stratifications are almost the exact same as the 985 and 211 tiers form before. As 
universities are already ahead, but also know that there is a chance of relegation, 
domestic competition and pressures will only increase. Because this system is so new, the 
new striving behaviors it will create is ripe for future exploration.  
Additionally, the seldom-studied C9 League offers a glimpse at how global pressures 
are amended to local characteristics. Despite being labeled as the Chinese Ivy League in 
literature and other sources (see Allen, 2017), it was found through the qualitative 
analysis that the union is largely unknown in that domestic front. Unlike the Ivy League 
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in the American sector (O’Meara and Bloomgarden, 2011), the C9 cannot be considered 
the prestigious benchmarks for strivers. It has not manifested into an important actor in 
the sector and its members have had little meaningful cooperation. In fact, university 
coalition building in China does not seem to have as much resonance because the system 
is too competitive and there has been little incentive in cooperation. Potentially, this 
factor explains why the sector is so ripe for international collaborations in lieu of 
meaningful domestic multi-university unions. The interviewees also generally believed 
that the coalition was hampered because it originated by the universities themselves 
instead of the Ministry, and only official governmental policies could truly gain the clout 
seen by peers in the West. Only Tsinghua and Beida, the first two 985 universities, have 
been recognized as the genuine top institutions of the hierarchy, filling a similar role as 
the Ivy League in the striving model. All 985 and 211 universities, including the other C9 
members, can be considered second-tier global strivers looking to catch these two 
prestigious institutions domestically.    
Chinese universities are stuck in the middle of two powerful forces; one from the 
outside globalized sector that is pushing university ranking standards onto institutions, 
and the other from the government’s own rank and policies that also promote 
normalization and constraints to variation. While it is generally known that the global 
rankings irk academics and other actors in the sector, there is less criticism of the 
government’s efforts. Though, some did express their frustration: “Here in China, of 
course because universities governed by Ministry of Education and that is detriment to 
development,” complained one late-career C9 professor. In the future of Chinese higher 
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education, there will be an increase in striving behaviors due to the combination of 
pressures from a strong, central government and growing global ambitions.   
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CHAPTER SIX: Testing Student Familiarity and Knowledge of University 
Rankings in China: The Global and Local Nexus 
 
Abstract 
Rankings and performance indicators have gained much influence in the education 
sector worldwide. In the context of higher education, this phenomenon has been reflected 
through both domestic and international university rankings. While academics and 
administrations often criticize them, league tables are important tools for student 
decision-making. University rankings have been especially impactful on the Chinese 
sector. Yet, studies have not fully explored how students in the domestic setting engage 
with these global forces. Using a survey of over 900 students from Chinese universities, I 
explore how knowledge of rankings varies in different student populations. Through 
multivariate analysis, I find that students from elite institutions and from affluent 
backgrounds are more attuned to university rankings in general. However, when gauging 
student knowledge of rankings, elite university students only perform better in knowing 
their domestic ranking and actually worse when guessing their global ranking, while 
there are no affluence associations. This study, the first of its kind in terms of testing 
student knowledge, shows how the impact of university rankings is mitigated by local 







Popular university rankings first arrived in domestic higher education sectors in the 
early 1980s with the advent of the US & World News Report (US News) scheme. Ever 
since, league tables have been heavily criticized from within higher education for being 
imprecise, too simplistic, and harmful to educational outcomes (Ehrenberg, 2005; 
Hazelkorn, 2015; Altbach, 2015). The narrowly defined metrics, such as research 
publications and citation, make it risky for institutions to deviate from the standard 
measurements as dictated through the ranking schemes, as they could fall in the rankings. 
For instance, some law schools have changed missions to fit the schema, even programs 
with original missions rooted in diversity rather than the elite raking numbers (Sauder & 
Lancaster, 2006; Espeland & Sauder, 2007). In other cases, universities game the system 
through tactics like encouraging poorly qualified students to apply in order to drive down 
admit rates (Volkwein & Gruing, 2005). While every university may not aspire to be 
Harvard, the rankings force the comparison (Hazelkorn, 2012). 
Despite objections from academics and administrators, rankings have become a tool 
ubiquitously relied upon for information by the general public, but particularly for 
students and parents. Students and parents have been especially paying attention, 
pressuring university policymakers to play the ranking game. Numerous studies show 
that students in Western nations use the rankings as an important factor in the college 
selection process (see Federkeil, 2002; Meredith, 2004; Drewes & Michael, 2006). If a 
university makes it to the coveted front page of the US News ranking issue, it will see a 
significant boost of qualified applicants the following year (Bowman & Bastedo, 2009). 
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Hazelkorn (2015) suggested that there is a similar effect from moving into the top-100 in 
the global rankings, too. 
The effects of rankings on international students have been well studied in recent 
years, as this population especially utilizes rank indicators in their university selection 
process (see Cao et al., 2016; Spires et al., 2017; Perraton, 2017). In the People’s 
Republic of China (China or PRC), because students who are doomed by the high-stakes 
college entrance exam (gaokao) often choose to go abroad, global rankings have become 
a crucial part of the higher education sector (Yang, 2015). Students flock to nations 
abroad, especially those in the West, for higher education, and increasing for at the 
secondary level; and they are not simply studying for just a semester or short-term. Many 
of them spend years as undergraduates and sometimes graduate school abroad.  
Despite the clear implications of rankings on the international stage, the effects on 
students within the Chinese domestic sector have not been fully explored. University 
rankings that are similar to US News have spread across the globe in recent decades 
(Hazelkorn, 2015). The nation has had national rankings in its higher education sector 
since the early 1990s, such as NETBIG or Guangdong Institute of Management Science 
(Liu & Liu, 2005). However, many of the schemes have had difficulties gaining traction 
in the sector and have subsequently shut down. While outside ranking organizations do 
not quite have the cachet domestically, like US News in the US, government-sponsored 
projects have provided important hierarchical structure to the system. Universities 
included in high profile national funding projects have gained in status, while those 
schools left out have lost reputation (Ngok & Guo, 2008). Yet, the intersections between 
these domestic distinctions and ranking effects, local and global, have not been explored.  
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The impact of rankings is important to both the global and domestic higher education 
sectors, as research has shown that league tables are only gaining more ubiquity with 
time throughout the world (Hazelkorn, 2015); however, these influences are not simply 
universalized across actors or societies. Ball (2012) contended that global convergences 
actually resemble localized hybrid translations of internationalizations. In his critique of 
neoliberal policy, which encompasses rankings, he argued, “it morphs and adapts, taking 
on local characteristics from the geographies of existing political economic 
circumstances… social influences and individual agency all play a role” (p. 30). 
Similarly, scholars such as Pizmony-Levy (2011) and Marginson (2017) used the 
metaphor of a light through a prism to describe the refraction of global pressures onto 
local actors. Given these arguments of localization, even as ranking forces have 
standardizing effects, the reception and interpretation by Chinese students are still filtered 
through a societal prism. While studies have shown how students manage rankings in the 
college selection process, especially for international students, there has been no research 
on tested knowledge of ranking information. Exploring how different types of individual 
students have reacted to university rankings will provide deeper understanding of the 
localizations to these international forces. 
In this research, I used quantitative data to explore how students perceive both 
domestic and global university rankings through multivariate analyses. I relied upon an 
original student survey to ascertain this complex intersection of the global and local onto 
the higher education sector. In this study, I address the following research questions in 
the Chinese context: 1) How familiar are students with university rankings? 2) What are 
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the characteristics that determine familiarity with rankings? 3) What factors determine 
students knowing or not knowing their approximate university rank? 
Given the literature, I posited that students in this sector would be quite familiar with 
university rankings, especially those from elite institutions, with study abroad aspirations, 
and from affluent backgrounds. However, in general, the students tested in this research 
were not as attuned to rankings as expected; though, those who were more familiar with 
league tables, indeed, shared the predicted characteristics. Similarly, I speculated that 
students who correctly guessed their universities’ ranking would be from these same 
backgrounds. However, the results yielded more nuanced patterns, highly dependent on 
both local and individual characteristics and between global or domestic rank schemes.     
 
China and Ranking Forces   
China has the largest higher education sector in the world, with over 2,500 degree-
granting universities and millions of students at various institutional types, according to 
the Ministry of Education. In recent years, the nation has become one of the most 
important players in the globalized sector. China sends the most students abroad, with 
over 700,000 per year according to UNESCO, and it is also quickly rising as a key intake 
destination for students, on target to have 440,000, only behind the US and UK according 
to Institute of International Education. Additionally, Chinese universities have made key 
advancements in artificial intelligence, robotics, and other innovations, often through 
partnerships with some of the top innovation in the world, such as MIT and Cambridge 
(Yang & Welch, 2011). The PRC government has been attracted to these kinds of high 
profile projects with elite universities around the world and has also been especially 
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attuned to rankings (Gries, 2004). The county has a history of technocratic rule in recent 
decades and, in general, has utilized ranking metrics in various aspects of Chinese 
society, such as class rank, city tiers, and other clear status markers (see Edwards, 2008; 
Ho, 2008). These types of technocratic measurements and evaluations of global forces 
have now become ubiquitous; not only in China, but throughout the world (Cooley & 
Snyder, 2015). 
The complexity of the higher education system globally cannot easily be understood 
without a simplification—this quantification of abstract ideas into easily definable 
measurements is known as commensuration (Espeland & Stevens, 1998). Given the 
national focus on global prestige in the sector, it should be no surprise that in 2003 China 
actually helped to usher in a new era of global university rankings with the establishment 
of the Academic Ranking of World Universities (ARWU) at Shanghai Jiao Tong 
University. Other popular global and local league tables soon followed and the world was 
quickly inundated with these metrics. The power of university league tables comes from 
the perception of a scientific rationality and a perceived need for this kind of information 
lionized globally (Steiner-Khamsi, 2003; Crossley, 2014). For the higher education 
sector, students, parents, alumnae, and the general public want these numbers and the 
universities are basically forced to acquiesce (Hazelkorn, 2015). Chinese stakeholders 
have been keen on these kinds of metrics.  
 
Other Rank Forces  
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has emphasized international recognition 
through prestigious external distinction (Gries, 2004), such as Olympic medal counts or 
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placement on the OECD’s Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) test 
scores, where China1 dominated the field of nations to rank as the number one society in 
2009, which caused stir around the world (Sellar & Lingard, 2013). These International 
large-scale assessments (ILSAs) actually provide underpinnings to ranking literature. 
Heavily studied, these ILSAs have significant impact on the general public, 
policymakers, or other actors within domestic settings across the world (Addey et al., 
2017). The tests results are put in country rank order and often scandalized in their local 
settings to reflect domestic actor preferences, either to outside policy choices or internal 
reforms (Steiner-Khamsi, 2004). So-called “PISA Shock” is a phenomenon that 
sometimes strikes nations after the results are released in which there is a national panic 
due to rank outcomes (Waldow, 2009).     
One common characteristic of these ranking force studies is that information is often 
misunderstood or manipulated. In a critique of media’s skewed portrayal of ILSA results, 
Stack (2007) noted, “The headlines and leads concerning all three tests demonstrate the 
power… to frame a story about what a good education is, and the importance of numbers 
to demonstrate the veracity of the story,” (p. 108). Similarly, Takayama (2010) found that 
Japanese policymakers “romanticized [an] image of Finnish education” that fit their 
personal policy preference, regardless of where they sat on the political spectrum (p. 67). 
Even PISA Shock is often rooted in a misunderstanding of scoring—national outcomes 
usually remain static, but as other nations improve or join the assessment, other nations 
fall, creating a false sense of failing.  
In one pertinent study of the misinterpretations of ILSAs, Pizmony-Levy (2017) 
tested general public knowledge of national rank on this ILSA in both Israel and the 																																																								
1 China was represented by just one city, Shanghai, in that year’s assessment.  
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United States. The results are nuanced, but some populations, such as more educated 
Americans, believed 15-year olds in their country were underperforming their actual 
levels. Understanding how the general public views these globalized forces offers a 
deeper study of their impacts. While tests of general knowledge are only beginning in 
relation to ILSAs, it has actually never been carried out in higher education or to the 
Chinese case. 
 
University Rankings in China 
While the United States has US News, China has its own domestic rankings (Liu & 
Shan, 2007). NETBIG and Guangdong Institute of Management Science (GIMS) were 
both founded in the 1990s, but have since shuttered after failing to gain a foothold in the 
sector (Liu & Liu 2005). There was even a high profile pay-for-rank scandal from a 
renowned scholar named Wu Shulian, whose popular ranking scheme affiliated with 
GIMS came under fire after the news of a pay-for-rank scandal broke. Members of the 
National People’s Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Conference actually attempted to ban unsanctioned university rankings in 2004 because it 
was believed that they disrupted the higher education sector. The Ministry of Education, 
though, has not made any official ruling and has, for now, simply tolerated these league 
tables (Wang, 2009). Some rankings, such as the one offered by the Chinese Universities 
Alumni Association (CUAA), are still relevant (Luo et al., 2016). The organization 
utilizes ranking criteria that measure research, faculty awards, program types, student 
awards, governmental status, and reputation (Liu & Liu, 2005) However, because the 
government plays such a crucial role in Chinese society, private sector solutions, while 
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present in society, have often been overshadowed by official policies, and the education 
sector is no different.  
Two policies have dominated the elite Chinese higher education sector for over two 
decades, providing a national hierarchy in the same way US News does in the US sector. 
First, the Project 211 was introduced in 1995 with the goal of having Chinese universities 
reach a “world standard” in research and teaching (Ngok & Guo, 2008, p. 546). This 
status was eventually granted to over 100 universities and included hefty research project 
funding (Li, 2004). In 1998, an even more elite policy was introduced with the Project 
985; China’s paramount leader Jiang Zemin, while making a speech at Peking 
University’s centennial anniversary, declared, “China must have a number of first-rate 
universities of international advanced level” (as cited by Li, 2004, p. 17). The 
government officially unveiled this high profile project with a major injection of funding 
to nine universities and eventually expanded to 39 (Li, 2004; Ngok & Guo, 2008). While 
Tsinghua University and Peking University received a lion’s share of the investment, all 
of the universities included in the project became the very elite of the sector. In 2015, 
these projects were replaced by the World Class 2.0 project (also called Double First 
Class or ShuangYiLiu), officially put in place in 2017. However, it appears that this new 
project will mirror the segmentation of the sector. 
With the multiple elite projects and other governmental policies, there is a hierarchy 
in Chinese higher education: Tsinghua and Peking are clearly perched atop the national 
sector; next are the other 985 universities, which are quite influential; below are the 211 
institutions; following behind are the regional universities or even the new global 
ventures; and last are the local universities and technical schools (Yang, 2017). While 
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this national hierarchy is not officially a ranking, the statuses align closely with both 
global and domestic rankings within in China. Looking at Chart 6.1, from 2012 to 2016, 
985 institutions have dominated the CUAA ranking charts, accounting for every spot in 
the top-25 and the majority of positions in the top-50 every year, while 211 institutions 
make up a majority of the top-100. Universities in neither project hardly appear in the 
league tables. The results are even more pronounced in the global rankings. Looking at 
Chart 6.2, only 985 universities have factored in this popular global scheme, and those 
without government distinction have never made an appearance. Because these rankings 
often overemphasize research (Hazelkorn, 2015) and the 985 universities have increased 
publication output since its implementation (Zhang et al., 2013), the results in the league 
tables during this period are quite expected.  
Chart 6.1: Number of Universities in the Top-25, 50, 100 of CUAA Ranking by Type 
 Within the top- Within the top- Within the top- Within the top- Within the top- 
 25  50 100 25  50 100 25  50 100 25  50 100 25  50 100 
Project 985 25 36 38 25 36 38 25 36 38 25 36 39 25 36 39 
Project 211 0 14 52 0 14 53 0 15 55 0 14 51 0 14 51 
None 0 0 10 0 0 9 0 0 7 0 0 10 0 0 10 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Source: CUAA as calculated for this research.  
 
Chart 6.2: Number of Universities in the Top-100, 500, 1000 of QS Ranking by Type 
 Within the top- Within the top- Within the top- Within the top- Within the top- 
 100  500 1000 10  50 1000 10 50 1000 10 500 100 10 50 1000 
Project 985 3 18 - 3 16 23 3 18 24 4 23 27 4 22 28 
Project 211 0 1 - 0 1 2 0 0 3 0 2 3 0 2 5 
None 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Source: QS as calculated for this research. 
  
Given the disparities between the ranking outcomes, the national project statuses have 
been crucial indicators for the domestic sector, even when considered globally. Because 
of this national hierarchy, I expect students from the more elite universities to be more 
attuned to their national and global rankings. The following section, though, will explore 
more research on student choice in university selection in China.   
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Students in the Chinese Higher Education Sector  
Studies related to Chinese student college decisions have been mixed-method in 
nature and they often focus on class, location, and the international sector. Geography has 
been an especially important aspect of studies because the East Coast has grown rich 
through liberalized and favorable government policies (Bai, 1998; Liu & Morgan, 2015). 
The best universities are clustered in a few cities and provinces, while working 
opportunities after graduation also center in these areas; China’s hukou (household 
registration) system only exacerbates the geographic inequality, as students are bound to 
apply for universities through their local registration and some areas have limited quota 
for admission per province (Wang, 2011). Students with Beijing or Shanghai registrations 
have a greater chance of gaining admission to top institutions, because these areas have 
the most 985 or 211 institutions. He et al. (2016) found that Chinese students heavily 
attracted to universities in these “first-tier regions” because of the perceived economic 
benefits, as opposed to amenities (p. 67).  
Parental background is also a crucial attribute in student education. Poorer families 
are constrained by the college process, both financially and knowledge-wise, while the 
more educated and affluent have considerable agency and guanxi (Bodycott & Lai, 2012; 
Liu & Morgan, 2015). One such empirical study from Sheng (2017) utilized a mixed-
method analysis of almost 2000 secondary school students and 50 parental interviews in 
Beijing. She found a strong association between the self-reported wealth indicators and 
choosing one of the more elite institutions. Further, working-class parents had little 
knowledge to provide in the process. Meanwhile, middle-class to upper-class parents 
have the means to move their students abroad if they feel they cannot score well enough 
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to enter a high-status university (Sheng, 2012). Liu et al. (2013), though, reported that 
parental background did not always have a significant impact in a study of over 12,000 
students. They indicated that social class effects did not relate to degree choices among 
Chinese students, other than with law and medicine.  
Because international educational mobility has long been a crucial aspect of the 
Chinese system, with many middle and upper-class parents electing to send their child 
abroad (Yang, 2015), research of choice in this area is quite rich. In almost every study 
on the subject, university rankings are discovered to be central pull factors in student 
decisions (see Hou et al., 2014; Huang et al., 2015; Cao et al., 2016; Spires et al., 2017; 
Perraton, 2017). Manns and Swift (2016) showed that these students, like their domestic 
counterparts, utilize league tables to whittle a list of potential choices. Additionally, as 
with the “front page” effect of US News, which is roughly the top-25, researchers have 
found that a threshold of the top-100 and top-400 were key markers for international 
Chinese students (Gong & Huybers, 2015). These types of students have been especially 
cited as seeking ranking information on university marketing materials or websites 
(Chen, 2007). “Students want more consumer type information through guidebooks or 
comparative or benchmarking data, increasingly on a global scale and accessible online,” 
argued Hazelkorn (2015, p. 7). 
In parallel to domestic findings, parental impact was also important in pupil study 
abroad decision-making (Bodycott & Lai, 2012). In one study with almost 800 students 
surveyed in China, Cao et al. (2016) found through hierarchical regression modeling that 
the impact from parents was the top effect in students desire to study abroad. Educated 
parents were more likely to push their child to study abroad. In line with other research, 
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reputation of academic quality was the next greatest factor in their test, which they use as 
a proxy for ranking. In a focus group of several parents in China, Spires et al. (2017) 
found that parents use more pull factors rather than push factors in the study abroad 
choice of their children. Western nations’ reputations as academic or technological 
leaders were key influencers, though rankings were not explicitly mentioned. Aside from 
rankings, parents have also been concerned with safety and expenses in the study abroad 
college-going process (Gong & Huybers, 2015). 
All of these factors reported in the student choice literature on the China case will be 
considered for this research. Considering the importance of parental background, I expect 
that students from affluent homes will have more perceived and confirmed rank 
knowledge than their less affluent peers, as a high position is often a prestige symbol. 
Accordingly, I anticipate students who are considering studying abroad will also score 
well on my test of rank knowledge and ranking familiarity. These students are especially 
attuned to university rankings. Critically, given the impact of governmental statuses for 
universities, via the Projects 985 and 211, I expect these institutional factors to be quite 
influential on student refractions and perceptions of university rankings.   
 
Data and Methods 
This research relied upon an original survey of 1,120 Chinese students sampled 
through two methods during the spring and summer of 2017. For this particular segment 
of the research, I removed graduate and exchange students from the collected data to 
better align with the focus of the research questions, centering on the undergraduate 
responses, which brought the total size to 924 respondents—all undergraduates in China.   
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The survey was created specifically for this research inquiry on the impact of 
rankings on the Chinese higher education sector. The design focus was for a quick and 
readable survey that students could finish in ten minutes or less, in order to minimize 
drop-offs (Bradburn et al., 2004). The questions were translated into Mandarin by a 
doctoral researcher who is a native speaker of Chinese. The instrument was then pretested 
with the help of a Chinese research assistant. All of the materials, both in English and 
Chinese, were submitted and approved by the university institutional review board (IRB) 
in compliance with ethical and privacy guidelines.  
The sampling was conducted in two separate phases. First, the majority of 
respondents, 620 students, were surveyed through primary research fieldwork while I was 
based at Beijing Normal University under the Confucius China Studies Fellowship. My 
access allowed me to meet professors from across China to disseminate the survey to 
their students via WeChat, and in some cases live in-class sampling. For the in-class 
collection, I personally witnessed classes access and complete the survey through their 
phones. Only professors, students, or university administrators were given the survey QR 
code or link to distribute to their networks. To entice recruitment, I offered a chance to 
enter into a lottery for a very small reward of 20 RMB2 if students completed the survey. 
Thus, the chances of someone unqualified taking the survey was unlikely due to the 
relatively lower financial benefit.  
For the second phase of sampling, and to bolster the responses from regional and 
local universities, I employed a Shandong-based private marketing research firm that 
specializes in market research for foreign firms to add 500 respondents. The service 
operates similar to Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, offering a small fee to the students for 																																																								
2 This is roughly equal to a cup of Starbucks coffee.  
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each survey that they complete. They have a pool of student respondent across China that 
they send survey requests to complete. I checked the IP addresses, time of opening the 
survey, and time to complete the survey for this half of the respondents to ensure accurate 
results from the firm.    
 
Measurements 
The full measurements of variables used in this study can be found on Table 6.1. In 
order to measure the factors important to the university selection decision by students, 
respondents were asked to assess the importance of various items (rankings, 985 or 211 
status, teaching, location, major, or career) to their college-going decision, ranging from 
very important to not important at all. Similarly, another crucial variable in this study 
comes from familiarity that students had with university rankings. The respondents were 
asked to make a self-assessment of “How familiar are you with university rankings?” The 
categorized responses ranged from familiar, not too familiar, totally unfamiliar, and 
unsure. I combined the familiar categories due to limited selections of “very” and I also 
combined totally unfamiliar with unsure to allow for easier interpretation of these similar 
conceptions.3 These range of questions were adapted from past educational surveys 
related to ILSAs and parental opinion to fit the Chinese higher education context 
(Pizmony-Levy & Green-Saraisky, 2016; Pizmony-Levy & Doan, 2016). 
I have taken this research a step beyond self-assessments by actually testing my 
sample’s knowledge of the topic. I tested whether students knew the approximate range 
of universities’ ranking, both globally and nationally, by asking them to guess their 																																																								
3 I ran all of the tests with totally unfamiliar with unsure as separate categories and the results align with 
those found in this research.   
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universities’ league table position. The ranges used for the domestic test were: top-10, 
top-25, top-100, no national rank, or unsure; and the ranges used for the global test were: 
top-100, top-500, top-1000, no global rank, or unsure. I then compared the results to the 
actual 2015-2016 academic year league tables for one of the most popular domestic 
schemes, CUAA (Luo et al., 2016), and one of the most popular global schemes, QS 
(Hazelkorn, 2015). To simplify the analysis, I folded the “I don’t know” answers in with 
all students who guessed incorrectly (didn’t know ranking=0), while all the students that 
correctly guessed the approximate rank were left in one group (knew ranking =1) (a 
common practice in social science research of this nature; see Caudill & Groothuis, 2005; 
Fagerlin et al., 2006; Pinhey & Millman, 2004; Reynolds, 2010).   
Media is often an important aspect to studies on rankings, especially in knowledge 
assessments (see Stack, 2007; Waldow, 2009). In this study, I asked, “How often do you 
follow stories in the newspaper, radio, TV about what is happening in education in this 
country?” and allowed responses of never, rarely, sometimes, and often. Further, I asked 
students to identify their specific ranking information sources, both globally and 
domestically, including media, friends, universities, family, and professors, as adapted 
from Pizmony-Levy and Green-Saraisky (2016). In the analysis, I also used each source 
to tally a total rank source variable. Additionally, for those students with at least some 
familiarity with rankings, I asked them to identify specific ranking schemes that they 
were familiar with, including ARWU, Times Higher Education, QS, US News, CUAA, 
China Education Center (CEC), Webometrics, and other.   
Demographics are important controls for social science research. In this research, I 
captured gender, geography, major, parental education, and university type. Studies 
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related to student university selection often use parental education as a proxy for 
affluence (see Liu et al., 2013; Liu & Morgan, 2015; Sheng, 2017). In the survey, I had 
participants identify their parents’ educational background, from below high school, high 
school, some college, college degree, and graduate school. Geography is also especially 
critical to studies in Chinese higher education (see Bai, 1998; Wang, 2011; He et al., 
2016). For this study, I organized geographic categorize in five categories: the eastern 
coast, central provinces, the northeast, the western part of the country, and other 
geographic settings (such as Hong Kong). Similarly, I recorded the university type for the 
respondents, including local institutions, regional universities, universities in the 211 
Project, and elite 985 Project universities. For educational background, I organized 
students in terms of freshmen, sophomores, and upperclassmen (a combination of juniors 
and seniors). I also captured their majors in three categories: natural sciences, social 
sciences and the humanities, and education.  
 
Data Analysis  
I utilized both multinomial logistic regression and binomial logistic regression 
analyses in this study. Logistic regression analysis has advantages in that neither normal 
distributions nor linear relationships between the dependent and independent variables 
are assumed, as with ordinary least square (OLS) regression. I could not use ordered 
logistic regression in these tests because my outcome variables are not ordered, given the 
“I don’t know” responses that were included. The selected design models still must 
mostly avoid multicollinearity, which I confirmed in my models via the COLLIN 
command in Stata, finding that all of my variables in the models had a VIF well under 
	179 
two (Williams, 2015). This type of modeling first gained popularity through sociological 
studies where researchers have often used categorical instruments (see Long, 1997).  
In the tests, I first performed a multinomial logistic regression analysis to examine the 
association between the effects of demographic controls and ranking-related 
characteristics on general familiarly with university rankings, both domestically and 
internationally. This analysis produced the odds of self-determined understanding of 
rankings by undergraduate students in China, as reported through odds ratios. The 
method allows for estimations of multiple binary logistic regressions between all of the 
categories. In the model, I used familiar as the reference group. Additionally, I then used 
a binomial regression analysis with the knowledge testing results of the students’ guesses 
of their universities’ global and domestic university ranking level (knew ranking=1, did 
not know=0) as the dependent variable, 4  along with the associations between 
demographics and various rank characteristic effects.5 I have also reported the binomial 
models’ results through odds ratios.   
																																																								
4 A note on the models’ dependent variables: For the binomial regression model, I used the dummy variable 
constructed from the ranking knowledge test (didn’t know ranking=1; knew ranking=2) in order to simplify 
the analysis. However, I also ran multinomial models with the full range of responses to the tests, which 
included those who were wrong one, two, and three degrees over their ranking, those who were one and 
two degrees under their ranking, those who did not know, and those who answered correctly. Using this 
variable, the multinomial models could not properly run, as the data was too thinned out and some of the 
most crucial control variables had too few respondents to be included, such as university type, a notorious 
problem with this type of modeling. In another round of tests, I folded the variables into those who had 
over guessed, under guessed, didn’t know the ranking, and those who answered correctly. The models in 
this test had the same issue as before. Finally, I ran a model using those who had incorrectly guessed, 
correctly guessed, and answered that they did not know. In this round, the domestic Chinese model worked, 
but the global model had the same data thinning issues as the other failed models. Given these issues and 
past research that has been similarly conducted, I selected the binomial model with the binary outcome.  
5 A note on the models’ independent variables: This study contains numerous categorical independent 
variables. Through regression modeling, one of these categories for these variables must be used as a 
reference that is compared to all the others. The remaining categories, then, are never compared together in 
the models. To maximize transparency, I have included extra tables in the appendix with that can be used 
as a reference. Multinomial logistic regression provides a difficult interpretation between various 
categories. Ordinal logistic regression (OLR) is often preferred because it provides a more intuitive 
interpretation through hierarchical modeling (Peterson & Harrell, 1990; Warner, 2008). However, the 
assumptions are much more difficult to meet in OLR. First, using the BRANT command in STATA, I found 
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Limitations  
Though the sample is large and I was able to gather a robust segment of the 
population that reflects the Chinese student experience with university rankings, the data 
presented cannot be considered generalizable (George & Bennett, 2005). The online 
collection was not random, meaning it could be biased towards those with greater global 
networks, as personal connections through my university and other elite Chinese 
institutions assisted with the dissemination. Further, for the in-class sampling, I was not 
able to enter any courses related to hard science, only education and social science. Plus, 
students could have simply been playing on their phone during the surveys. The paid 
market research organization data was used to bolster students from non-985 or 211 
universities, but their data is not promised to be generalizable. They have a large pool of 
students from various universities across China that they use for market research 
purposes. In a combination with these sources, I ended up with an oversample of females 
and students from elite 985 universities, among others.  
True random sampling for survey research in China is difficult and very expensive. 
Because of these barriers, many other important parallel studies have employed similar 
methods with the same sample weaknesses found in my study (see comparable works by 
Chen, 2007; Gong & Huybers, 2015; Cao et al., 2016; Liu & Morgan, 2016). Despite 
these sample limitations, I can still draw trends from this research, but I will not make 
generalizable conclusions to the entire Chinese higher education system. 																																																																																																																																																																					
that the model did not meet the proportional odds/parallelism test that would need to be met for this kind of 
modeling (Brant, 1999). Besides, OLR modeling is not a bit for instruments with a high number of “I don’t 
know” answers, as it is difficult to interpret these types of responses hierarchically. Similar, binomial 
logistic regression also has constraints. The outcome in this model can only be yes or no, (e.g. knew the 
ranking or did not). There are certainly nuances that can be further studied in tested-rank knowledge of 
students beyond a binary test. Further research directions will be explored in the concluding section to 
consider more in-depth analyses of rank knowledge testing.    
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Results From the Statistical Analysis  
Descriptive Patterns for Rank Familiarity and Knowledge  
Because rankings have shown to be crucial aspects for the student university selection 
process, the general population should be fairly informed on these metrics (McManus-
Howard, 2002; Hazelkorn, 2015). However, this sample actually displays a general low 
degree of familiarity with league tables. Only 277 respondents considered themselves to 
be familiar with league tables, which is only around a third (30%) of the students. At the 
same time, over 44% and 26% of the students considered themselves to be not so familiar 
or totally unfamiliar, respectively.6 Other traditional factors proved to be much more 













6 I also ran a correlation test between the importance of ranking factor and ranking familiarity. There is no 
significance in this relationship (p>.05) and the correlation coefficient is minimal (.014).   
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Graph 6.1: Factors Important to Student College-Selection 
 
Source: Student survey data from this research 
Career and major have been reported as fundamental factors for students in the 
college decisions (see examples in Bai, 1998; Liu & Morgan, 2015; Yang, 2015). 
Likewise, the literature demonstrates that location is another critical aspect to students in 
China, especially because the Eastern coast and urban cities offer the most career 
opportunities (Liu, 2013). All of the elite universities, mostly found in these same 
regions, are also highly competitive factors (Allen, 2017). Graph 6.1 illustrates a simple 
distribution of various importance factors for the college students and the sample 
comports to these past findings. Even as the other factors—such as teaching, career, and 
major—showed to be generally more essential for students, all of these factors were only 
separated by several percentage points. In the study, league table position is a somewhat 
important factor in the university selection process, aligning with past research.  
The importance of league tables appears to be grouped with amenities and the elite 
projects, as secondary factors of importance. Only 45% of students said that university 









for teaching, major, or careers. Similarly, around 45% of the students considered rankings 
to be somewhat important in this process. Even as only around one in ten (9%) said 
rankings were not a very important or even fewer (1.5%) said they were not at all 
important in their decision, league tables are still only a secondary factor for this sample.  
These descriptive results do not render the league table factor as unimportant, only 
that there are more salient characteristics to this choice. This could help explain why 
there is a gap in the literature in terms of domestic rankings in China. Further, because 
there is not a consensus in ranking importance, understanding the reasons for the 
discrepancy becomes more imperative.     
Self-reported and assessed knowledge is a crucial tool for social science, but it also 
has its drawbacks, as subjects could misjudge the inquiry (Spector, 1994). I have taken 
this research a step further to actually test my sample’s knowledge of the subject. In 
general, less than a third of students were able to identify their universities’ domestic 
ranking (mean = .287). Conversely, almost two-thirds of the respondents correctly knew 
their global university ranking. Fig. 6.1 illustrates a cross-tabulation of these results in 
four categories, those who knew both rankings, those who knew neither, those who only 
knew the national, and those who only knew the global ranking. Less than half of the 
students correctly identified just their global league table position (45.0%), followed by 
just over a quarter who failed to identify either (27.5%). Interestingly, only knowing the 
national ranking had the fewest individuals, at 12.1%.  
The disparity between the domestic and global dynamic could be connected to the 
assertion that university rankings are much more critical to international students, as they 
lack local contexts, and thus students do not really pay attention to national rank. Further, 
	184 
only around 14% of these students said that they were going to study abroad after their 
undergraduate studies, an important indicator because, according to the research, these 
types of students are most attuned to league tables. It also helps to explain why many 
students placed factors, rather than rankings, as very important to their domestic 
university selection.  
 
Figure 6.1: Cross-Tabulation of Students Knowing Domestic and Global Rankings  
 
 
Source: Student survey data from this research. 
 
There are local and individual characteristics that could help to explain the 
differences between knowledge of rankings from students. The demographic control 
variables are standard in student research: gender, grade level, region, and parental 
education. The rank-related characteristics provide a more nuanced description to this 
particular exploration.  
In other patterns of note seen on Table 6.1, the surveyed individuals were particularly 
adept at consuming educational news, as the mean response was sometimes. Additionally, 
they averaged a little fewer than 2.4 global ranking information sources and a little fewer 
than three domestic ranking information sources. I also asked for familiarity of specific 
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university ranking schemes. The respondents reported that they were more aware of CEC 
and CUAA more than any other schemes, which makes sense because these are domestic 
Chinese schemes. For global league tables, the QS scheme had the most students report 
knowing it. There appeared to be a large drop between awareness of domestic rankings 
compared to global counterparts. Overall, though, these students were seemingly a well-
informed group on general educational-related information given their media 
consumption and rank awareness. However, how do these factors shape perceived and 
tested knowledge of university rankings?  
Table 6.1: Definitions, Metrics, and Descriptive Statistics for Variables in the Study    
Variable Definition and Metrics  M/SD Frequency (%) 
Dependent Variables     
Ranking Familiarity  How familiar are you with university rankings? 
     Familiar  
     Not too familiar 








Know Global Rank If the student correctly knew their global rank according to 
the 2016 QS list.  
Yes = 1; no = 0 
.632  
    
Know China Rank If the student correctly knew their global rank according to 
the 2016 CUAA list.  
Yes = 1; no = 0 
.287  
    
Independent Variables     
Importance of Ranking  How important is this factor in your university selection 
decision? 
  
      Not very  10.0 
      Somewhat   44.7 
      Very  45.2 
    
University Type      Local   
     Regional 
     211 Project  





    
Gender      Female = 0; Male = 1 .315  
    
Grade level       Freshman 
     Sophomore  




    
Region       East coast  
     Central 
     Northeast 
     West 






    
Parental education      Below high school 
     High school 
     Some college 






     Graduate school 6.6 
    
Education news How often do you follow stories in the newspaper, radio, TV 
about what is happening in education in this country? 
Never = 1; rarely = 2;   
sometimes = 3; often = 4  
2.97/ .656  
    
Global info. rank 
sources  
Total number of marked information sources on global 
university rankings 
Min. = 0; Max. = 5 
2.41/1.27  
    
China info. rank sources Total number of marked information sources on domestic 
university rankings 
Min. = 0; Max. = 4 
2.73/1.28  
    
Study abroad  Do you plan on studying abroad after graduation? 
Yes = 1; other = 0 
.138  
    
Specific Ranking 
variables  
Please mark each university ranking that you are familiar 
with.  
  
    
     ARWU  .193  
     THE  .190  
     QS  .270  
     US News  .162  
     CUAA  .311  
     CEC  .440  
     Webometrics  .177  
     Other  .030  
Source: Results from statistical analysis of student survey data of this research.  
 
 
Multinomial Logistic Regression Analysis of Ranking Familiarity  
The multinomial logistic regression analysis of the effects between demographic 
characteristics and rank-related characteristics on self-reported familiarity with university 
rankings has been presented on Table 6.2. In each test, the comparison group is students 
familiar with rankings versus those with other responses and reported in odds ratios. 
Panel A only includes the rank-related variables and the demographic backgrounds of the 
students are only introduced in Panel B to complete the model. This construction design 
of the model demonstrates the critical importance of ranking-related variables, as their 
effects hold even after individual characteristics are controlled for in the test.  
In Panel A, only the effects of the rank-related independent variables are presented. 
The independent variable, importance of rankings to the college-going decision, did yield 
associations: students who considered rankings somewhat or very important were more 
likely to be familiar with rankings than not so familiar, accounting only for rank-related 
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characteristics (p<.01; p<.05). Though, there were no associations for those familiar and 
unfamiliar with rankings in terms of importance of rankings. In relation to media, there 
were also some surprising results. An increase in sources of Chinese rankings was 
associated with a greater likelihood for a student to be unfamiliar with rankings 
compared to being familiar, controlling for rank-related variables (p<.001). Conversely, 
in some expected results, those who consume more educational news are more likely to 
consider themselves familiar with rankings rather than being unfamiliar and not so 
familiar with league tables, accounting for the other factors in the model (both p<.001). 
Additionally, as students gained global ranking sources, they were less likely to be 
unfamiliar compared to familiar with league tables, with the same controls (p<.05).   
As predicted by the literature, university type and study abroad plans had significant 
relationships in the model. In comparison to students in 985 universities, those in both 
regional and local universities were more likely to be found in either the unfamiliar 
categories, rather than the completely familiar category, adjusting for rank-related 
features (p<.001). Similarly, students in 211 universities were more likely to be 
unfamiliar with rankings when compared to their 985 peers (p<.01). I also ran the 
analysis with local universities as the reference group, 211 and regional universities do 
not have associations in any category. 
International mobility is a considerable part of the growing attraction to rankings, and 
students in this research confirm these past findings. Those without plans to study abroad 
were considerably less likely to be familiar with rankings, compared to being both 
unfamiliar (p<.001) or not so familiar (p<.01), when controlling for the other rank-related 
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indicators. These global and local intersections are especially important and will be 
further highlighted in the next section. 
Table 6.2: Multinomial Logistic Regression of the Effect of Demographics and 
Ranking-Related Characteristics on Familiarity with University Rankings 
(n=924) 
 Panel A Panel B 












Rank-related      
Importance of Rank     
      Somewhat 0.44** 0.76 0.41** 0.66 
      Very  0.50* 1.01 0.52* 0.93 
Education news 0.46*** 0.27*** 0.46*** 0.28*** 
Chinese rank source  1.05 2.27*** 1.13 2.22*** 
Global rank source 1.03 0.81* 1.04 0.85 
University Type     
     Local 0.82 5.30*** 0.58 3.24* 
     Regional 1.29 3.25*** 1.00 2.83** 
     211 1.16 4.32** 0.83 2.90* 
Study abroad  0.38*** 0.22*** 0.47** 0.25*** 
     
Demographics      
Gender (Male)   0.85 1.24 
Parental Edu.     
     High school   0.99 1.64 
     Some college    0.83 0.74 
     College degree   0.49** 0.35** 
     Grad school   0.38** 0.14** 
Region2     
     Central   0.65 0.93 
     Northeast   0.68 1.24 
     West   0.95 0.90 
     Other   0.15** 0.53 
Grade level     
     Sophomores   0.75 0.78 
    Upperclassmen   0.72 1.30 
Major     
     Social Science   1.12 0.95 
     Education   0.76 1.13 
     
Constant 28.3*** 3.19 52.2*** 4.37 
Pseudo R2  0.15  0.19 
* = p<.05; ** = p<.01; *** = p<.001 
Omitted reference groups: importance of rank = not important; parental education = below high school degree; region = East coast; 
grade level = Freshmen; major = natural science; university type = 985 universities  
 
Adding controls for demographic characteristics in the model is an important step in 
this analysis. As illustrated in Panel B, these independent variables do not alter the 
overall analysis as compared to the previous panel. The patterns for the rank-related 
variables mostly maintain their effects across panels, in an illustration of how crucial they 
are to ranking familiarity by Chinese undergraduates. The only effect to lose its 
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associations is the global rank sources variable. The importance of ranking in students’ 
college-going decision retained the effects. Students who did not view rankings as an 
important characteristic were more likely to be not so familiar with rankings compared to 
familiar, when accounting for other rank-related variables and demographics (p<.05; 
p<.01). Though, this still does not show an effect on the relationship between familiar 
and unfamiliar in the model.  
Other associations remain in this second panel. The same patterns persist with 
Chinese rank sources, educational news viewing, and study abroad. University type keeps 
the same associations as with Panel A, along with the mentioned switched reference 
groups additionally tested, accounting for the full range of controls.  
For the demographic controls added in Panel B, there are few clear patterns across the 
groupings. The most apparent trend comes from parental education differences. For 
instance, students with parents that had graduate degrees are more likely to be familiar 
with rankings than being unfamiliar (p<.01) and not so familiar (p<.05), as compared to 
those with the lowest amounts of education and accounting for other variables in the 
model, when accounting for other demographic and rank-related variables. Likewise, 
students with parents that had either a college degree were less likely to be unfamiliar 
(p<.05) or not familiar (p<.05) of this ranking question and more likely to report 
familiarity, compared to those at the lowest tier of education, including the full model 
controls. I also ran the effects of this test with graduate school as the comparison because 
its effect size was much greater than the others. Students with parents in graduate school 
were more likely to be familiar with rankings rather than unfamiliar, when compared to 
all of the other categories except for college degree holders. The results indicate that 
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affluence is an important factor in this relationship, comporting to research on these 
student populations.       
The only other relationships in Panel A come from the regional background variable. 
Those from the eastern coastal region are more likely to report being familiar with 
rankings rather than not so familiar, compared to those from the other areas. Though, this 
relationship does not hold across the familiar to unfamiliar comparison. It may appear 
that other regional students could produce a statistical different association, but that is not 
the case, as I also ran the test with this variable as the reference group. No other 
demographic controls yield a relationship in Panel B.  
Clear patterns have emerged from the examination of the effects on self-reported 
ranking familiarity. Local context related to ranking and education especially matters to 
this relationship, along with familial backgrounds and some personal characteristics to a 
degree. These finding all concur with past literature as cited in the previous section. 
Taking the exploration a step further, though, I tested beyond self-assessment, which led 
to the obvious question: Do these trends persist when considering actual displayed 
knowledge?  
 
Binomial Logistic Regression of Ranking Knowledge  
Table 6.3 displays the binomial logistic regression tests for the effects of 
demographics and rank-related characteristics as reported in odds ratios. The three 
models in the Panel A test for knowledge of national university rank (e.g. did the student 
accurately know their university’s ranking in China); meanwhile, the three Global Panel 
models capture the international ranking knowledge (e.g. did the student accurately know 
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their university’s global ranking). Within each panel, step-wise modeling was utilized to 
capture distinctive relationships. Models 1 and 4 are considered to be the full models. 
Models 2 and 5 include a deconstructed ranking information sources variable (including 
family, peers, university, and professors) in order to isolate effects within the diverse 
sources for students. The last set of models (3 and 6) introduces specific ranking schemes 
to help understand which are actually considered in the Chinese context. Because the 
survey instrument reduced the number of respondents for this question to those who had 
some knowledge of rankings, the sample contains 235 fewer respondents than the first 
sets of models. I also removed ranking familiarity from the last model because of 
collinearity with the specific rank schemes.      
While the rank-related characteristics provide important understanding in this 
research, their effects in this domestic model were found to be somewhat muted. 
Unexpectedly, the degree of importance for rankings in the college-going decision has no 
association in any of Panel A’s models. Likewise, different levels of ranking familiarity 
also have no associations. Furthermore, across the first three models, unlike in the 
ranking familiarity tests, educational news consumption has no association in this tested 
relationship. But, in Model 1, as students’ rank information sources increase, the less 
likely that they were able to correctly guess their domestic university ranking, when 
accounting for all controls in the model (p<.05). To help understand this relationship, 
Model 2 deconstructs this variable into individual sources. Students that considered their 
professors as a source of information for rankings are actually more likely to incorrectly 
guess their national ranking, adjusting for demographic and ranking variables (p<.05). No 
other specific individual sources proved an association in this relationship. Further, 
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Model 3 adds specific ranking schemes, but they too fail to yield any statistically 
significant associations in Panel A. 
In the previous test of ranking familiarity, university type and study abroad yielded 
fascinating results. In this panel, nevertheless, none of the models yield a relationship 
between tested rank knowledge in China and studying abroad plans. For university type, 
there is a powerful effect for those in the 985 and 211 universities in knowing their 
national ranking when compared to those in local colleges, when accounting for all other 
independent variables (both p<.001). There is no association between local and regional 
institutions. These findings are parallel to the entire Domestic Panel. When switched to 
211 as the comparison, these students are more likely to know their national rank than all 
other tiers.  
There are few demographic associations in the Panel A, when adjusting for all 
variables in the model. Sophomores compared to freshmen were more likely to accurately 
know their university ranking (p<.01 in all models). Though, this effect does not hold, as 
students stay longer at a university, because upperclassmen do not show any differences 
to freshmen in this test. Education majors, compared to those in social sciences, are less 
likely to know their domestic university ranking (p<.05 in all models). Unlike with 
familiarity with ranking, there are no associations in any of the models between parental 
education and the tested ranking knowledge. The same patterns with demographics hold 
across the first three models. When I changed the reference group to science, there are no 





Table 6.3: Binomial Logistic Regression of the Effect of Demographics and Ranking-Related 
Characteristics on Students Knowing their University Rankings  
 Panel A: Domestic Ranking Panel B: Global Ranking 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Rank-related        
Importance of Rank       
      Somewhat 0.69 0.65 0.86 1.35 1.31 1.39 
      Very  0.90 0.85 1.18 1.51 1.45 1.58 
Education news 0.97 0.92 1.00 0.96 0.91 0.84 
Rank info sources 0.82*  0.84 1.10  1.11 
Familiarity with 
Rankings 
      
     Not so 0.85 0.85  1.49* 1.43*  
     Unfamiliar  0.85 0.83  1.86** 1.70*  
University Type       
     Regional 1.02 1.08 1.31 0.75 0.72 0.51 
     211 10.0*** 10.5*** 11.5*** 0.36* 0.34** 0.37 
     985 4.37*** 4.57*** 4.97** 0.60 0.59 0.26** 
Study abroad  1.00 0.98 0.89 1.14 1.20 1.05 
       
Demographics        
Gender (Male) 0.90 0.89 0.85 1.04 1.03 1.02 
Parental Edu.       
     High school 1.17 1.18 0.91 1.35 1.31 1.40 
     Some college 1.05 0.99 1.17 1.71* 1.66* 1.56 
     College degree 1.38 1.33 1.04 1.48 1.48 1.38 
     Grad school 1.08 0.99 0.83 1.64 1.70 1.49 
Region       
     Central 1.12 1.13 1.30 0.99 0.99 0.92 
     Northeast 0.76 0.73 0.75 1.42 1.45 1.35 
     West 1.40 1.39 1.48 1.14 1.20 1.11 
     Other 0.70 0.82 1.00 0.71 0.85 0.48 
Grade level       
     Sophomores 2.07** 2.04** 2.65** 1.49+ 1.45 1.83* 
     Upperclassmen 1.03 1.04 1.01 1.57* 1.49 2.25** 
Major       
     Social Science 1.38 1.35 1.24 0.64* 0.65* 0.65 
     Education 0.46* 0.46* 0.34* 1.06 1.10 0.76 
       
Other Rank       
Source Type       
    Media  2.02   1.84*  
    Friends  0.79   1.16  
    Universities   0.90   1.39+  
    Family  1.01   0.55*  
    Professors  0.62*   1.04  
Specific Rankings       
     ARWU   1.28   0.75 
     THE   1.37   1.12 
     QS   1.36   1.94* 
     US News   1.05   1.24 
     CUAA   1.14   0.64* 
     CEC   1.02   1.00 
     Webometrics   1.34   0.74 
     Other   1.44   0.29* 
       
Constant  0.26* 0.15* 0.10** 0.75 0.56 2.16 
Pseudo R2 0.17 0.17* 16.5 0.06 0.07 0.08 
n 924 924 689 924 924 698 
* = p<.05; ** = p<.01; *** = p<.001; + =  p<.051 
Omitted reference groups: importance of rank = not important; parental education = below high school degree; region = east coast; 
grade level = freshmen; major = hard science; university type = local 
Note: Models reported in odds ratios.   
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The global model yields some counters to the previous panel. First, the ranking 
familiarity background did yield a relationship in Models 4 and 5 of this panel, 
accounting for all controls. In opposition to conventional wisdom, students who were not 
too familiar with rankings were more likely to know their global university ranking 
compared to those who self-reported familiarity to rankings (p<.05). The same pattern 
holds true for those who considered themselves as completely unfamiliar with rankings 
(p<.01). Because this result was quite surprising, I double-checked the data and survey to 
make sure it was not accidentally reverse-coded. The data was correct. In a visualization 
of this pattern, Fig. 6.2 displays the estimated predicated probabilities for the actual 
knowing ranking for the various levels of ranking familiarity, holding all the other 
variables in the model at their means. In this scenario, students had about a 70% 
probability of knowing their university rank if they self-identified as unfamiliar with 
rankings, compared to about 56% for those who said they were familiar with rankings, 
which was the lowest of the three categories. While the domestic results for students 
scored relatively better in knowledge of national ranking, there is little difference 
amongst all the groupings. 
The other ranking-related characteristics add quite diverse effects in this relationship. 
Though, ranking importance and educational news viewing still did not produce statically 
relationships. And while number of ranking sources was similarly flat in Models 4 and 6, 
the breakdown of this variable in Model 5 yielded differing findings. Students that listed 
media as a source for ranking information are about 1.8 times as likely to correctly know 
their global ranking, when controlling for demographic and rank-related features (p<.05). 
Conversely, students that reported information from family members were almost half as 
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likely to correctly identify their global ranking, using the same controls (p<.05). For the 
test of specific rank schemes in Model 6, adjusting for all independent variables in the 
model, students that had heard of CUAA, a domestic ranking, and other rank sources 
were less likely to correctly know their international university league table position 
(p<.05). Inversely, students that knew the QS ranking scheme were almost twice as likely 
to accurately know their university’s global position (p<.05). None of the other specific 
schemes produce a statistically significant relationship in these models.  
Figure. 6.2: Estimated Adjusted Probabilities of Knowing University Ranking By Student 
Familiarity with Ranking  
 
Source: Results from statistical analysis of student survey data of this research.  
 
There were other crucial rank-related relationships in Panel B. But, study abroad 
again disappointedly did not yield an association to ranking knowledge. For university 
type, only 211 universities yielded a relationship in the full models of 4 and 5, as these 
students were less likely to correctly guess their global rank, including all the adjusted 
controls (p<.05; p<.01). In rearranging the reference, I found that 211 students had no 
differences between 985 respondents in this relationship, but proved less adept at 
guessing their global rank than the other lower tiers. The partial Model 6 does show other 
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differing associations, but this discards too many respondents to interpret this specific 
variable.  
The demographic independent variables in the Panel B yield some differing results 
from the previous domestic models. However, there are just as few relationships between 
the demographic and this outcome. Science students compared to social science majors 
are more likely to know their global university ranking in Models 4 and 5, when 
accounting for all demographics and rank controls (p<.05). Students with parents that 
have some college are more likely to know their college rank than students with parents 
at the low end of the educational spectrum (p<.05). However, the other levels of 
education did not yield any associations in these models.  
Figure. 6.3: Estimated Adjusted Probabilities of Knowing University Ranking By Students in 
Various University Types 
 
Source: Results from statistical analysis of student survey data of this research.  
 
To better understand how university type works with this relationship, Fig. 6.3 
illustrates the estimated adjusted probabilities of knowing university rankings given all of 
the other characteristics are set to their mean. In the global comparison, local and regional 
university students have much greater probabilities of accurately knowing their university 
ranking (72% and 66% respectively), while 211 and 985 students falter in domestic 
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knowledge (48% to 61% respectively). However, this effect is reversed for the domestic 
setting. Students in local and regional universities are not very likely to correctly identify 
their national score (both 15%). Conversely, the elite 211 and 985 Project respondents 
correctly identified their domestic position at a rate of 65% and 43%. These differences 
help to understand how ranking forces are altered through contextual prisms at a local 
level.  
 
Conclusion and Discussion  
University rankings have had adverse and unintended effects on higher education 
across the globe. It is impossible to truly quantify the complexity of an entire university 
and the process decontextualizes local settings, standardizing one vision. The narrowly 
defined metrics used by the various schemes simplify the process for those who lack 
detailed knowledge. The general public, especially students and parents, crave this kind 
of commensurate information (Hazelkorn, 2015). Applicants modify their behavior based 
on advice from league tables, such as culling a list of potential universities or determining 
the entire selection process based on a single digit (Gong & Huybers, 2015). Powerful 
university presidents and their entire organizations are forced to adhere to these standards 
because outsiders use them.  
In China, reverence to university rankings is quite prevalent, especially at the elite 
end of the spectrum. However, the local contextualization for the Chinese case differs 
from Western societies, refracting the effects that rankings have on students. For one, 
universities located on the east coast and in major cities have an advantage because these 
locales account for the most economic opportunities and students flock to these areas. In 
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the same vein, many of the best universities are located in these regions: 985 universities 
are the most competitive, followed by the 211 universities, and both sets are clustered in 
these competitive areas. For the gaokao, the college entrance exam, scores to get into 
these elite institutions are unimaginable. Despite important local factors, nonetheless, 
both global and national rankings still have an impact on the sector.    
In this study, one exploration focused on the familiarity of Chinese undergraduates to 
university rankings. Overall, students in my sample were not as attuned to ranking as I 
had expected. Clearly, other factors, such as location, major, and teaching, were even 
more considerable influences in this decision than league tables. Less than half of the 
respondents considered rankings as an important aspect to their college selection, 
approximately half as few as the leading characteristics—teaching, major, and careers. 
Yet, past research has already proven that these other conventional characteristics are 
indeed crucial in education (see Wang, 2011; Liu & Morgan, 2015; Sheng, 2017), and the 
disparity in ranking resonance has been overlooked. Exploring why and how different 
types of individuals experience rankings will further push the understanding of 
localization of these global forces.   
In more in-depth analysis of self-assessed ranking familiarity through multinomial 
logistic regression, the set of rank-related independent variables mostly showed some 
kind of associations in this relationship, even more predictive than individual 
demographic characteristics. In accordance to past literature, students prepared to study 
abroad were found to be much more familiar to rankings. Similarly, students with more 
educated parents, were also expectedly more familiar with these league tables, which 
indicates that the more affluent families are paying more attention to these elite status 
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symbols. Though, the importance of rankings in the college-going decision was an 
uneven predictor of familiarity, without a clear trend across the degrees of importance. 
This uncovered disconnect could help to explain why many students could not accurately 
guess their universities’ ranking, adding to the critique of self-assessments (Spector, 
1994).    
Through knowledge testing, a large portion of students did actually know their global 
ranking, but this pattern was less pronounced when asked about the domestic rank. 
Numerous local contextualizations predict how well a student did on this self-assessment, 
compounded by the global and local intersections. One of the most powerful predictors 
came from university type. Because the steep hierarchy in China is highly ingrained in 
the higher education sector, students in either 211 or 985 universities could clearly 
interpret their perceived domestic rank compared to their lower tier counterparts. Thus, 
these systems could be considered de facto rankings, with 985s as roughly the top-40 and 
the 211s roughly the top-100. The regional or local institutions had no such reference, 
which meant that these students misinterpreted their national league table position.  
This test on the global scale provides the reverse story. Students from regional and 
local universities faired much better in this self-assessment. None of these institutions are 
actually ranked globally and most of them are quite domestically focused. Thus, these 
respondents could easily choose unranked globally in an accurate reflection. While the 
trend is changing, the other elite Chinese universities are also mostly completely 
unranked, especially 211 institutions. But, there are more 985 institutions slowly moving 
up in all global ranking schemes, as illustrated through QS in an earlier section. These 
institutions also have an intense focus on international outreach as part of governmental 
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plans and administrative strategies. It is no wonder that students in these universities have 
a more accurate imprinted awareness of the global sector compared to 211 students. 
Conversely, 211 universities lag behind their more elite counterparts and do not share the 
same global pushes from the central government. Even as these international strategies 
are probably present from the administration, the reality is that this group of domestic 
elite universities are not globally elite. Hence, considering these factors, these 211 
respondents have overinflated their position in the global hierarchy as a reflection of their 
higher standing domestically.  
China’s rapidly changing system is ripe for further exploration in the global and local 
intersections of rankings. Technically, the 985 and 211 Projects ended in 2015, but their 
institutionalization is still clearly felt. The new elite-making strategy from the central 
government is called Double First Class, but the new plan has essentially repackaged the 
former projects into a singular plan, mostly keeping the old hierarchies intact. This new 
project, though, goes beyond targeting the entire university as world-class and adds an 
additional focus on creating world-class disciplines. I speculate that, with the increased 
and targeted investment, even more Chinese universities will rise in the global league 
tables. This rise should alter the conceptions in the local contextualization of global 
pressures from rankings. Potentially, once the Chinese system has global recognition as a 
whole, the institutions could turn to an inward focus on the domestic setting, similar to 
the sector in the US.  
Another area that should be explored in this is with rankings portrayed in popular 
media. Seemingly, students only have surface level knowledge of rankings, despite the 
professed importance. If this is the case, then it is worth discovering how students 
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actually learn about rankings. My study only grazed this area of inquiry with the 
educational news viewing, ranking sources, and specific ranking independent variables. 
Students are getting information from these sources, but my prediction is that most 
sources lack substance in the reporting. A further examination of each of these items 
could unite higher education research with work being done on media portrayals of other 
sectors, such as ILSAs and policy references.  
Finally, despite all of the focus on rankings and their effects on the sector, students in 
the sample mostly displayed a discount between actual rank scores and the assessments 
of their universities. This study provides hints at why this happens, such as local and 
individual refractions, but cannot fully explain the process. Perhaps, once a student 
actually finalizes the college-going decision process and joins a university, they move 
from an outsider, who relies on external evaluation, to an insider, who relies on more 
contextual of the institution. They gain hyper-local contextualization from all their 
experiences. Even an international student from across the world can begin to understand 
a university’s culture once they have arrived. The ranking becomes less important, unlike 
all the other pull factors that brought the student in the first place, such as career and 
major. These changes and disconnects need to further be explored to help understand the 
alleviation of rankings as a force on higher education.  
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CHAPTER 7: Research Implications and the Future of University Rankings in 
China and the World  
How did people compare domestic universities before 1983? How about before 
2003 for international comparison? Today, it seems almost unimaginable not to have 
league tables in higher education, as they have become engrained into every sector 
across the world, and continue to proliferate deeper into sectors—there are even 
community college rankings now. Educators cannot escape these ranking metrics.  
Universities across the world must play the ranking game because students, parents, 
policymakers, and other stakeholders demand it information, audits, and 
accountability through simple commensuration.  
The history of university rankings is relatively brief compared to how much 
impact these metrics have had across the world in such a short span of time. In 1983, 
US News & World Report first published its popular ranking issue that went on to 
dominate American higher education (Rust & Kim, 2015). Similar domestic 
university rankings have proliferated to other systems across the world. Educators and 
university stakeholders have decried these kinds of league tables for their adverse 
effects on education (see Bok, 2003; Ehrenberg, 2005; Volkwein & Gruing, 2005). 
Nonetheless, students, parents, and even policymakers are paying attention to 
institutional rank position, often using the league tables in decision-making (Bastedo 
and Bowman, 2009; Gong & Huybers, 2015; Yudkevich et al., 2015; Hazelkorn, 
2015). Universities then have been forced to acquiesce to the narrow metrics 
established by the ranking agencies through a vicious cycle: Institutions or 
departments with missions that fall outside of the scope of the given schemes, such as 
	 203 
a focus on diversity over prestige, are penalized in metrics, leading to a drop in score. 
Stakeholders negatively react to any drop, forcing university leaders to alter policies. 
These pressures have led to a normalization, or isomorphism, of universities across 
the world, driving them to look more and more similar; though, as I have illustrated in 
this research, local characteristics still are important in this standardization process.   
Two decades after the first US News ranking was released, the first relevant global 
ranking was founded by Shanghai Jiao Tong University in 2003. ARWU changed the 
world, and, soon after, other important global rankings popped up around in Europe 
and in the US, including the THE and QS ranking schemes. In 2007, global university 
rankings were still considered in their “infancy” stage (Salmi & Saroyan, 2007). 
Now, only a decade and a half later, there is a firmer grasp of the effects that these 
indicators are having on higher education; yet, in relative terms, this phenomenon is 
still an adolescent, not even twenty years old. Their imprint will still need to be 
monitored for generations to come. These global rankings carry all of the same 
critiques as their domestic counterparts, with strong standardization effects on 
universities worldwide (Hazelkorn, 2015; Marginson, 2017). International students, 
universities, and policymakers all look to these rankings for sense-making in a 
complex system of global higher education.  
My study considered both global and local rankings in China through research 
that had been done on the topic within the country and in others, especially in the US. 
Through this review of literature, I established a cycle for rankings impact higher 
education globally, as displayed on Fig. 7.1 and first introduced in Chapter 2. In the 
model, university ranking agencies define the criteria for the ranking metric, usually 
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comprised of research, university characteristics, and reviews. While in the US 
private sector ranking agencies have dominated higher education, this research 
explored beyond private industry to include governmental rankings. The actors 
impacted by rankings—students, governments, peer groups, and university 
employees—all have diverse reactions to these ranking metrics depending on the 
sector, but also must acquiesce to specific standards determined by the schemes. This 
research focused on the students and academics/ administrators in China, offering a 
viewpoint for balancing reverence for both domestic and global rankings. Finally, the 
universities themselves react as institutions to the listed set of actors, as these actions 
cycle back to the rankings measured through their various metrics, such as increased 
research capacity or numbers of international students.  
Figure 7.1: Model for Reactions to University Rankings 
 
Source: Synthesized by the author using ranking literature.  
The Model for Reactions to University Rankings is useful and flexible for 
studying rankings throughout the world. While this study focused on elite Chinese 
universities, reactions to rankings can be understood through this theoretical model in 
any sector and level of higher education, as rankings and audit culture has permeated 
to the global elite research universities, down to local colleges. Like the differences 
found in this study between China compared the US or the West, there will be 
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variations depending on local contexts and domestic features. Yet, the model can be 
adapted and tested to further push the understanding of rankings throughout the world 
and in various settings. This study focused on China and, indeed, has revealed some 
differences from the more commonly studied societies in regards to rankings, namely 
the United States, where much of the theoretical groundwork was first laid.    
 
Chinese Higher Education and Rankings  
The founding of the ARWU launched the global ranking craze that has changed 
sectors across the world. This development in education is one of the few to have 
originated outside of the Western world, which is sometimes lost in research on this 
topic (see Shahjahan et al., 2017). In retrospect, it is logical that global ranking 
emerged in China before anywhere else because of specific set of convergences in the 
nation. First, Chinese society has held historical reverence for rankings and metrics 
through Confucian hierarchies, most notably in education through the Imperial 
Examinations system (Hofstede & Bond, 1988). Further, the use of indicators for 
decision-making has been a key aspect of CCP governance since the nation’s 
founding in 1949 (Hayhoe, 1989; Lü, 2000). In more recent decades, the move 
towards technocratic pragmatism in the management of the country has only 
increased the importance of metrics and rankings in the nation; and, in the past few 
decades, Chinese leaders and policymakers have emphasized catching up to the West 
in science, research, and education (Lü, 2000.). Neoliberal ideas borrowed from the 
West were injected into Chinese society that already had a reverence for aspects of 
the audit culture (Mok and Lo, 2007). A common metric for measuring progress 
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compared to the US and other education powers was a logical step given the national 
history of rankings in Chinese culture, recent CCP strategy, and the convergence of 
aspects of neoliberalism.  
In China, higher education institutions and actors are all highly attuned to 
rankings, especially at the elite level, but the attention to these metrics has only been 
magnified because of the mentioned reverence for indicators. Most universities 
appear to be making a push to move up in some sort of league table or hierarchy 
either domestically or globally, and in both for the top of the sector. In my study, I 
was able to travel throughout China to meet with a wide variety of actors in the higher 
education system, with a special focus on the elite end of Chinese higher education. 
Fostering elite universities has been especially of interest to the Chinese government 
in recent years and there is no doubt that these national elite institutions want to be 
elite globally, a desire that is backed by the government (Song, 2017). These top end 
universities have sought international recognition and world-class status, giving 
impetus for the study and its focus.  
A key finding from the study uncovered the use of ranking metrics in the world-
class university conception by decision-makers in Chinese universities. Through the 
interviews, it was revealed that rankings have provided a key metric for this status in 
China. Specifically, being in the top-100 can be seen as a type of credential for 
Chinese universities. These results mirror the top-25 impact that has been discovered 
with domestic rankings in the US (Bowman & Bastedo, 2009). Yet, the international 
higher education sector is even more difficult to comprehend than domestic sectors 
where actors have more familiarity. For instance, ascertaining which universities have 
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obtained world-class is almost impossible without clear metrics because there is no 
clear definition, which has opened the opportunity for rankings to provide 
commensurate criteria to decision-makers. Because there is no agreed upon 
definition, people have chosen the proxy of a ranking to make sense of the complex 
global higher education environment. These tools are seen as transparent and 
scientific, meaning they provide a perceived object value to measure world-class 
status similar to reports in the West (Porter, 1996). In Chinese universities, as 
international students, scholars, and partnerships increase and become the norm on 
campus, these metrics will only continue to be used by actors, such as administrators, 
professors, and leaders.  
In another important finding in the research, these elite Chinese institutions in the 
study have displayed clear striving behaviors as described by O’Meara (2007), 
chasing university rankings in order to gain prestige. The striving model was 
originally conceived for the US domestic higher education sector and few studies 
have looked beyond the United States or considered striving from a global 
perspective. However, O’Meara’s work remains a useful framework when 
considering Chinese universities’ ambitions internationally and the world-class 
conception. There are some features that are germane to the Chinese case. Unlike in 
the US with the Ivy League, within the established Global Striving Model that I have 
adapted for the study of China, the only two institutions that mirror adorations and 
emulation the likes of Harvard or Yale are Tsinghua University and Peking 
University. Not concerned for domestic rankings but rather only global rankings, 
these two institutions have been recognized as the top of the sector, and are rapidly 
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gaining international acclaim. Despite both being in the C9 League, the other seven 
members of this grouping do not carry the same cachet in China as the Ivy League 
does in the US. Instead, these universities, along with the other 985 and 211 
universities, still jockey for domestic rankings, while also coveting global rankings. 
Other regional institutions still strive in this model, but only for domestic ranking 
prestige. Likewise, global ambitions should be considered in this model when 
analyzing China, as international rankings like QS have clear impact on the sector. 
The international angle has also not been explored in regards to US universities, but it 
might simply be missing from inquiry into the American system, and future studies 
should further test these ambitions in the sector, especially for its elite universities.  
With all the focus on institutional reaction to rankings, the intended audience for 
rankings can easily be lost: these rankings are largely made for students. If students 
were not attuned to rankings, universities would likely ignore these indicators. The 
reality is that students are highly invested in university league tables, craving 
information because of the steep investment and centrality of a college degree. In my 
study, I actually tested student knowledge of rankings, which is the first of its kind 
ever conducted. Somewhat surprisingly, there was a disconnect between what 
students knew and what the reality of the league tables, depending on the background 
of the student. Students from the very elite universities could understand their 
domestic position, but faltered on the test of their global position on the rankings. 
Hazelkorn (2015) has posited that students do not need to rely on their local rankings 
as much because they have more expertise in a sector through experience. Rightly, 
respondents already in the elite 985 or 211 universities could roughly understand their 
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position as being in the top-50 or top-100, but students in these non-elite institutions 
had no such marker and fared worse in this test. Conversely, while many Chinese 
universities have not been ranked globally, 985 and 211 university students wrongly 
thought that they had been, likely due to the global outlook that these universities 
have. Connecting with the research on global striving, 985 and 211 universities have 
been chasing both domestic and international prestige, while regional and local 
universities are not. The new Global Striving Model aligns with the results of my 
student study because the elite university students are getting global signals, even as 
their institutions are not ranking yet.     
Another crucial aspect that emerged from the research was the reverence for 
domestic rankings and indicators from the government, which was a decisive 
consideration for all the actors in the study. The Chinese government has strict central 
control compared to the American sector. In the latter, a private business magazine 
has completely altered the sector, forcing institutions to change missions, hiring 
decisions, student admission policies, among others. There are some relations 
between these domestic Chinese patterns and to the global rankings, as universities 
are similarly chasing metrics related to these league table criteria. However, instead 
of private enterprise driving these decisions in China, it is the strong central 
government pressuring for change. Furthermore, the Ministry of Education’s 
discipline ranking is directly tied to institutional funding as measured by a multitude 
of indicators, such as research output, awards, and reputation. Academics and staff 
are keenly aware of these incentives, which consume more of their institutional 
anxiety than private rankings. Even students in the elite government project 
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universities, which have dominated the MoE’s ranking, were dramatically different 
compared to their counterparts in terms of ranking familiarity and knowledge. 
Additionally, the Chinese government pushed for lofty global ambitions, and some of 
the MoE’s ranking indicators have aligned with metrics in international league tables. 
Even the new World Class 2.0 Project, which has replaced the 985 and 211 Projects, 
has incorporated ranking-like attributes, as universities can now fall down or rise to 
differentiated bands within the system. Importantly, the criteria measured by the 
international ranking systems do not run counter to the CCP’s goals, as the two are in 
lockstep together: for instance, the intense focus on hard sciences and overall research 
output. Because of this symmetry, it is advantageous for Chinese universities to 
simultaneously push global ranking ambitions and domestic progress together 
because there are considerable overlaps and no contradictions right now.   
 
Future Research on Rankings and Chinese Education   
A New Era in China? 
There has been an explicit push to catch up to the West, emphasizing a range of 
internationalization efforts (Mok & Chan, 2008). However, while international 
ranking pressures are quite fierce on the Chinese sector, there are also powerful 
localization refractions taking place. The Party and the central government still play a 
supreme role in policies and organization for education in China. The incentives for 
these universities are to strive through boosts in research capacity, recruitment of 
international students and faculty, and establishment of partnerships with the elite 
abroad, which directly and indirectly lead to rises in the rankings. Right now, the 
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CCP has pursued a plan of global eminence in higher education, with the goals 
mostly aligning to the ranking metrics, such as putting an emphasis on research 
output and pursuing international students. Perhaps, in the future, if the government 
turns inward, the pressures of global university rankings will be muted, while 
domestic counterparts amplified.  
Potentially, as Chinese universities become leaders in the global hierarchy, the 
domestic sector could turn more inwards, shedding the catch-up mentality that has 
driven the sector since the 1980s. There are hints that this inward push could happen 
in the near future, making the system more similar to that of American universities, 
with less focus on internationalization. President Xi’s recent declaration for more 
Chinese tradition in education and growing international censorship could signal that 
the sector is reaching a new era (Song, 2017), one that is not defined by globalism 
and instead by a new Chinese introspection. This kind of turn happened in Japan from 
the 1980s to the 1990s, as the higher education strengthened and solidified. China 
might be on the cusp of something similar. If that happens, there will be global 
reverberations. Chinese students will likely stop going abroad; the numbers of 
international students will level off and then dive. We will see a “peak” Chinese 
student population. It could already be happening now, as growth rates are already in 
decline.  
I saw in China that institutions are already using the rankings, and with 
connections to policymakers globally, Chinese universities can already point to these 
signals as their recognition increases. Just as the literature suggests, stakeholders in 
other countries will use these metrics in decision-making, giving reverence to Chinese 
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universities as an example of “best practices” (Steiner-Khamsi & Stolpe, 2006). 
Chinese institutions will continue to move up the perceived international hierarchy 
because their policymakers are playing the ranking game, and the rest of the world is 
playing, too. The forces from the ranking metrics will help to standardize Chinese 
universities with others across the world, to societies and institutions looking to make 
a similar jump in global recognition. The rapid rise of Chinese universities is ripe for 
emulation, even if there are considerable critics in the West. Scholars should seriously 
consider how Chinese institutions are perceived in nations around the world, 
especially in the Global South and vis-à-vis the West, with a keen focus on the 
importance of rankings to these other sectors.  
 
Issues of Academic Freedom  
One issue that I did not address in this research was issues related to intellectual 
freedom. Challenges to this ideal have been ranging in recent years, as the Chinese 
government has clamped down on academic freedom at the same as the international 
rise chronicled in this research. Altbach (2016) provided critique of the intense 
Chinese governmental focus on international recognition, saying that the nation’s 
elite universities would eventually hit a glass ceiling due to an overbearing central 
government and a lack of academic freedom. He argued that moving up in the 
rankings would not provide Chinese institutions with true elite status because of these 
barriers with academic freedom. While this study did not have a focus of academic 
freedom, the issue did arise during some of the interviews and my travels in China 
and warrants further consideration.  
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In recent years, instead of simply copying Western institutions, Chinese 
universities have made concerted overtures to carve domestic identities, even while 
keeping global standards. In 2016, at the National Conference on Ideological and 
Political Work in Universities, Chinese President Xi Jinping declared that a shift in 
policy was needed in the creation of “world class universities” with “Chinese 
characteristics” (as cited in Song, 2017). Ngok and Guo (2008) noted that top Chinese 
scholars have argued that academic freedom can be part of this equation of global 
success with local “spirit” (p. 549). Though, Marginson  (2014b) and Zha (2012) both 
contended that the concept of academic freedom has different meaning in China than 
in the West, the former connecting closer to national interests or support, rather than 
an independent critical inquiry of the latter. I heard similar echoes during my 
interviews and other interactions in China.  
The moves to decrease Western influence have actually been part of a longer 
trend in Chinese policy to root out perceived subversive behavior. In a famous 
example pertaining to education, Document Number Nine was a high-level Party 
directive leaked in 2013 outlining "Western principles" that were seen as “anti-
China,” as quoted by the ChinaFile. Subsequent moves by the CCP to curb liberal 
ideals counter to the Party line have been seen throughout the educational sector. For 
instance, some high profile controversies arose in 2017 when publishers of top 
academic journals, such as Nature and the China Quarterly, were pressured to censor 
their sites in China, according to multiple media reports from the New York Times. In 
perhaps no coincidence, Nature has been quite revered in the Chinese higher 
education sector (Tian et al., 2016). These kinds of cases show the clear consternation 
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between the expectations of academic freedom and Chinese higher education. I must 
note, though, that the Hanban, an affiliate of the Chinese government, funded my 
project and that there was never an inkling of academic intervention into my research. 
In fact, once I arrived in China, the Hanban simply gave me the funds and I almost 
never heard from them again. The operations of the Hanban have gotten considerable 
attention in recent years and have been attacked as a propaganda tool of the CCP. 
These critiques certainly should be further explored.  
The issue of academic freedom in China warrants more research, especially as the 
government gains more influence across the world. In future studies, I would like to 
further explore how the strict rules and censorship impact international ambitions and 
research. Academics have already pointed to self-censorship as a strong controlling 
tool of the CCP. Businesses, publications, and educators often are aware of the off-
limit issues and avoid them without heavy-handed involvement from the government. 
There is a possibility that this practice is happening at its universities, as academics 
publish in journals or choose international research partners. Future studies should 
attempt to understand how self-censorship has driven a focus on items that are 
politically harmless, possibly driving the sciences while squeezing the humanities or 
social sciences. The former being safe from political no-go areas while the latter is 
filled with theoretical landmines.  
 
More Competition, More Pressure, More Cheating  
With the Chinese penchant for indicators and ranking metrics, there have been 
accounts of deceptive practices in various historical Chinese eras, such as with the 
	 215 
impossible expectations of yields during the CCP’s early days of central planning 
(Lü, 2000). In recent years, with the dual pressures of global ambitions and central 
government demands, there have reports of cheating and gaming the system 
throughout the higher education sector. Controversy has arisen from the retraction of 
published research from Chinese academics in highly selective journals, which had 
been completely fabricated (Lin, 2013; Cyranoski, 2017).     
While my study did not yield any direct accounts of cheating due to pressures 
from rankings, there were reports of gaming the system in order to produce better 
results for the institution. For instance, I heard accounts of some bureaucratic 
maneuvers to move research from professors in a department with little chance of 
being ranked to a department that could be ranked; or asking foreign professors to 
publish in areas that they did not have expertise simply to boost department output. 
Because institutions know the ranking criteria, there is incentive to funnel resources 
or change policy to promote growth in these areas, which has been a key critique of 
ranking impact. What the rankings measure becomes important, while everything else 
falls to the wayside, such as community impact or diversity missions (see Espeland 
and Sauder, 2007). This gaming of the numbers is not considered cheating—though, 
it is chided by academics—it does raise concern that pressures are so extreme that 
they foster more scrupulous behaviors.  
The incentives to cheat in the rankings are numerous and the practice is difficult 
to catch because universities themselves report their numbers to the agencies, even in 
the case of the Ministry ranking. Yet, gaming the system or cheating the rankings is 
not just a Chinese problem; indeed, the United States has had its own issues in 
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fraudulent practices related to league tables, most recently with falsifying numbers by 
Temple University to gain a boost to its MBA’s ranking, according to reporting from 
Inside Higher Ed. The Chinese system, though, brings extra burdens that could result 
in more pressures to cheat. Publishing research in English journals that are indexed in 
the indices counted by the rankings is a difficult proposition for many academics. 
Yet, the so-called SSCI Syndrome is rampant among Chinese universities, with steep 
rewards for publishing in these journals. It is easy to see how a scholar in China could 
fall behind if they do not have the language skills to publish internationally. Likewise, 
the MoE’s discipline ranking is critical to many top departments and institutions 
because the results are tied to funding. An ideal ranking allows departments to stay on 
top or move up in the national hierarchy through expansion of resources. The rich get 
richer in this reward structure. Furthermore, the new World Class 2.0 should only 
exacerbate the pressures, as the project contains a mechanism for universities to fall 
out or move up in the various bands, as opposed to the 985 and 221 Projects that were 
static. The prospects of falling out or joining the elite are only going to increase 
burdens placed upon academics to produce and for administrators to find those that 
can. Within this environment, I predict that there will only be even more cheating 
scandals uncovered in the coming decade.  
Researchers should keep a keen eye on how faculty and administrators survive 
within a competitive environment, including to matters related to mental health, 
predatory journals, and academic poaching, which have not been fully explored in 
literature related to China. Campbell and O’Meara’s (2013) Faculty Perspective 
Framework, first discussed in Chapter 2, provides a model that could be expanded to 
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the case of China. With the duel pressures pushing from local and global forces, 
actors within the sector could be at risk for issues related to mental health. I heard 
many young academics and doctoral students during my fieldwork talk of dread and 
depression that stems from the pressures in Chinese higher education. Similarly, with 
the publish are perish mantra overtaking the academy in China and the world, 
predatory journals have begun to prey on young scholars and non-native English 
speakers with promises of metrics and indices. These low-quality journals mask 
themselves as legitimate operations, but extort money from potential victims in order 
to publish a paper. I predict that this problem will only increase in China and in other 
areas in which rankings are given so much credence. Institutionally, poaching of 
productive and promising academic faculty by the top universities will also increase, 
as funding becomes more and more tied to competition. While doing field research, I 
heard about this practice already, but I could not work it into my interviews given the 
scope and focus of the project. Further, the Chinese government has even created 
some policies to recruit top-level talent from American and European universities 
known as the Thousand Talents Plan (Kim & Allen, 2018). A central goal for this 
plan is to recruit Chinese academics that left China to get an education abroad and 
who have become successful in their fields. The recruits receive significant 
employment packages and other bonuses. Both international and domestic poaching 
should further be explored in relations to university rankings, as the latter provides an 




Connecting University Rankings to ILSAs  
The findings in this research connect higher education and the discourse on ILSAs 
for lower levels of education. International assessments have been powerful policy 
diffusion agents for policymakers around the world in recent decades (Waldow et al., 
2014). Media and other stakeholders in societies worldwide have scandalized the 
results, creating a kind of panic around the education system. Yet, oftentimes, the 
nuances of PISA scores or other tests have been lost in the reporting, which has 
caused the public to misunderstand the meaning or ranking for their nation (Pizmony-
Levy, 2017). Likewise, in my findings from the student survey data, there was 
considerable misinterpretation of university ranking knowledge. In fact, students who 
claimed to be the most familiar actually fared worse when asked their global rank 
score. Given the intense focus on university rankings, understanding the mismatch of 
information by students is imperative. Universities could potentially use the lack of 
ranking knowledge by stakeholders to lessen the normative effects from these outside 
forces.  
These impacts from university rankings should be considered alongside 
international assessments, which have been well studied and theorized. Perhaps, these 
similar forces have not fully been considered together because ILSAs are both more 
granular and national, while university league tables only provide basic institutional 
data. Regardless, they both have similar usages through the continued trend in policy 
by numbers, inculcating local educators, policymakers, and other stakeholders.  
To further bridge research on international testing and university rankings, a 
media analysis of ranking coverage should be conducted. In this kind of data 
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collection, articles relating to university or higher educational specific themes should 
be tracked across time, which can be done through the China Core Newspapers Full-
text Database. Each university that has been mentioned should be coded. The search 
through the database will allow for the creation of a detailed social network map of 
connected peer institutions via article mentions throughout a given timeframe. It will 
be important to gather a sample of articles from before and after the establishment of 
global university rankings to compare the effects that the metrics have had. With a 
dataset of this nature, scandalization or glorification can be identified, along with 
reference societies or universities, similar to studies related to PISA media discourse 
(Waldow et al., 2014).   
Media analyses on university rankings do not have to be limited to Chinese news 
outlets. There has been little research on this kind of exploration in the American 
sector. In fact, reversing the analysis to US media could help to provide 
understanding on how Chinese institutions are perceived in the West. I suspect that in 
recent years, Chinese universities have been pegged as innovators in high tech 
science, such as artificial intelligence and robotics. An eventual ranking shock for 
American higher education via Chinese universities is something that could 
foreseeably happen in the future. A Nation at Risk provided that shock to the states in 
the 1980s, while similar effects have been seen with PISA in recent years. Eventually, 






University rankings have only gotten more important on both the local and global 
sector in recent years. While there are strong standardizations from these metrics, 
every university in the world does not interpret these forces in the exact same manner.   
Researchers must be ready to understand how these forces are being localized by 
institutions, faculty members, and students in order to recognize the variations taking 
place. Likewise, distinctive societies and their policymakers will react in different 
ways. In my study, the Chinese government has co-opted university rankings into the 
elite end of the sector with high profile investment projects. Because of these efforts, 
Chinese universities have been rising in global rankings in recent years, and will 
continue to do so. In other societies, the focus might be on domestic or other types of 
rankings, which should result in divergent behaviors or characteristics.    
Many academics and educators seem to agree that the intense focus on league 
tables is detrimental to education. Even in China, the faculty mostly abhorred the 
pressures from rankings, such as increased publications in English journals, despite 
governmental and institutional efforts. If universities want to loosen the hold from 
ranking agencies, then they must put up a bigger fight. Most global ranking agencies 
have co-opted universities to provide data, except for ARWU, which gathers public 
data. It will take a massive combined alliance of elite universities to opt out of 
helping the ranking agencies. For instance, a band between the Ivy League, Russell 
Group, the U15 in Canada, and elite Chinese universities to reject cooperation with 
agencies would provide a powerful normative effect across the world. If these elite 
groupings abandoned rankings, then other systems around the world would follow.  
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Unfortunately, I do not believe the above strategy is realistic. Universities are 
stuck in a type of prisoner’s dilemma with rankings. Even if some of the best opt out, 
others would likely stay in. Policymakers and university leaders would not simply 
agree with the rejection of these metrics. Likewise, both global and local strivers 
would look to take advantage in order to gain boosts in prestige. In the case of China, 
even as many academics begrudge global rankings, they have a profound reverence 
for the domestic government ranking. The government, too, seems to have co-opted 
rankings as a way to court international prestige, at least for now. Furthermore, 
students would find other outlets for rankings, such as a recent league table produced 
from the career social network LinkedIn. The tech giant wholly owns all if the data it 
uses to produce its ranking. If universities killed US News or QS, another scheme 
would likely rise to fill the void, such as LinkedIn or other social media platforms. 
For the foreseeable future, universities are stuck with university rankings. Thus, we 
must continue to measure their diverse effects onto universities, stakeholders, and the 
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APPENDIX A: IRB Material 
 
Informed Consent for Interviews 
  




INTRODUCTION TO THE RESEARCH: 
You are invited to participate in a research study on Chinese universities and university 
rankings. You are an academic or administrator at a Chinese university and qualify as a 
perspective participant for this research. You will be one of 60 participants nationwide 
who will be participating in this interview. I ask that you read this form before agreeing 
to be in the study. 
 
The study is being conducted by Ryan M. Allen, Doctoral Fellow in the Department of 
International and Comparative Education at Teachers College, Columbia University. I 
have been invited by the Hanban to research in China under the Confucius China Studies 
Fellowship.   
 
The interview consists of five sections. In the first, I will ask about general background 
information about you. The second section explores your general experiences with 
Chinese universities and rankings. In the third section, I will ask specifically about your 
perceptions of universities abroad. The fourth section is about China’s higher education 
investment policies. The last section will allow for any general comments you may have 
about university rankings and Chinese universities. Please remember all responses are 
confidential. 
 
WHY IS THIS STUDY BEING DONE?   
The purpose of this study is to collect data from individuals who are students, faculty, or 
staff at Chinese universities in order to analyze the effects of university rankings. The 
study will allow me to better understand the Chinese higher educational experience and 
to compare it with those in the West, especially in the United States.  
 
WHAT WILL I BE ASKED TO DO IF I AGREE TO TAKE PART IN THIS 
STUDY? 
If you decide to participate, you will be interviewed by myself, the principal investigator. 
During the interview you will be asked to discuss your experience at your university with 
university rankings. This interview will be audio-recorded. The audio-recording will be 
deleted upon transcription of the interview. If you do not wish to be audio-recorded, you 
will/will not be able to participate. The interview will take approximately one hour. You 
will be given a pseudonym or false name/de-identified code in order to keep your identity 
confidential.  
 
RISKS AND BENEFITS: 
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Participation is voluntary, poses no risks and you may stop at any time. You will receive 
no direct benefit from participating in this study. You should feel free to skip any 
questions that do not apply to you or that you are not comfortable answering.  
 
The risk and possible benefits associated with this study are like those in your daily life.  
 
PAYMENTS: 
You will not be paid for participating in the study.  
 
DATA STORAGE TO PROTECT CONFIDENTIALITY: 
I will audio record the interviews but will take specific measures to ensure 
confidentiality. First, only pseudonyms for participants will be used when transcribing 
interview recordings and notes. I will keep a list of names linking each participant to 
his/her pseudonym, and will keep this list in a password-protected folder on my 
computer. The second measure involves audio storage. All audio will be recorded on a 
laptop using the QuickTime app, and then stored on the principal investigator’s computer 
in a password-protected folder. Third, I plan to delete all audio recorded and collected in 
connection with the project once the project has been completed. 
 
TIME INVOLVEMENT: 
Your participation will take approximately 60 minutes, depending on your answers. You 
may also end the interview early if you feel the need to do so.  
 
HOW WILL RESULTS BE USED:  
I cannot anonymously interview participants in this study, as I need to be face-to-face. 
Thus, I will use common research techniques to mask the exact identity of any 
participants by giving them pseudonyms and vague descriptions within the actual 
reporting of the research. For example, I will say a “professor in the sciences at a large 
985 university in Beijing” instead of using an exact name/ university position. 
  
If you have any questions about the questionnaire, you may contact me:  
• Ryan M. Allen, at rma2138@tc.columbia.edu.  
 
If at any time you have comments, or concerns regarding the conduct of the research or 
questions about my rights as a research subject, you should contact the Teachers College, 
Columbia University Institutional Review Board/IRB. The phone number for the IRB is 
+01 (212) 678-4105. Or, you can write to the IRB at Teachers College, Columbia 
University, 525 W. 120th Street, New York, NY, 10027, Box 151. 
 
CONSENT FOR AUDIO AND OR VIDEO RECORDING  
Audio recording is part of this research study. You can choose whether to give 
permission to be recorded. If you decide that you don’t wish to be recorded you will not 
be able to participate in this research study.  
 
______I give my consent to be recorded ____________________________________     
                              Signature                                                                                                                                  
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CONSENT FOR FUTURE CONTACT 
The investigator may wish to contact you in the future. Please initial the appropriate 
statements to indicate whether or not you give permission for future contact for this 
study.  
 
I give permission to be contacted in the future for information relating to this study:  
 
Yes ________________________    





• I have read and discussed the informed consent with the researcher. I have had 
ample opportunity to ask questions about the purposes, procedures, risks and 
benefits regarding this research study.  
• I understand that my participation is voluntary. I may refuse to participate or 
withdraw participation at any time without penalty.  
• The researcher may withdraw me from the research at his or her professional 
discretion if there is a conflict on interest or distressing situation.  
• If, during the course of the study, significant new information that has been 
developed becomes available which may relate to my willingness to continue my 
participation, the investigator will provide this information to me.  
• Any information derived from the research study that personally identifies me 
will not be voluntarily released or disclosed without my separate consent, except 
as specifically required by law.  
• I should receive a copy of the Informed Consent document.  
 
My signature means that I agree to participate in this study 
 














Survey Informed Consent  
  
Principal Investigator: Ryan M Allen, Teachers College, Columbia University, 
rma2139@TC.Columbia.edu 
 
INTRODUCTION TO THE RESEARCH: 
You are invited to participate in a research study on Chinese universities and university 
rankings. You are a students, faculty, or staff at a Chinese university and qualify as a 
perspective participant for this research. You will be one of approximately 1500 
participants nationwide who will be participating in this survey. I ask that you read this 
form before agreeing to be in the study. 
 
The study is being conducted by Ryan M. Allen, Doctoral Fellow in the Department of 
International and Comparative Education at Teachers College, Columbia University. I 
have been invited by the Hanban to research in China under the Confucius China Studies 
Fellowship.   
 
The survey consists of four sections. The first asks for general background information 
about you. The second section explores your general experiences with Chinese 
universities and rankings. The third section asks specifically about your perceptions of 
universities abroad. The last section asks questions about your future plans and for other 
comments. Please remember all responses are anonymous. 
 
WHY IS THIS STUDY BEING DONE?   
The purpose of this study is to collect data from individuals who are students, faculty, or 
staff at Chinese universities in order to analyze the effects of university rankings. The 
study will allow me to better understand the Chinese higher educational experience and 
to compare it with those in the West, especially in the United States.  
 
WHAT WILL I BE ASKED TO DO IF I AGREE TO TAKE PART IN THIS 
STUDY? 
If you agree to participate in the study, you will follow a secure link to an online survey 
that will take approximately 10 minutes to complete.  
 
RISKS AND BENEFITS: 
Participation is voluntary, poses no risks and you may stop at any time. You will receive 
no direct benefit from participating in this study. You should feel free to skip any 
questions that do not apply to you or that you are not comfortable answering.  
 
The risk and possible benefits associated with this study are like those in your daily life.  
 
PAYMENTS: 
You will not be paid for participating in the study. But you will have the option to be 
entered into a lottery for a gift card with a value of 20 RMB.  
 
DATA STORAGE TO PROTECT CONFIDENTIALITY: 
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The questionnaire is completely anonymous. Because your responses are confidential, I 
hope that you will be comfortable being completely honest when answering our 
questions. Data collected in this survey will be stored in password-protected folders on 
my personal computer. In all project publications and presentations that result from this 
research, we will not identify any participants.  
 
TIME INVOLVEMENT: 
Your participation will take approximately 10 minutes, depending on your answers.  
 
HOW WILL RESULTS BE USED:  
The results will be tallied into a database of all respondents. I will use the database to 
look for trends and opinions in the Chinese higher education sector. Since the survey is 
completely anonymous, in the final written report, there will be no names or any other 
identifying information that could be used to pinpoint who participated in the survey.  
 
If you have any questions about the questionnaire, you may contact me:  
• Ryan M. Allen, at rma2138@tc.columbia.edu.  
 
If at any time you have comments, or concerns regarding the conduct of the research or 
questions about you rights as a research subject, you should contact the Teachers College, 
Columbia University Institutional Review Board/IRB. The phone number for the IRB is 
+01 (212) 678-4105. Or, you can write to the IRB at Teachers College, Columbia 




• I have read and discussed the informed consent with the researcher. I have had 
ample opportunity to ask questions about the purposes, procedures, risks and 
benefits regarding this research study.  
• I understand that my participation is voluntary. I may refuse to participate or 
withdraw participation at any time without penalty.  
• The researcher may withdraw me from the research at his or her professional 
discretion if there is a conflict on interest or distressing situation.  
• If, during the course of the study, significant new information that has been 
developed becomes available which may relate to my willingness to continue my 
participation, the investigator will provide this information to me.  
• Any information derived from the research study that personally identifies me 
will not be voluntarily released or disclosed without my separate consent, except 
as specifically required by law.  







 By checking the box, I acknowledge that I have read the information statement 
describing the research on Chinese higher education. 
 




APPENDIX B: Research Sampling Instruments  
 
Interview Protocol Questions 
 
Background: 
1. Tell me about your education / training / background? 
2. Please tell me about your current research or job duties? 
 
Conception:  
1. Which university rankings are you familiar with?  
a. Are these highly influential in China? 
b. Which sectors are concerned with rankings? 
2. How do university rankings affect your research? 
3. How do university rankings affect your teaching? 
4. How do university rankings affect your administrative activities or other duties? 
a. What kind of discussions about the rankings have you had with your 
colleagues, administration, or other officials?  
b. Does the administration have a certain goal for rankings?  
5. Do you think students are concerned about rankings?  
6. What are the biggest problems with the rankings? 
 
World Class and Reference Groups: 
1. How do you define a “world-class university”? 
a. Is there a certain rank that a university must attain to be world class?  
2. Have you ever worked on a joint-project with another university? 
a. Did the institution’s ranking factor into the project? 
3. Is there any university globally that you attempt to emulate?  
4. Do you look at how other nations’ universities are doing in the rankings?  
a. How about just China in general? 
b. Which institutions around the world are your university’s peers? 
 
Chinese Elite-Making: 
1. Can you tell me about the 985/211 projects? 
a. Have they been a success? 
b. Do rankings matter for these intuitions? 
2. How will the change in the projects change things?  
3. Can you tell me about the C9 League?  
a. Does it work similar to the US Ivy League?  
4. Have you seen any other coalitions being created by universities?  
5. Will the new World Class 2.0 project be different than the 985/211 projects? 
 
What if question 
1. What happens on the day the rankings are released?  




3. Is there anything else you think I should know about university rankings at your 
institution or in China? 
 
Snowball: 











































Survey Instrument Questions 
 
Instructions:  
• This interview is geared towards students at universities in China. 
• Students will be asked to complete the survey via Qualtrics 
• It should only take around 10 minutes.  
 
Section One: Demographics: 
1. What is your gender? 
a. Man 
b. Woman 
c. Transgender  
d. Other (ENTER TEXT) 
e. I prefer not to answer 
 
2. Which university do you attend? 
[fill-in the blank] 
 
3. What is your current student status? 
1. Undergraduate 1st year 
2. Undergraduate 2nd year 
3. Undergraduate 3rd year 
4. Undergraduate 4th year 
5e. Graduate Student MA   
6f. Graduate Student PHD 
7g. Visiting student/ Study Abroad  
8h. other_______ 
 
4. What is your major? 
[fill-in the blank] 
 
5. Which is your home province and city? 
[List of all Chinese provinces] 
 
6. What is the highest educational level that either of your parents has attained?  
a. No formal education  
b. Less than high school 
c. High school completed 
d. Some university/college 
e. University/college completed 
f. Post-graduate degree completed 
 
7. How often do you follow stories in the newspaper, radio, TV about what is happening 
in education in this country? 
a. Never  
b. Rarely  
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c. Sometimes 
d. Often  
e. Don't know 
 
Section One: Experiences with Rankings  
1. How familiar are you with university rankings? 
a. Very familiar   
b. Somewhat familiar   
c. Not so familiar   
d. Not familiar at all 
e. Don’t know 
 
1.b If answered ‘a’ or ‘b’, please mark each university ranking that you are familiar with  
a. Academic Ranking of World Universities 
b. Leiden Ranking 
c. Times Higher Education World University Rankings 
d. QS World University Rankings 
e. SCImago Institutions Rankings 
f. U-Multirank 
g. U.S. News & World Report 
h. Chinese University Alumni Association (CUAA) 
i. China Education Center Lt. 
j. Webometrics  
 
2. Where do you get your information on university rankings? (mark all that apply) 
a. Media 
b. university materials 
c. friends/ classmates 
d. parents/ relatives 
e. teachers/ professors 
f. don’t know 
g. don't have any 
 
2.b. If marked media, please list media your often see information about the rankings?  
[Fill in the blank] 
 
3. What do you think is the approximate rank of your university globally? 
a. Top-25  




f. I don’t know 
 
4. What do you think is the approximate rank of your university within China? 






f. I don’t know 
 
5. How important were the following factors into your university selection decision? 











a. Quality of the 
professors  
1 2 3 4 5 
b. University 
ranking 
1 2 3 4 5 
c. 985 or 211 status  1 2 3 4 5 
d. University 
location   
1 2 3 4 5 
e. University 
amenities  
1 2 3 4 5 
f. Job prospects 
after graduation.  
1 2 3 4 5 
g. Had specific 
major you were 
interested in. 
1 2 3 4 5 
h. Other solution 
(ENTER TEXT) 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Section Three: World Class Conceptions  
1. The best universities in China are comparable to the best universities in world? 
a. Strongly agree 
b. Somewhat agree 
c. Nether agree nor disagree  
d. Somewhat disagree 
e. Strongly disagree 
 
2. If you want the best education, it’s important to go to the top ranked universities.  
a. Strongly agree 
b. Somewhat agree 
c. Nether agree nor disagree  
d. Somewhat disagree 
e. Strongly disagree 
 
3. China has some of the best universities in Asia? 
a. Strongly agree 
b. Somewhat agree 
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c. Nether agree nor disagree  
d. Somewhat disagree 
e. Strongly disagree 
 
4. Which non-Chinese university is most comparable to your current university? 
[fill-in the blank] 
 
Future Plans 
1. Do you plan on going abroad to study after graduation? 
a. Yes,  
b. no 
c. maybe 
d. I don’t know 
 
2. (If yes or maybe) How important are the following factors into your university 
selection decision abroad? 











a. Located in the 
West 
1 2 3 4 5 
b. University 
ranking 
1 2 3 4 5 
c. Reputation in 
China 
1 2 3 4 5 
d. Quality of 
professors  
1 2 3 4 5 
e. University 
amenities  
1 2 3 4 5 
f. Has many 
Chinese students   
1 2 3 4 5 
g. You have a 
connection at the 
university 
1 2 3 4 5 
h. Affordable 
tuition 
1 2 3 4 5 
i. Other solution 
(ENTER TEXT) 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
  
